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Introductory note
1. The sixth report on jurisdictional immunities of States
and their property is a continuation of the five successive
reports I already submitted to the International Law Commission. The introductory note in the fifth report on this
topic 2 is still applicable as a practical guide to the present
1 The

five previous reports were: (a) preliminary report, Yearbook . ..
1979, vol. II (Part One), p. 227, document A/CN.4/323; (b) second report,
Yearbook ... 1980, vol. II (Part One), p. 199, document NCN.4/33 I and
Add.l; (c) third report, Yearbook .. . 1981, vol. II (Part One), p. 12, docu1

f

I

~

report, which will cover the remaining exceptions to State
immunity in part III. As an introduction to the substantive
parts of the present report, which will bring the Commission closer to the conclusion of its study and preparation of
mentA/CN.4/340andAdd.l;(d) fourth report, Yearbook .. . 1982. vol. II
(Part One), p. 199, document NCN.4/357; (e) fifth report, Yearbook ...
1983. vol. II (Part One), p. 25, document A/CN.4/363 and Add. I.
2 Document NCN.4/363 and Add. I (see footnote I (e) above). paras.

1-27.

i

55

The practice of States

249-253

;1

.:
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draft articles on the topic, section A below gives the
updated status of the draft articles so far submitted, some
of which have been considered and provisionally adopted,
and indeed further adjusted and revised, while others are
still under active examination by the Drafting Committee,
and yet others have been set aside for the time being for
consideration after the submission of the rest of the draft
articles.
A. Status of the draft articles already submitted
2. To date, 15 draft articles have been submitted to the
Commission in the five reports already considered. Of
these 15 draft articles, the first five are contained in part I,
"Introduction", the second five in part II, "General principles", and the third five in part III, "Exceptions to State
immunity".

1.

PART I. INTRO'lUCTION

3. In part I (Introduction), article 1 (Scope of the present
articles) as provisionally adopted in 1980 3 has been revised
and readjusted so as to confine the scope of the draft
articles more explicitly to "the immunity of one State and
its property from the jurisdiction of the courts of another
State".4

4. Article 2 (Use of terms), as submitted in the second
report of the Special Rapporteur for temporary guidance,
has been partially considered in at least two separate connections. 5 First, following the revision of draft article 1,
limiting the scope of the daft articles, a definition of the
term "court" was introduced in paragraph 1 (a) of
article 2. 6 Secondly, paragraph 1 (f), defining "trading or
commercial activity",7 has been withdrawn and replaced
by the new paragraph 1 (g), defining "commercial contract".8

5. Other terms defined in article 2, paragraph 1,9 have not
been fully considered. The definitions of "immunity" and
"jurisdictional immunities" in former subparagraphs (a)
and (b) are perhaps self-evident and no longer needed. The
definitions of "territorial State" and "foreign State" in
subparagraphs (c) and (d) have been withdrawn and the
technique adopted of referring instead to one State in relation to another State. The definition of "State property"
in subparagraph (e), and paragraph 2 ofthe article, remain
to be considered. New terms may yet be included as consideration of further draft articles progresses.
6. Article 3 (Interpretative provisions) has been partially
considered in connection with the exception of "commercial contracts" as contained in article 12 and defined in
article 2, paragraph 1 (g), already provisionally adopted.
The Commission also provisionally adopted paragraph 2
of article 3, recognizing the use of the "nature test" as well
as the "purpose test" for determining the commercial or
non-commercial character of a contract or transaction. 1o
7. Paragraph 1, giving an illustration of the various elements which constitute a State for the purpose of immunity
and the types of power covered by the expression "jurisdiction" of another State, remains to be considered. I I
8. Article 4 (Jurisdictional inmunities not within the
scope of the present articles) has been briefly discussed in
connection with draft article 15 (Ownership, possession
and use of property), especially its paragraph 3. This
article, as well as article 5 (Non-retroactivity of the present
articles), is still to be considered more fully after the Commission has considered the rest of the draft articles. 12

2.

Ibid .• p. 100; for the commentary. ibid.
7

See footnote 5 above.

"Article 2. Use oj terms
"1. For the purposes of the present articles:
"(g) 'commercial contract' means:

"(i) any commercial contract or transaction for the sale or purchase
of goods or the supply of services;
"(ii) any contract for a loan or other transaction of a financial nature.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

including any obligation of guarantee in respect of any such
loan or of indemnity in respect of any such transaction;
"(iii) any other contract or transaction, whether of a commercial,
industrial, trading or professional nature, but not including a
contract of employment of persons.

"Article 1. Scope oJ the present articles

"Article 2. Use oj terms
"1. For the purposes of the present articles:
"(a) 'court' means any organ of a State, however named, entitled to
exercise judicial functions;

II.

9. Part II (General principles) is all but complete except
for the basic article, article 6 (State immunity), which,
despite its previous provisional adoption, 13 remains to be
re-examined with a view to possible reformulation so as to

"The present articles apply to questions relating to the immunity of
one State and its property from the jurisdiction of another State."
See Yearbook . .. 1980. vol. II (Part Two), p. 141.
"Article 1. Scope oJthepresent articles
"The present articles apply to the immunity of one State and its
property from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State."
See Yearbook . .. 1982. vol. II (Part Two). p. 99; for the commentary, ibid.•
pp.99-l00.
, For the original text of article 2, ibid.. pp. 95-96. footnote 224.

PART

See Yearbook . .. 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 34; for the commentary, ibid..
pp.34-35.
9 See footnote 5 above.
10

"Article 3. Interpretative provisions

"2. In determining whether a contract for the sale or purchase of
goods or the supply of services is commercial, reference should be made
primarily to the nature of the contract. but the purpose of the contract
should also be taken into account if, in the practice of that Statc, that
purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the
contract."
See Yearbook ... 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 35; for the commcntary,
ibid.. pp. 35-36.
II For the text of article 3, see Yearbook. " 1982. vol. II (Part Two),
p. 96, footnote 225.
12 For the texts of articles 4 and 5, ibid.. footnotes 226 and 227.
!3

"Article 6. State immunity

"\. A State is immune from the jurisdiction of [the courts oj]
another State in accordance with the provisions of the present articles.

Jurisdictional immunities of States and their property

give greater satisfaction to the various points of view
expressed. The study and analysis leading to the formulation of draft article 6 have not been seriously challenged,
but its wording requires further improvement and readjustment. There is sufficient general agreement that
immunity is a fundamental principle of international law
supported by the general practice of States. Only its fullest
extent has yet to be more precisely defined. A State is
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another
State. The rest of the draft articles will further clarify,
qualify or modify the scope and extent of the application of
this principle. Final revision of article 6 will therefore have
to await consideration of the remaining draft articles, so as
toallow a more generally accepted restatement of the basic
principle to materialize. 14 In the mean time, it may be
convenient to reaffirm the existence of a basic general
principle of State immunity in article 6 as further elaborated and qualified by other general principles in part II of
the draft articles, to the extent of and subject to the exceptions and limitations contained in part III. As is gradually
becoming increasingly apparent, in each of the particular
areas designated as exceptional, the extent of State immunity is being delineated. In each of these areas, immunity
exists to varying degrees and extent, beyond which no
immunity need be recognized or accorded.
10. Except for article 6 (State immunity), the remaining
four articles of part II (General principles) have been provisionally adopted without too much opposition. Article 7
(Modalities for giving effect to State immunity) 15 was
accepted by consensus subject to final approval of article 6,
since it contains an express reference to State immunity
under article 6. But article 7 covers wider ground than
modalities for fulfilment of the obligation to give effect to
State immunity. It also sets out the. circumstances when a
State is said to be impleaded, whether directly or indirectly,
and the different situations or occasions in which a proceeding not instituted against a State as such is still
regarded as being against a State. Inherent in the provisions
of article 7 is the differentiation between the higher and
lower echelons of bodies forming part of the State or under
its administration or control, and the requirement for acts
to be performed in the exercise of governmental or sovereign authority for State immunity to be extended to
cover agencies and instrumentalities of more remote connection with the central organ or machinery of government. Similarly, representatives of a State are immune
only in respect of acts performed in their representative
capacities and not otherwise, except for diplomatic agents
who are entitled to immunity ratione personae in addition
to their immunity ratione materiae, both of which belong
to the sending State in the ultimate analysis and which can
be waived only by the sending State.
"2. Effect shall be given to State immunity in accordance with the
provisions of the present articles."
See Yearbook . .. 1980. vol. II (Part Two), p. 142; for the commentary,
ibid.• pp. 142 et seq.
14 See Yearbook ... 1982. vol. II (Part Two), p. 100, footnote 239.
Several alternative formulations have been proposed, such as:
"A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another
State except as provided in the present articles"; or " ... except as
provided in articles 12 to 20"; or " ... to the extent and subject to the
limitations provided in the present articles".
IS Ibid.; for the commentary, ibid.• pp. 100 et seq.

9

11. Article 8 (Express consent to the exercise of jurisdiction),16 article 9 (Effect of participation in a proceeding
before a court) \1 and article 10 (Counter-claims) 18 deal
with the various aspects of consent to the exercise ofjurisdiction, expressly given as in article 8, or by conduct such
as participation in a legal proceeding, as in article 9, or the
effect of counter-claims by or against a State, as in article
10. Articles 8 and 9 were provisionally adopted in 1982 and
article lOin 1983, thus completing the provisions on general principles dealing with consent as an important
element in the establishment or application of State immunity.
12. Articles 6 to 10 constitute the general principles of
State immunity and are placed in part II, entitled "General
principles". Should the title be changed to "General provisions", a corresponding change will be needed for part
III, which could read "Extent of State immunity in specified areas" instead of "Exceptions to State immunity".
3.

PART

III. EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY

13. Part III (Exceptions to State immunity) begins with
article 1 J (Scope of the present part) 19 which, as revised by

the Special Rapporteur 20 after a preliminary exchange of
views in the Commission, is intended to serve as a link
between parts II and III of the draft articles. It would also
serve to introduce the necessary or implied condition of
reciprocity permissible in the granting or refusal of State
immunity in a given case in a specified area of activities or
conduct of a State. It is also designed to confirm the exceptional nature of subsequent articles providing for a limited
application of State immunity. Part III in its entirety and in
each of its specific provisions from article 12 to article 20
deals with actual limitations of State immunity.

14. Four exceptions have so far been proposed by the
Special Rapporteur in articles 12 to 15, of which two have
been provisionally adopted by the Commission together
with their respective commentaries, namely article J2
(Commercial contracts)21 together with its ancillary pro-

Ibid.• p. 107; for the commentary, ibid.• pp. 107 et seq.
Ibid.• p. 109; for the commentary, ibid., pp. 109 et seq.
18 See Yearbook . .. 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 22; for the commentary,
ibid.• pp. 22 et seq.
16
17

19 The text originally submitted by the Special Rapporteur read as follows:

"Article 11. Scope of the present part
"Except as provided in the following articles ofthe present part, effect
shall be given to the general principles of State immunity as contained
in part II of the present articles."
See Yearbook . .. 1982. vol. II (Part Two), p. 95, footnote 220.
20

"Article 11. Scope of the present part

"The application of the exceptions provided in part III of the present
articles may be subject to a condition of reciprocity or any other condition as mutually agreed between the States concerned."
Ibid., p. 99, footnote 237.
21

"Article 12. Commercial contracts

"I. If a State enters into a commercial contract with a foreign
natural or juridical person and, by virtue of the applicable rules of
private international law, differences relating to the commercial contract fall within the jurisdiction of a court of another State, the State is
considered to have consented to the exercise of that jurisdiction in a
(Continued on IIfxl page.)
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visions 22 and article 15 (Ownership, possession and use of
property).23 The adoption of article 12, which had presented the greatest difficulties, constituted an important
breakthrough in the efforts to secure a more generally
acceptable solution to the main and central problem of
State immunity. Article 15 had not given rise to much
comment or opposition, although the reasons for accepting
it could be based on diverse grounds, centring on the unique applicability and monopoly of the lex situs and therefore the supremacy ofthe/orum rei sitae. at least in so far as
immovables are concerned. Reasoning in private international law finds stout support in public international law
doctrine of the supreme authority of the territorial sovereign. The principle of territoriality overrides all other
considerations, including that of sovereign immunity,
which is personal to the State claiming entitlement to
immunity.
15. Two other exceptions were proposed by the Special
Rapporteur in his fifth report, namely article 13 (Contracts
of employment)24 and article 14 (Personal injuries and
("'Ol'!llrlf(':!!

(Ulllilluet/.1

proceeding arising out of that commercial contract, and accordingly
cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction in that proceeding.
"2. Paragraph I does not apply:
"(a) in the case of a commercial contract concluded between States
or on a Government-to-Government basis;
"(b) if the parties to the commercial contract have otherwise expressly agreed."
See Yearbook . .. 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 25; forthecommentary, ibid..
pp. 25 et seq.
22 Article 2, paragraph I (g), and article 3, paragraph 2 (see footnotes 8
and 10 above).
2J

"Article 15. Ownership. possession and use of property

"I. The immunity of a State cannot be invoked to prevent a court of
another State which is otherwise competent from exercising its jurisdiction in a proceeding which relates to the determination of:
"(a) any right or interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, or
any obligation of the State arising out of its interest in, or its possession
or use of, immovable property situated in the State of the forum; or
"(b) any right or interest of the State in movable or immovable
property arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia; or
"(c) any right or interest of the State in the administration of property
forming part of the estate of a deceased person or of a person of unsound
mind or of a bankrupt; or
"(d) any right or interest of the State in the administration of property of a company in the event of its dissolution or winding up; or
"(e) any right or interest of the State in the administration of trust
property or property otherwise held on a fiduciary basis.

"2. A court of another State shall not be prevented from exercising
jurisdiction in any proceeding brought before it against a person other
than a State, notwithstanding the fact that the proceeding relates to, or is
designed to deprive the State of, property:
"(a) which is in the possession or control of the State; or
"(b) in which the State claims a right or interest,
if the State itself could not have invoked immunity had the proceeding
been instituted against it, or ifthe right or interest claimed by the State is
neither admitted nor supported by prima facie evidence.
"3. The preceding paragraphs are without prejudice to the immunities of States in respect of their property from attachment and execution, or the inviolability of the premises ofa diplomatic or special or
other official mission or of consular premises, or the jurisdictional
immunity enjoyed by a diplomatic agent in respect of private immovable property held on behalf of the sending State forthe purposes of the
mission."
See Yearbook . .. 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 36; for the commentary. ibid..
pp. 36 et seq.
24 The text originally submitted by the Special Rapporteur read as follows:

damage to property).2S There was a lack of enthusiasm for
these two exceptions since they found no support in the
general practice of States. Nevertheless, a trend seems
to have emerged in recent legislation and treaty practice
projecting such limitations for future progressive development. After the first round of discussion in the Commission, the Special Rapporteur submitted a revised draft
of these two articles to the Drafting Committee.
16. The application of the exception concerning con_
tracts of employment as provided in the revised article 13 26
seems narrowly confined to the small number of cases in
which the employer State, of its own free will, decides to
place 10cal\y recruited non-national employees under the
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"Article 13. Contracts of employment
"I. Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State in respect of proceedings relating
to a 'contract of employment' ofa national or resident of that other State
for work to be performed there.

Paragraph I does not apply if:
"(a) the proceedings relate to failure L employ an individual or
dismissal of an employee;
"(b) the employee is a national of the employing State at the time the
proceedings are brought;
"(c) the employee was neither a national nor a resident of the State of
the forum at the time of employment; or
"(d) the employee has otherwise agreed in writing, unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the forum, the courts of that State have
exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter."
Ibid.. p. 18, footnote 54.
25 The text originally submitted by the Special Rapporteur read as follows:
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"2.

"Article 14. Personal injuries and damage to property
"Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of another State in respect of proceedings relating to injury
to the person or death or damage to or loss of tangible property, if the act
or omission which caused the injury or damage in the State of the forum
occurred in that territory, and the author of the injury or damage was
present therein at the time of its occurrence."
Ibid.. p. 19, footnote 55.
26 The revised text of article 13 submitted by the Special Rapporteur
read as follows:

"Article 13. Colllracts o/elllp/oymelZl
"I. Unless otherwise mutually agreed between the States concerned, a State which employs an individual for services to be performed, in whole or in part, in the territory of another State, and has
effectively placed the employee under the social security system of that
other State, is considered to have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of that other State in a proceeding relating to the contract
of employment.

"2.
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Paragraph I does not apply if:
"1

"(a) the individual has been appointed under the administrative law

of the employer State, and is performing functions in the exercise of
governmental authority;
"(b) the proceeding relates to non-appointment or dismissal of an
individual seeking employment or re-employment;
"(c) the individual is a national of the employer State at the time the
proceeding is instituted;
"(d) the individual was neither a national nor a habitual resident of
the State of the forum at the time when the contract of employment was
concluded, unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties to the
contract of employment;
"(e) the individual has otherwise agreed in writing, and the court of
the State of the forum does not retain exclusive jurisdiction by reason of
the subject-matter of the proceeding or the subordinate rank of the
employee performing services of a solely domestic or non-governmental nature."
Ibid., p. 20, footnote 58.
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social security system of the host State in preference to its
own. This may constitute a clear indication of intention to
consent to the exercise of local jurisdiction and the applicability of local labour law in regard to that particular
contract of employment. This exception does not concern
either appointment or non-appointment of an employee,
or dismissal, or non-renewal of the contract of employment. It may concern breaches of the terms of the contract
of employment to which local labour law and regulations
oflocallabour relations apply. Thus a large volume of State
immunity is preserved in the field of contracts of employment.
17. The revised text of article 14 (Personal injuries and
damage to property)27 is very limited in the scope of its
application so as to cover only recovery of pecuniary compensation for insurable risks of accidents resulting from
inland transport of passengers and goods by rail, road,
waterways or air, and the liability of the occupier ofpremises for risks which are also insurable. It is designed not to
deprive individuals of otherwise available relief without in
any way inconveniencing the foreign Government. It does
not concern transboundary torts or letter-bomb cases. But
the insurance companies involved would no longer be able
to hide behind the cloak of sovereign immunity, and this
may serve in a way to encourage government agencies
operating in another State to take out insurance policies
where such are not required or already compulsory. Both
articles 13 and 14 remain with the Drafting Committee and
will be considered at the thirty-sixth session.
18. Following the above account of the work so far
accomplished and the draft articles still to be reconsidered
and revised or readjusted before provisional adoption, it
may now be convenient to proceed with a presentation of
other possible exceptions or particular areas in which the
extent of State immunity deserves the closest scrutiny and
the most meticulous consideration.
B. Debate in the Sixth Committee at the thirtyeighth session of the General Assembly
19. At the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly,
about 80 representatives took part in the debate on the
report of the Commission on the work of its thirty-fifth
27 The revised text of article 14 submitted by the Special Rapporteur
read as follows:

"Article 14. Personal injuries and damage to property
"I. Unless otherwise mutually agreed between the States concerned, a State which, through one of its organs, or agencies or instrumentalities acting in the exercise of governmental authority, maintains
an office, agency or establishment in another State or occupies premises
therein, or engages therein in the transport of passengers and cargoes
either by air or by rail or road, or by waterways, is considered to have
consented to the exercise ofjurisdiction by a court of that other State in
a proceeding relating to compensation for death or injury to the person
or loss of or damage to tangible property, if the act or omission which
caused the injury or damage in the State of the forum occurred in that
territory, and the person responsible for or contributing to the injury or
damage was present therein at the time of its occurrence.
"2. Paragraph I is without prejudice to the rights and duties of
individuals in one State vis-clovis another State which are specifically
regulated by treaties, or other bilateral agreements, or regional arrangements, or international conventions specifying or limiting the
extent of liabilities or compensation."
Ibid., footnote 59.
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session. No fewer than two thirds spoke on chapter III of
the report, on jurisdictional immunities of States and their
property, touching on one or several aspects of the topic. 28
The fact that consideration of the topic in progress enlivened the debate in the Sixth Committee is in itself an
encouraging sign, confirming the general belief that the
topic is of practical importance and the need and relative
urgency for it to be completed in the near future. The
Special Rapporteur believes it may be useful at this point to
give his overall impressions of the debate on the topic and
to provide further clarifications where lingering doubts
and hesitations subsist.
1.

IRRELEVANCE OF CONTINUING DIFFERENCES
IN IDEOLOGY

20. Ideological differences with regard to the personality
of the State or the capacity and functions of the State continue to exist. There is no likelihood that such a controversy could be resolved one way or the other. It became
apparent from the debate that, according to one school of
thought, a sovereign State cannot have two different personalities. A State cannot act otherwise than as a sovereign
entity. All functions undertaken by the State are governmental and official. A State does not act nor can it perform
an act in a like manner as an individual. This theory is not
only prevalent among socialist States but also adhered to in
some non-socialist countries. 29 On the other hand, this
distinction has been recognized from the very beginning of
State immunity in thejudicial practice of several countries,
notably Italy, Belgium and Egypt. The ideological differences in this connection cut across the distinctions between
socialist law and non-socialist law, civil law and common
law, Islamic law and non-Islamic law, or other similar
classifications oflegal systems. It would appear to serve no
useful purpose for the Special Rapporteur or the Commission to endeavour to resolve these differences. On the contrary, in its study the Commission has so far tried to avoid
taking any side in the confrontation between such unavoidable differences. Possible solutions proposed by the Special
Rapporteur therefore do not rely on any such distinctions.
21. While the Commission has been able to reach the
conclusion, tentatively as it may seem, that State immunity is a general principle, and that its limitations are exceptions to the general principle, which is of course composed
of several elements and qualifications as elaborated in
articles 6 to 10, the proposed exceptions have not been
based on any such differences which could give rise to
objections from one quarter or another. Thus all the criticisms and objections raised in the Sixth Committee against
the application of any such distinctions, whether between
acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis, to which considerable lip-service continues to be paid in a growing quantity ofjudicial decisions, or between public acts and private
28 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session,
Sixth Committee, 36th to 50th, 54th and 70th meetings, See also the
statement introducing the report and the concluding observations by the
Chairman of the Commission, ibid., 34th meeting, paras. 12-20, and 54th
meeting, para. 52.

29 See, for example, the statement by Miss Fraschini, the representative
of Uruguay, ibid.. 45th meeting, para. 45.
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acts, or between official and governmental capacity or personality and unofficial and non-governmental capacity or
personality, or between the various functions undertaken
by a Government or State organ, do not apply to the draft
articles proposed and provisionally adopted by the Commission.
22. The criticism levelled against the lack of justification
or practical difficulties in the application of the functional
criterion or any such distinctions need not therefore retain
the attention of the Commission, which proceeds on the
assumption that such differences in ideology persist and
endeavours to find solutions regardless of such differences.
None of the solutions proposed will therefore be based on
any of the distinctions or criteria which have been the
subject of penetrating, and at times justified criticism.
2. EMERGENCE OF SUBTLE DIFFERENCES
IN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

23. The expression "jurisdictional immunities" to many
and in several legal systems tends to presuppose the existence of jurisdiction, i.e. invocable or exercisable jurisdiction, depending on the point of view from which the
initiation of a legal proceeding is considered; the plaintiff
may invoke jurisdiction while the court may exercise it.
Generally speaking, it seems logical enough that the question of immunity from jurisdiction does not and cannot
arise unless and until it is clear that such jurisdiction, from
which the defendant could claim to be immune, does exist.
Following this conceptual or theoretical approach, the
scope or limit of jurisdiction is not at issue in any examination or investigation of the question of State immunity.
In practice, however, the disconnection between jurisdiction and jurisdictional immunity is not so clear-cut. When
jurisdiction of a court is challenged, it could be challenged
on the ground of jurisdictional immunity, because it impleads the foreign sovereign directly or indirectly, or on
any other ground, such as the "act of State" doctrine, or
lack ofjurisdiction under the laws of the organization of the
court ratione materiae because the subject-matter of the
dispute lies outside the scope of its jurisdiction or beyond
its limits, or ratione personae because the person involved
is exempt from the jurisdiction or forlack ofcapacity to sue
and be sued of either one of the party-litigants. Nor is the
court bound to decide upon the question of immunity
before determining the extent of its jurisdiction in any case
or vice versa.
24. Procedural discrepancies have compounded the difficulties of approaching the issue. In most systems, jurisdictional immunity need not be raised by the party.
Although it can be raised at any stage of the trial, it can also
be considered by the court proprio motu or d'office. In other
systems, it is a question of ordre public and the court is
bound to consider its own competence in any event. In
general, other branches of the Government, such as the
State Department, the Procureur de la Republique or the
Avvocato dello Stato could raise the question with the court
by making a suggestion of immunity or intervening as
amicus curiae. In some systems, "jurisdictional immunity" is so inextricably linked and intimately confused with
invocability or exercisability ofjurisdiction that there is no
tangible, subtle distinction left in effect between immunite
de juridiction and incompetence d'attribution, especially in

civil-law countries where the court has little discretion,
upon proof of its competence en fa matiere, to decline or
refuse to exercise jurisdiction. It has no choice but to sit
and decide the case. When the court declares itself incompetent, the effect is the same as dismissal of a case for lack
of jurisdiction or on the ground of jurisdictional immunity.
25. This subtle distinction has to be maintained in order
to appreciate the necessity for the pre-existence ofjurisdiction in many classes of case before proceeding to decide on
the question of immunity. Without this distinction, it
would make no difference whether the defendant was entitled to State immunity or not, or whether in fact as well as
in law the court had no jurisdiction in the first place,
regardless of the personality or the personal attributes of
the defendant. Reference to the existing jurisdiction or the
permissible scope of exercisable jurisdiction is determined
by the internal law of the State of the forum. The law on this
point may be found in some cases in the constitution of the
State or in the judicature act or in the law of the organization of the courts of justice. Whatever it may be called, it
determines the scope and extent of jurisdiction in any
given case, and whenever there is a foreign element in the
proceeding, the law determining the invocability or exercisability or appropriateness of jurisdiction of a court is
known as the applicable rules of private international law
or conflict of laws, whether or not there is a question of
conflict of laws or of concurrence of jurisdictions.
26. It is a fortunate coincidence that many representatives 30 have pointed out that, in the present study of jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, the
Commission is neither required nor called upon to examine, co-ordinate or harmonize the question of extent or
scope of jurisdiction of the courts of any State, nor to
regulate internationally or by way of uniform rules the
applicable rules of private international law or conflict of
laws of every State. One has to start from the proposition
that jurisdiction exists or that there is jurisdiction which is
valid and recognized generally. Of course, disputes between States as to the propriety of the exerc~se of concurrent jurisdictions or priority of jurisdiction belong to other
fields of private and public international law. They do exist
and always continue to exist in relation to this topic as well
as countless other topics involving the exercise ofjurisdiction whenever there is a foreign element in the dispute. It is
not the purpose of the present study to resolve all questions ~
covered under a much larger heading of national jurisdiction or extent of judicial jurisdiction of a national court.
One point should be made clear beyond dispute, however,
whatever the views regarding the distinction between immunite de juridiction and incompetence d'attribution:
whenever the court decides to exercise its jurisdiction and
to consider the meritsofthe case, it has also decided that it
is competent and has jurisdiction in accordance with its
applicable rules of private international law governing the
question of jurisdiction in such matters. In so doing, the
court has also decided that the defence of jurisdictional
immunity raised by one of the parties was not available to
take the case out of its jurisdiction. Thus doubts could only
30 See, for example, the statements by Sir Ian Sinclair, the representative
of the United Kingdom, ibid., 39th meeting, para. 93, and by Mr. De Stoop,
the representative of Australia, ibid., 50th meeting, para. 49.
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exist when the court declines to exercise jurisdiction, since
the issue of extent or scope of jurisdiction may have been
confused or merged with the question of jurisdictional
immunity. When jurisdiction is assumed and exercised,
both questions have been clearly determined, namely the
existence of jurisdiction and the non-applicability of State
immunity.

3.

DIMINISHING CRITICISM AND GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF
THE NECESSITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF STATE
IMMUNITY

27. One encouraging element resulting from increasing
appreciation of the problems confronting the Commission
is the decrease in opposition to and decline in criticism of
its work, with regard both to the areas of investigation and
to the seriousness of the objections. It must be insisted
several times that the source materials before the Commission constitute the sum total or quasi-sum total of existing
State practice and that the selection of cases presented
under each rubric is not at random, nor discriminaury,
before this fact is understood and accepted. It also took
time and effort to point out that practically every legal
system has followed a path that is not always uniform,
regardless of the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis, and
that the seeming distortions are not the Special Rapporteur's own doing but inherent in the practice of States itself.
It has become at times impossible to untwist or unbend the
course of legal developments so as to stretch it into a
straight line. Like a river, whose natural course is dictated
by geological conditions and the volume and fre9uency ~f
rainfall, so the judicial practice of States on thlS t~P1C lS
conditioned by several factors of common sense, 10glC and
even expediency.
28. Clearly, some of the misgivings will remain, owing to
the complexity of the subject-matter under investigation
and existing differences in the various legal systems, differences not only in ideology, but also in approach, methodology and outcome. Such differences either appear
reconcilable or could be put aside in order to allow a more
orderly international regulation to operate; but lack of indepth appreciation may continue. Care should be taken
lest lack of practice in a given State be misconstrued as
existence of practice favouring absolute immunity, when
in actual fact there has been no decision upholding any
State immunity anywhere. In the same way that it can~ot
be said that a particular legal system has adopted a restnctive practice, nor can the opposite be inferred simply from
the absence of practice to the contrary. It has become
increasingly more apparent that the question of jurisdictional immunities of States deserves international attention and cannot be left to the judicial decisions of municipal courts alone, nor exclusively to nationallegislation. 31
The codification and progressive development of internationallaw on the topic by an international institution will
alone be likely to provide an adequate and satisfactory
answer to most of the questions involved.
;1 Several representatives in the Sixth Committee indicated that no
legislation was contemplated in their countries. At the informal meeting of
legal advisers of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee held in
New York from 23 to 25 November 1983, it was agreed to await further
developments in the work of the Commission before considering new
initiatives.
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29. This growing realization is imperative ifchaos is ever
to be replaced by order. State immunity as a principle is to
be upheld, but several specified areas should be investigated to determine the precise extent of immunity, its
applicability and the conditions or limitations qualifying
its application. These specified areas may be viewed as
exceptional spheres where State immunity may not operate or apply to its maximum capacity, but is otherwise
limited by more impelling reasons of practical necessity or
sheer common sense or good faith. Reciprocity is another
consideration that has its valid application and mounting
persuasive force. If States are at the same time, though not
in the same case, giver and recipient of immunity, reciprocity is inevitable, though not necessarily controllable.
4.

COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ARTICLES

30. A large number of speakers in the Sixth Committee
took time to comment in a highly constructive and very
encouraging way on the draft articles provisionally
adopted or recently submitted. The Special Rapporteur
could not help being inspired by many of the commentators, who are without exception well-wishers.
31. Article 10 (Counter-claims) received positive endorsement in principle. No one spoke against the substance
or principles contained in its provisions. Some merely suggested possible drafting improvements, which will be reexamined during second reading. This is not insignificant
in view of the vastly different rules of procedure that exist
in various legal systems. The Drafting Committee is to be
congratulated for its agility in meeting most of the points
encountered in the formulation of the three paragraphs to
cover different situations in the prevailing systems in various parts of the world.
32. Article 11 (Scope of the present part) is designed to
introduce the notion of "reciprocity" as an element which
will ensure flexibility in the application of the exceptions
proposed in part III of the draft articles. It has been
observed quite correctly that reciprocity will serve to
reduce the scope of application of State immunity rather
than expand it. It will not reduce the exceptions, although
in actual practice there appear to be diametrically opposite
schools ofthought. One is found in the practice ofIndia 32
and concerns more the executive than the judiciary, since
the rule seems to favour general immunity except where,
by virtue of reciprocity, the principle of State immunity
has no application in the other country concerned. Another
school followed by Italy would allow State immunity only
if, by way of reciprocity, it can be clearly proven that the
Italian State would likewise be accorded jurisdictional
immunity. This doctrine of reciprocity applies especially
with regard to immunity of State property from attachment and execution. Proof has to be furnished of existing
legislation of the other State or else confirmed in writing by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through normal diplomatic
channels. 33 Thus property of a foreign State is not auto12 See, for example, the statement made at the thirty-fourth session of
the Commission by Mr. ]agota (Yearbook ... 1982. vol. I, pp. 189-190,
1729th meeting, paras. 6-12). Mr. Rao expressed a similar view at ~he
informal meeting oflegal advisers of the Asian-African Legal ConsultatIve
Committee in New York on 25 November 1983 (unpublished).
;; See, for example, decree law No. 1621 of 30 August 1925 on the
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matically accorded immunity from attachment or execution, unless, by virtue of reciprocity, it can be established
that, under existing legislation of that country, property of
the Italian State is accorded immunity from attachment
and execution. Whichever way the doctrine of reciprocity
is to be applied, it would only operate to limit rather than
expand the scope of State immunity.
33. It has also dawned on the Special Rapporteur, listening to the various comments made in the course of the
debate in the Sixth Committee during the thirty-eighth
session of the General Assembly, that the nature of the
exceptions in part III could also be clarified in the provision of article 11. For instance, it has been stated all along
that the principle of State immunity is relative in the sense
that consent is decisive. Thus, even if the cases under consideration were to fall squarely within one of the exceptions
provided for in the draft articles, nothing could prevent the
court ofa State from granting immunity. In any event, the
court may also follow the lead of the executive in any given
case for any reason that it considers to be imperative. Even
convenience could be operative as a reason for the court
declining to exercise its otherwise competent jurisdiction
on the ground that it is a forum non conveniens, or that
other forums are more convenient and therefore more
appropriate.
34. Article 12 (Commercial contracts) has attracted the
most comment, together with the related provisions of
article 2, paragraph 1 (g), and article 3, paragraph 2. The
majority of speakers seemed to think that it had struck a
satisfactory balance. There were those who would like to
see a more restrictive formulation, and also those who
would consider these provisions superfluous. Admittedly,
the problems did not arise in regard to socialist countries,
but no strong objection was raised against allowing the
world community, including the non-socialist countries, to
endeavour to resolve this difficult and complex question
among themselves. Yet others expressed the view that the
Commission was on the right track, but hoped that further
improvement could be introduced to maintain an even
better equilibrium between the interests of various groups
of States, the rich and the poor, developed and developing,
socialist and non-socialist, and other opposite types of
interest. To be more precise, criticism was levelled from
some quarters regarding the use of the expression "applicable rules of private international law" -so much used in
the context of conflict oflaws-which refers to an internal
legal system With a foreign element, concerning the scope
and extent of existing competence or jurisdiction of a court
of law rather than State immunity. The interests of developing countries would be better served if the exception
ofcommercial contracts were further linked to a significant
territorial or other substantial connection or contact with
the forum State, especially if it were further reinforced or
secured by the establishment of a local office or agency
operating within the territory of the forum State, whence
the dispute resulting from a commercial contract has
emerged. The second reading of this draft could produce a
still more satisfying improvement. As it is, the draft represents a breakthrough and offers a possible way out of the
labyrinth in which the law finds itself.
(Footnote 33 continued)

.

property of foreign States in Italy, Rivista di diritto int~rn~zlon~le (Ro.me),
18th year (1926), p. 159, "Atti esecutivi sopra bem dl Statl esten nel
Regno".

35. Article 13 (Contracts of employment) has also been
the subject of favourable as well as less kindly expressed
views. The revised version was definitely preferred but
opinions still varied from one extreme to another. The
Drafting Committee will have to meet another challenge
here.
36. Article 14 (Personal injuries and damage to property)
has come up against some strong opposition, unless it is
confined to pecuniary compensation and coverage for
insurable risks. Opinions were also divided. The interests
of foreign States and the safety and welfare of local inhabitants are at stake, though not necessarily in direct
conflict, since the insurance company comes into the picture as the middleman who claims the best of both worlds.
The Drafting Committee will also face considerable difficulties in this connection, though, it is hoped, by no means
insurmountable ones.
37. Article 15 (Ownership, possession and use of property) has attracted little comment. It was on the whole
considered satisfactory, except for the saving clause concerning diplomatic and consular premises in paragr~ ph 3,
which could be made clearer. Ultimately, it might be
necessary to spell out in part IV of the draft articles, in no
uncertain terms, the immunity of State property from
attachment and execution. Such immunity, as the representative of France pointed out,34 could not be identified
with the inviolability and protection provided in the two
Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963. 35 Perhaps the gap
will have to be filled, and part IV rather than article 15
appears to offer an appropriate place.
C. Continuing progress in legal developments
38. Since the previous report, submitted in 1983, legal
developments have occurred in abundance and in rapid
succession, so that any observation made on the practice of
a State today may no longer be valid tomorrow. Before
proceeding to confirm or make any necessary alterations to
the projected structure of the rest of the present study, it
may be necessary to glance quickly at the legal developments that have occurred since the preparation of the fifth
report.

1.

SHARP INCREASE IN RESTRICTIVE PRACTICE

39. Whatever the outcry or denial of emerging trends,
there appears to be an unmistakable upsurge in legal developments which clearly indicates a strong tendency in
favour of further restrictions of State immunity in every
imaginable field, most important of all in the allowance of
actual attachment and execution of State property where it
really hurts-affecting not only the sovereign dignity of the
State, but more practically the means by which meaningful
diplomatic intercourse or interchange of good offices and
international transactions are engaged.
34 See the statement by Mr. Guillaume, the representative of France
(Official Records of the General Assembly. Thirty-eighth session. Sixth
Committee. 41st meeting, para. 29).
35 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (United Nations,
Treaty Series. vol. 500, p. 95), and 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (ibid.• vol. 596, p.261).
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40. Recent practice in the United States of America has
been noted for the liberal interpretation that its courts have
been prepared to give to the wording of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,36 so as to disallow State
immunity where the commercial transaction, wherever
concluded and performed, could cause direct effect in the
United States, or entail financial consequences therein, or
bring tangible benefits or advantages such as repatriation
of profits to the home base in the State of the forum. In
actual practice, however, United States courts could be
said to have imposed self-restraint in certain decisions
holding the injury to have occurred outside the territory of
the forum State 37 or that the commercial transaction in
question had no bearing or adverse effect in the United
States. 38 In any event, the Act in question was designed to
establish a well-recognized exception to jurisdictional immunities customarily accorded to foreign Governments,
and not in any way whatsoever to expand or enlarge existing territorial or national jurisdiction of United States
courts, nor to create new special jurisdiction where none
had existed before. 39
In that particular connection, it is not United States
pI dctice that has gone furthest in favour of the exercise of
jurisdiction in regard to commercial activity, rather the
most recent case-law of the United Kingdom, where the
House of Lords admitted the assumption of sister-ship
jurisdiction upon the physical presence of a sister ship.40
41.

42. Yet in terms of doctrinal confirmation of the nature
test for a commercial transaction, notwithstanding the
public or sovereign purpose of the contract from the point
of view of the State, the Constitutional Court of the Federal

Republic of Germany must now be regarded as a champion
in upholding jurisdiction by application of the nature test
to the exclusion of all other tests and proceeding thereby to
allow attachment and also the eventual possible execution
of the assets of the property of a foreign sovereign State (in
one case, the National Iranian Oil Company).41 German
case-law was careful to disallow such a drastic measure
against the bank account ofa foreign State for the operation
of an embassy (a case concerning the Philippine Embassy),42 although other bank accounts not connected with
the operation of the embassy might not be so leniently
treated.
43. In this connection, Unitcd States courts may be leading the field in holding that the burden lies on the foreign
embassy concerned to furnish proof that the bank account
to be attached was for the purpose of operating the embassy
and in ruling that a mixed account is liable to attachment
and therefore unprotected by State immunity.43
44. This sharp twist in the recent practice of countries
holding a restrictive view of immunity is far more alarming
than the theoretical absence of jurisdictional immunity,
followed by a judicial pronouncement or even condemnation without any prospect of satisfaction or execution of
the judgment. What appears in the fifth report of the
Special Rapporteur regarding Italian practice in the field of
contracts of employment 44 must now be disavowed. 'In
cases judged since the preparation of that report (1983),
bank accounts of embassies were attached for payment of
social security and other emoluments under contracts of
employment. 45

2.
United Srares Code, 1976 Edition, vol. 8, title 28, chap. 97; reproduced in United Nations, Marerials on Jurisdictional Immunities ofStates
and rheir Properry (Sales No. E/F.8l.V.IO), pp. 55 et seq.
For United States case-law, see, for example, Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria and Central Bank of Nigeria
(1981) (Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 647 (1981), p. 300; see also
United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , p. 527); Harris Corporation v. National Iranian Radio and Television (1982) (Federal
Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 691 (1983), p. 1344). Cf. a similar trend which
has emerged in the case-law of France: see, for example, Corporaci6n del
Cobre v. Braden Copper Corporation et Societe Le Groupement d'importat ion des meraux (1972) (Revue generale de droit international public
36

(Paris), vol. 77 (1973), p. 1240).
37 See, for example, Sedco, Inc. (Petr6leos Mexicanos) (1982) (Federal
Supplement, vol. 543 (1982), p. 561). Pemex, as an instrumentality of the
Mexican Government, was held to be immune from jurisdiction, and the
blow-out concerned was held to be non-commercial and also within the
discretionary activity protected by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976.
38 See, for example, Maritime International Nominees Establishment v.
Republic of Guinea (1982) (Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 693 (1983),
p. 1094). The court declined jurisdiction for lack of a substantial link
between the commercial activity and the United States.
39 See, for example, Warnerv. Territory ofHawaii (I 953)(ibid., vol. 206
(1953), p. 851). See also American Law Institute, Restatement of the

Foreign Relations Law ofthe United States (Revised), Tentative Draft No.2
(27 March 1981) (Philadelphia, Pa.), pp. 171-221, Part IV: Jurisdiction
and Judgments, chap. 2, especially p. 178: "The law ... does not establish
causes of action or create or destroy legal obligations ... ". The Act refers to
any civil action against a foreign State as defined in the Act and which is
not entitled to immunity under the provisions of the Act or under any
applicable international agreement.
40 See, in particular, The "I Congreso del Partido" (1981) (The All
England Law Reports, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1064). Two sister ships of the
1 Congreso del Partido, namely the Marble Islands and the Playa Larga,
were at the origin of the action.
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ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL PRACTICE UPHOLDING
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

45. As much as the Special Rapporteur is willing to recognize and accept as authoritative and persuasive any current
judicial decisions supporting the doctrine of absolute immunity, none has been found in the period since the preparation of the fifth report. A memorandum submitted by a
member of the Commission 46 has proved of the greatest
value as evidence of existing adherence to an absolute view
of State immunity. Clearly, the absolute doctrine as propounded in the memorandum and supported by some
members of the Commission is entitled to the greatest
weight as an authoritative statement of the law in a given

4. See the decision of 12 Api! 1983 by the Federal Constitutional Court
concerning the complaint of unconstitutionality submitted by the National
Iranian Oil Company (Entscheidungen des Bundesveifassungsgerichts
(Tiibingen), vol. 64 (1984), p. I).
42 See the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 13 December
1977 in X v. Republic of the Philippines (United Nations, Materials on
Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , p.297).
43 See, for example, Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of Tan::ania
(1980) (Federal Supplement, vol. 507 (1981), p. 311).
44 Document AlCNAI363 and Add. I (see footnote I (e) above),
para. 48.

" The Ccremoniale Diplomatico della Repubblll'a has intervened on
two occasions in actions, one involving the Embassy of Algeria and the
other the Embassy of the Islamic Republic ofIran, for payment of social
security and other emoluments. See Appunto (Rome), !O June 1983.
46 Yearbook
... 1983. vol. II (Part One), p. 53, document
AlCNAI371.
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State, whether socialist or non-socialist. It has certainly
afforded a sound foundation for the Commission in its
continuing search for a better balanced approach to this
difficult conceptual problem.
46. It is high time an absolute view was cited so as to
present firm opposition to the restrictive trends that
appear to be asserting themselves. The question is how to
slow down, arrest or even reverse the trends so as to maintain what jurisdictional immunities there might still be for
States and their property. The trends would not be suspended simply by enunciation of an opposing doctrine or
by mere declaration of an absolute principle. Even ifsuch a
gesture were to be followed up by national legislation, it
would only allow immunity one-sidedly to foreign States,
and only by a process of reciprocal treatment would jurisdiction in tum be upheld and exercised. Just as it is correct
to predicate that most of the developing countries have not
adopted the practice of restrictive immunity, it is equally
accurate to state that none of the socialist countries has
adopted a restrictive view of State immunity. But to state
any such proposition, however emphatically, is still far
from providing concrete evidence of a judicial decision
allowing immunity in cases where it would have been
denied in countries practising restricted immunity. Regrettably, nothing short of an affirmative judicial decision
could be viewed as establishing the acceptance of absolute
immunity in the judicial practice of States. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the Special Rapporteur to
invent or concoct such a decision in a vacuum.
47. Judicial decisions that have gone a long way to
approaching an absolute rule of State immunity are to be
found in the practice of British and American courts,
dating back to The "Pesaro" (1926) 47 and The "Porto Alexandre" (1920),48 which must now be considered to have
long been overruled and discarded. As has been seen, the
judicial practice of the States that had upheld absolute
immunity has now radically changed. As far as the research
of the Codification Division reveals, there are no such
judicial decisions in the practice of other States.

47 See Berizzi Brothers Co. v. SS "Pesaro"(l926) (United States Reports,
vol. 271 (1927), p. 562).
48 United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920, p.30.
See also The "Parlement beIge" (I 880)(ibid., vol. V (1880), p. 197)and The
"Cristina" (1938) (The Law Reports, House ojLords, Judicial Committee
oJthe Privy Council, 1938, p.485).

3.

CONTINUING PURSUIT OF THE CURRENT PROGRAMME

48. In the circumstances, the more appealing alternative
would appear to be to accelerate the pace of work in pursuit
of the current programme. This would at least provide an
assured way of containing the restrictive trends. By examining the particular areas where exceptions are believed to
have been recognized, and by circumscribing and delineating the scope of the application of such exceptions in the
specified areas, taking into account all the theoretical differences identified and the various points of view noted,
and bearing in mind the differences in legal, political and
economic systems prevailing in various States, an approach may be found which could yield salutary results.

49. In the pages that follow, it is therefore proposed to
examine draft articles in the following specified areas of
part III.
Article 16. Patents, trade marks and other intellectual
properties;
Article 17. Fiscal liabilities and customs duties;
Article 18. Shareholdings and membership of bodies
corporate;
Article 19. Ships employed in commercial service;
Article 20. Arbitration.
50. It should be recalled at this point that the selection of
the above specified areas has not been without precedent.
Rather, precisely because such areas have been considered
exceptional in a number of instruments, multilateral conventions,49 regional or bilateral treaties, or legislative enactments,SO the present study cannot afford to overlook
whatever authoritative source materials or practice may
exist in order to prepare the groundwork upon which to
erect a solid edifice of legal propositions.
49 See, for example, the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity
and its Additional Protocol (Council of Europe, European Treaty Series
(Strasbourg), No. 74 (1972» and the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of State-owned
Vessels (Brussels, 10 April 1926) and Additional Protocol (Brussels, 24
May 1934) (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CLXXVI, pp. 199 and
215; reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional1mmunities . . " pp. 173 et seq.).
50 See, for example, the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
oj 1976 (see footnote 36 above); the United Kingdom State Immunity Act
1978 (see footnote 58 below); Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance, 1981
(see footnote 62 below); and Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979 (see

footnote 61 below).

Draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property (continued)
PART III. EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY (continued)
ARTICLE 16 (Patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties)

A. General considerations

1.

SCOPE OF "PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES"

51. The object of article 16 is to examine the extent of
State immunity in another specified area, that involving

"patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties".
Under the general heading of article 16 are grouped three
categories of intellectual and industrial property. The first
group is designated as "patents" and includes industrial
designs and inventions for industrial or manufacturing
purposes. The second group, entitled "trade marks",
covers the use of trade names, service marks or other similar rights pertaining to merchandise on sale in the markets
or for general or limited distribution for commercial pur-
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poses. The third group comprises the remaining types of
industrial or intellectual property, such as copyright, translation rights, reproduction rights, literary works. artistic
objects, musical compositions, lyrics, video tapes, discs,
and audio and audio-visual tapes.
52. Industrial or intellectual properties under the heading
of article 16 are therefore rights protected by States,
nationally as well as internationally. The protection provided by States within their respective territorial jurisdictions varies according to the organized system of registration of such rights, for which protection is guaranteed by
internal law and enforced by appropriate machinery. The
system for deposit, examination, investigation and eventual registration is administered in each State in accordance with its prevailing legislation and customs. It is not
unusual that, in industrially or economically developed
countries, the protection provided is more effective and
infringement is discouraged or severely punished, while in
less developed or developing countries, such a system may
either be non-existent or be at a very embryonic stage,
since expert knowledge is required before registration of
any invention, patent or industrial design. Copyrights of
literary works, artistic objects and musical compositions,
reproduction,..translation or performance of which must be
authorized in advance, often against fees or royalties, are
more widely known the world over, for they are also associated with cultural heritage and works of art protected by
recognition of an author's rights, regardless of the commercial or non-commercial nature of the reproduction, performance, publication or distribution.
2.

I

I
\
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PROTECTION AS A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

53. Legal protection offered by the State of the forum
provides a strong foundation and a valid legal basis for the
assumption and exercise of jurisdiction. Protection is generally consequential upon registration or even upon application for registration or upon deposit of such an application. It may also exist otherwise in certain systems
where, even prior to actual acceptance for registration,
some measure of protection is conceivable. Protection
depends on the existence and sanctity of the national legislation and the effectiveness of the system in operation in a
particular society. Thus not only is the appropriate legislation applicable, but also there has to be an effective system of registration in force to afford a sound legal basis for
jurisdiction.
54. It follows that effectiveness is only practicable within
the territorial confines of the State concerned. Thus the
system in operation could be invoked for protection in
cases of infringement of intellectual properties or violation
of the rights protected only in so far as infringements or
violations occurring within the territory of the State of the
forum are concerned. In the case of infringements or violations outside such territorial limits, other remedies or a
different kind of protection available in another State
under the jurisdiction of another authority would have to
be invoked.
55. It could also be stated that the basis for jurisdiction is
. ~he existence of a substantial territorial connection or
Important contact with the State of the forum. Without the
occurrence of violations or infringements within its terri-
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tory, there would be no justification for the exercise of
jurisdiction. This is so because the legislative protection
given is available only territorially, the State not being in a
position to extend its protective arms beyond the limits of
its own national territory.
3.

CLOSENESS TO TRADE AND USE OF PROPERTY

56. It is clear that the area specified under article 16 bears
the closest relationship to "commercial contracts" under
article 12 and "ownership, possession and use of property"
under article 15. In the latter two articles, the two exceptions appear to have been fairly widely accepted in the
practice of States. Article 16 could be considered as an
extension of the exception of trading transactions recognized under article 12, the difference being that, in article
16, the purpose of the protection is to prevent "unfair
competition" in trade and to regulate the imposition of
trade restrictions such as anti-trust legislation. The protection of patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties is designed to ensure greater fairness in commercial
practices. The result of this protection could be felt internally as well as in international trade, as the origin of the
goods may be in one State and their distribution might
infringe rights in another State. While the measure of protection is territorially limited, its beneficial consequences
could be transboundary, if not world-wide, regardless of
the place of origin, production or manufacture of the
goods; the place of infringement could be at the receiving
end, in the country of either wholesalers or retail traders.
Even under modern theories regarding rules of conflict of
laws for unfair competition or restraint on trade, the law of
the country where the infringement occurs is a decisive
factor and this could be the proper forum to exercise j urisdiction.
57. By analogy with article 15, copyrights and other intellectual property rights constitute a collection ofproprietary
rights or rights to use or reproduce which could be designated as properties under the classification of "incorporeal
hereditaments", i.e. intangible rights, or rights without a
corpus. Recognition and protection of such industrial
designs or other intellectual properties is a matter for the
law of the place where the particular right is registered. In
other words, the lex situs of such intangible properties is
the law of the place of their registration. Thus the applicable law, as well as the invokable or exercisable jurisdiction, seem to cross at the same convenient point so as to
make the court of the State where protection is offered for
the registration of such rights as well as of the place of their
infringement the only competent forum, and as such a
forum conveniens under the applicable rules of private
international law.
4.

CONSENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

58. Ifa State seeks the protection of another State for the
registration of a patent, invention or industrial design, it
has clearly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
territorial authority from which it is seeking protection
within the territory of another State. This would seem
equally true when a State seeks to claim or contest a claim

Documents of the thirty-sixth session

18

to such rights, or is otherwise involved in a dispute concerning infringements of such rights or properties. Of
course, if the State does not contest the rights but admits
the violations or infringements, it would be difficult in the
same breath to invoke its sovereign immunity for an activity which is not only commercial and non-governmental, but also involves unfair competition and trade practices. It would seem logical for consent to be presumed or
implicit in the event ofinfringements, just as in the event of
contestation. In the latter event, the foreign State would be
claiming the protection of the State of the forum and, as
such, would be another claimant of the rights at issue or in
dispute.
59. Such a line of reasoning is attractive, whether the
search for protection by another State is evidence of consent if this is regarded as a right to use an incorporeal
property, or ifit is considered to be a waiver or abandonment of immunity when a State competes in trade in the
territory of another State, especially in the field of unfair
competition of trade practices, beyond entering an ordinary commercial contract. Whatever the rationale behind
the suggestion of non-immunity in this specified area,
whether on the grounds of implied consent by analogy with
article 12 or article 15, or whether it is likened to commercial contracts under article 12 or to the use of property
under article 15, common sense appears to dictate absence
of objection to this restriction on State immunity. The
practice of States may bear witness to this preliminary
finding.

B. The practice of States
1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

60. It should be observed, before exploring the practice of
States in this specified area, that legal developments in the
field of patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties are matters of comparatively recent occurrence.
Trade names and trade marks may have been the earliest of
intellectual properties to have been given national and
international protection. Patents ofinventions and industrial designs were relatively unknown in the developing
world, and it is not until very recently that attention has
been drawn in developing countries to the need to provide
incentives for initiatives of invention and ingenuity, even
in more primitive societies. Thus State practice has not
been too rich in this area where another State is a party to
litigation before a national authority. Earlier case-law of
developed countries has very few instances of such disputes. Judicial and governmental practice of States can
only be found in the contemporary period.
61. Another explanation may be found in the fact that
States did not normally engage in trade themselves until
very recently, and now that they do, they have not indulged
in unfair competition, save in very rare, exceptional
instances. With the assistance of a theory of consent by
conduct or by necessary implication, a State very often
finds itself appearing as claimant or indeed plaintiffbefore
the courts of another State, thus avoiding the invocation of
State immunity. Again with the aid of such a doctrine,
acceptance of this exception to State immunity does not
need to be based on too much practice.

62. The present inquiry is limited to the protection of
patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties at the
national level; beyond that there exists another layer of
protection, at the international level, which might be interState or intergovernmental relations or protection offered
by an international system or organization, such as WIPO,
or by a series of international conventions, such as the
Paris Copyright Convention. 51 The present study is conducted at the national, as opposed to the international
level. Thus, when a State seeks the authority, judicial or
administrative, of another State to protect its rights against
infringements, it may be an initial step in the process of
exhaustion of local remedies.
63. In actual practice, a State may succeed to the rights
and obligations of private firms or trading or manufacturing companies, by way of nationalization or otherwise, and
also become answerable for the infringements of patents by
the corporations it has nationalized or acquired. This is not
an uncommon phenomenon in this day and age, when
developing countries and 'ocialist as well as capitalist
States have also deemed it expedient to nationalize an
industry or enterprise or the production and management
of natural resources such as oil, gas, electricity, water and
other sources of energy. Banking and other financial institutions are no exceptions to the wave of nationalization to
remedy or improve national economies.
2.

I
f

JUDICIAL PRACTICE

64. Judicial decisions directly in point are not so plentiful
for reasons that are apparent from the foregoing general
observations. The case-law regarding patents, trade marks
and other intellectual properties is regarded as a specialized
field for practitioners. Only specialists in anyone of the
three groups are well versed in the jurisprudence in a particular branch of the industry or artistry protected. Thus
cases involving foreign States or Governments or their
agencies and instrumentalities are rare. Nevertheless, the
few leading cases that are available are instructive and so
noteworthy that they deserve the most attentive consideration.
65. The leading case in this particular area is indisputably
the decision of the Supreme Court of Austria in Dralle v.
Republic ofCzechoslovakia (1950).52 This decision ranks as
one of the causes celebres in the historical development of
the case-law of Austria and is well known throughout the
world for the thoroughness with which the court examined
not only Austrian case-law, but also the judicial practice
and jurisprudence of as many important countries as are
known in the annals of legal science. Not only European
cases, but also Latin-American and Asian cases were cited
and examined by the court. In this case, the respondent was
the Czechoslovak State, engaging in business under the
name of a firm. The dispute related to the use of trade
51 Universal Copyright Convention, revised at Paris on 24 July 1971
(United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 943, p. 178).
52 Osterreichische Juristen Zeitung (Vienna), vol. 5 (1950), p. 341, case
No. 356; International Law Reports, 1950 (London), vol. 17 (1956), p. 155,
case No. 41; lournaldu droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 77 (1950),
p. 749. The text of the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court is reproduced (in English) in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp. 183 et seq.
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marks which applied to goods made by the German parent
company, sold in Austria and registered in the name of the
Czechoslovak subsidiary nationalized by the Czechoslovak State. The German parent company sought an
injunction to prevent the Czechoslovak Government from
using the trade marks. The extraterritorial effect of the
confiscation of trade mark rights was denied in relation to
the Austrian marks. It was also held that, since Austria
rejected the concept of a uniform trade mark in relation to
foreign marks, this also applied to internationally registered foreign marks. Since the nationalized marks were
subsequent to the rights of the plaintiff or his licenser, the
injunction could be granted. It was held that:
1. Under international law. foreign States are exempt from the jurisdiction of the Austrian courts only in so far as relates to acts' performed by
them in the exercise of their sovereign powers;
2. Similarly. under municipal law. foreign States are subject to Austrian jurisdiction in all contentious matters arising out of legal relations
within the sphere of private law. 53

Referring to the facts of the case, the court observed
that:

I
I

\
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68. In the absence of more recent decisions to the contrary or recognizing State immunity in relation to infringements of rights to the use of patents, trade marks or
other intellectual properties, the leading cases cited, especially the Austrian decision containing references to the
practice of States, must be viewed as clear indications of
an irreversible trend in support of restriction in this
particular area, as is in fact being confirmed by other forms
of State practice.

3.

GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE

69. It will be seen whether the trend in governmental
practice is pointing in the same direction or in the opposite
one.

66. Whatever may be the criteria used to distinguish
between actajure gestionis not covered by State immunity
and acta jure imperii entitled to immunity, the Supreme
Court of Austria was as convincing as it was convinced in
its historical approach and judicial reasoning that the business activity conducted in Austria was not protected by
State immunity and that the question relating to the use of
trade marks by foreign firms registered in Austria was
determined by Austrian domestic law under Austrian
jurisdiction. No immunity was recognized in respect of
questions relating to the foreign trade mark rights in dispute. The Czechoslovak Government could be said to be as
much a claimant of the foreign mark rights as the party
seeking relief from the court.

(a) National legis/at ion

Another less well-known case is the decision of

30 June 1977 by the Land High Court (Oberlandesgericht)

!

culty in holding that the Spanish State carrying on business
under private law within the Federal Republic of Germany
was subject to its jurisdiction. The activities of Spanish
Government tourist bureaux were held to be of a privatelaw nature and thereby not entitled to immunity, nor were
violations of copyrights exempt from local jurisdiction
even if performances and showings were made by government bureaux of official agencies of a foreign State.

... Today the position is entirely different; States engage in commercial
activities and. as the present case shows, enter into competition with their
own nationals and with foreigners. * Accordingly, the classic doctrine of
immunity has lost its meaning, and, ratione cessante. can no longer be
recognized as a rule of international law. 54

67.

i
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of Frankfurt in the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Spanish Government Tourist Bureau. 55 The
dispute related to the unauthorized performance of
copyrighted film scores and compensation for the infringement of copyrights. The claim for damages was statutebarred but was made on the additional ground of unjust
enrichment. The performances were held not to constitute
a permissible public use under the Literary Copyright Act.
I t was also held that film scores retained their separate legal
existence even if they were composed for a particular film,
because as a rule they could also be utilized for their own
sake. 56 Infringement of copyrighted film scores by showings of such films served, at least indirectly, the "gainful
purposes" of the Spanish StateY The court had no diffiUnited Nations, Materials .... p. 202.
5. Ibid., p. 195.
55 X v. Spanish Government Tourist Bureau. ibid.. pp. 294 et seq.
56 Ibid.. p. 297.
57 Ibid.. p. 294.
53

70. It is not without interest to note that the United
Kingdom, whose case-law has traditionally been associated with the most unqualified practice of sovereign
immunity, included the following provision as section 7 of
its State Immunity Act 1978:58
Exceptions from immunity

7. A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to:
(a) any patent, trade mark, design or plant breeders' rights belonging to

the State and registered or protected in the United Kingdom or for which
the State has applied in the United Kingdom;
(b) an alleged infringement by the State in the United Kingdom of any
patent, trade mark, design, plant breeders' rights or copyright; or
(c) the right to use a trade or business name in the United Kingdom.

71. This prOVISIOn has no direct counterpart in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the United
States,59 in which the commercial activity covered in subsection (a) (2) of section 1605 60 may in fact be said to have
overshadowed, if not substantially overlapped, the use of
copyrights and other similar rights. There has been no clear
decision to reject or support this proposition. On the other
hand, the British Act is reproduced in substance in section 9 of Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979,61 and
;, United Kingdom, T1e Pub/ic General Acts. 1978. part I, chap. 33,
p. 715; text reproduced in United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities .... pp. 41 e/ scq.
59 See footnote 36 above.
60 Cf. section 5 of Canada's 1982 "Act to provide for State immunity in
Canadian courts" (The Cal/ada Gazette. Part III (Ottawa), vol. 6, No. 15
(22 June 1982). p. 2949. chap. 95).
61 Text reproduced in United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities ... , pp. 28 et seq.
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almost verbatim in section 8 of Pakistan's State Immunity
Ordinance, 1981.62 Other Governments studying the possibility of adopting national legislation on this topic also
contemplate inclusion ofa similar provision covering this
exception in this particular area. 63
72. The adoption of a restrictive provision in the national
legislation ofa few countries, however important, may not
be indicative, let alone conclusive, of an emerging trend,
but the application of such legislation may produce a
widening restrictive effect in view of the practice of many
Governments, notably those ofIndia and Italy. The imposition ofa commensurate countermeasure in such circumstances is expressly envisaged in the third paragraph of
article 61 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the
USSR and the Union Republics. 64

forum, of such a right belonging to a third person and protected in that
State;

(b) International or regional conventions

75. While the Inter-American Draft Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunity of States as prepared by the InterAmerican Juridical Committee 66 is still in its initial stages
and far from being a final text, the problem relating to
patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties may
be considered overlapped by the wider exception of trade
or commercial activities in the first paragraph of its article 5. 67 The second paragraph states that trade or commercial activities of a State are construed to mean the performance of a particular transaction or commercial or trading
act pursuant to its ordinary trade operations.

(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity
73. The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 65
came into force in 1976 between Austria, Belgium and
Cyprus. It has since been ratified by the United Kingdom
and Portugal. The Netherlands is also contemplating ratification, while the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy
are probably already putting the provisions into practice,
stretching them to their logical extremes. It is no longer
true that the European Convention is accepted only by
Western European countries or members of the European
Economic Community. Austria is certainly following a
distinctly different policy, while Cyprus has been regarded
as Asian in the United Nations. The Convention provides:
Article 8

A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a
court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate:
(a) to a patent, industrial design, trade mark, service mark or other
similar right which, in the State of the forum, has been applied for, registered or deposited or is otherwise protected, and in respect of which the
State is the applicant or owner;

(b) to an alleged infringement by it, in the territory of the State of the

62 The Gazette ofPakistan (Islamabad), 11 March 1981 (text reproduced
in United Nations, Materials; .. , pp. 20 et seq.). Cf. section 8 of South
Africa's Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 (ibid., pp. 34 et seq).
6J See, for example, the draft Australian legislation of 1984 on the
immunities offoreign States, Foreign States Immunities Bill 1984, sections
10-20 (reproduced in International Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.),
vol. XXIII, No.6 (November 1984), pp. 1398 et seq;). Malaysia is also
conducting a study.
64 That provision reads:

"Article 61; Suits against foreign States; Diplomatic immunity;

"Where a foreign State does not accord to the Soviet State, its representatives or its property the same judicial immunity which, in accordance
with the present article, is accorded to foreign States, their representatives
or their property in the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR or
other authorized organ may impose retaliatory measures in respect of that
State, its representatives or that property of that State."
Text reproduced (in English) in United Nations, Materials on Judsdictional Immunities; ;., p. 40.
65 See footnote 49 above.

(c) to an alleged infringement by it, in the territory of the State of the
forum, of copyright belonging to a third person and protected in that
State;

(d) to the right to use a trade name in the State of the forum.

74. This international convention, although not universal in its application or participation, cannot be brushed
aside as insignificant in view of the importance which
industrially advanced countries attach to the protection of
intellectual property; the principle of reciprocity seems to
militate in favour of its widening acceptance in practice.

(ii) Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunity of States

4.

INTERNATIONAL OPINION

76. In the absence of clear communis opinio doctorum, as
noted by the Supreme Court of Austria in the celebrated
Dralle case concerning foreign trade marks (see paragraph 65 above), the way is clear for progress to be made
along the lines of the majority view or of an existing trend,
if any. Since the question is of relatively recent origin, the
opinions of publicists have not been so clear-cut or decisive, although it could not be denied that contemporary
views are by and large inclined towards a more restrictive
practice of jurisdictional immunity in this particular area
as well.

77. Thus, for example, the Committee on State Immunity of the International Law Association, in September
1982, recommended a set of draft articles for a convention
on State immunity,68 article III of which contained the
following provision:
Article III. Exceptions to immunity from adjudication

A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the forum
State to adjudicate in the following instances inter alia:

66 Draft approved on 21 January 1983 in Rio de Janeiro (OENSer.
G-CP/doc.1352183, of 30 March 1983). See also International Legal
Materials (Washington, D.C.), vol. XXII, No.2 (March 1983), p. 292.
67
"Article 5

"States shall not invoke immunity against claims relative to trade or
commercial activities undertaken in the State of the forum.
68 The draft convention was adopted by ILA at its Sixtieth Conference
(Montreal, 29 August-4 September 1982). See ILA, Report of the Sixtieth
Conference, Montreal, 1982 (London, 1983), pp. 5-10, resolution No.6:
"State Immunity".

:--

Jurisdictional immunities of States and their property

E. Where the cause of action relates to:
1. Intellectual or industrial property rights (patent, industrial design,
trade mark, copyright, or other similar rights) belonging to the foreign State
in the forum State or for which the foreign State has applied in the forum
State; or
2. A claim for infringement by the foreign State of any patent, industrial design, trade mark, copyright or other similar right; or

3. The right to use a trade or business name in the forum State.

5. A

CLEAR TREND

78. If any question, dispute or difference relating to the
rights or interests ofa State in a patent, trade mark or other
intellectual property registered, applied for or otherwise
protected by another State is subject to the applicable law
and jurisdiction of the court of that other State, it is not too
far-fetched to assume that the State owning or applying for
registration of such rights would have in fact accepted the
protection of another State and hence consented to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the forum State in all proceedings relating thereto. Half of the battle is over, since in most
cases relating to such rights the foreign State is invariably
in the position of a claimant. If the State is claiming the
rights or is applying for such rights, its consent to the
exercise of jurisdiction is presumed to have been given by
its own conduct. If, however, the State is alleged to have
infringed the rights of a third person and it disputes or
contests the allegation, then it is also inevitably a claimant,
for otherwise it will not have to be joined as a party to the
litigation, except in the event of an injunction being sought
against the State for the continuing use of such rights in the
State of the forum. Then the State is obliged either to forgo
the use of such rights or to contest the claim. In the latter
event, the State will in fact be in the position of a joint
claimant or co-claimant of the disputed rights.
79. A trend in the practice of States and legal opinion
seems to have emerged clearly in support of absence of
immunity, or the subjection of the foreign State claiming,
contesting or applying for such rights to the jurisdiction of
the forum State. There appears to be no other clear trend in
a different or opposite direction.

C. Formulation of draft article 16
80. The draft article for this particular area of patents,
trade marks and other intellectual properties might accordingly be formulated as follows:

Article 16. Patents, trade marks and
other intellectual properties

\
\

1. The immunity of a State cannot be invoked to prevent
a court of another State which is otherwise competent from
exercising its jurisdiction in a proceeding which relates to
the determination of:
(a) the right to use a patent, industrial design, trade
mark, service mark, plant breeders' right or any other similar right or copyright which has been registered, deposited
or applied for or is otherwise protected in another State, and
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in respect of which the State is the owner or applicant;
or
(b) the right to use a trade name or business name in that
other State.
2. A court of another State shall not be prevented from
exercising jurisdiction in any proceeding brought before it
which relates to:
(a) an alleged infringement by or attributable to a State,
in the territory of that other State, of a patent, industrial
design, trade mark, service mark, plant breeders' right or
any other similar right or copyright belonging to a third
person and protected in that other State; or
(b) an alleged infringement by or attributable to a State,
in the territory of that other State, of the right to lise a trade
name or business name belonging to a third person and
protected in that other State.
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ARTICLE 17 (Fiscal liabilities and customs duties)

A. General considerations

II'
:1

1. SCOPE OF "FISCAL LIABILITIES AND CUSTOMS DUTIES"

81. A State is not normally liable to taxation or customs
duties levied by another State, except in cases where it
establishes a business-official or commercial-or maintains an office or agency in the territory of another State.
The maxim par in parem imperium non habet or jurisdictionem non habet must be read in the context where there is
no overlapping of activities of a State in the territory or
under the territorial sovereign authority of another State. It
is generally undisputed that the principle of "territoriality"
or "territorial sovereignty" is more absolute and is not
subject to limitations or qualifications by the national or
personal sovereignty, or sovereign authority or personality
of another State.
82. It follows as a matter of course that, in most cases of
contact, confrontation, clash or conflict, the territorial sovereign exercises supreme authority over and within its territory. An outside sovereign or extraterritorial power must
be presumed to have submitted to the sovereign authority
of the territorial State and could only exert or exercise such
governmental or sovereign authority as had been previously agreed to by the territorial sovereign, which could
either waive its sovereign authority or consent to the exercise of a limited governmental power by the visiting extraterritorial authority. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to
the recognition of a colonial status or regime, directly
against the concept of jus cogens.
83. Conceptually, liability in terms ofjural relationship is
the correlative of power, as opposed to immunity which is
the correlative of non-power. Thus to admit the supremacy
or superiority of the territorial sovereign is already one big
step towards acceptance of liability, once the extraterritorial State projects its image or personality within the
territorial sphere of a sovereign authority of another
State.
84. The matter has to a large extent been regulated in so
far as diplomatic, consular or ad hoc missions are concerned. The special regime allowing for special privileges

I
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and exemptions from certain categories of taxation is
based on functional necessity and justified by the principle
of reciprocity. Beyond reciprocity and functional necessity,
exemption from taxation is granted as a matter of generosity or courtesy; it stems from the comity of nations, based
on considerations of reciprocal treatment rather than
opinio juris or legal obligation. Besides, there is nothing
to prevent two or more States or a group of States from
agreeing to accord tax concessions inter se (or even unilaterally) as part of a generalized system of special preferences, whether for internal revenues or levies for import
of goods or for other tariff or non-tariff barriers. The
rationale behind the authority to tax or to collect levies lies
in the supremacy of the territorial sovereign.
85. Article 17 may be entitled "Fiscal liabilities and customs duties" to denote absence of immunity from the
jurisdiction to tax or collect revenues. Lack of exemption
or of immunity from the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon questions of taxes or tax assessment is the equivalent of liability for taxation and payment of duties. This
heading also includes property taxes and rates for the utilities and facilities connected with immovable property.

2.

JURISDICTION TO TAX OR COLLECT IMPORT DUTIES

86. The legal basis for the jurisdiction or power of a State
to tax any person, including a foreigner or another State, is
to be found in the territorial connection of the source of
income or the importation or entry of goods into the territory of the territorial State. The power to tax can sometimes be excessive-if it extends beyond the territorial
scope or confines it has to be justified on another ground,
such as nationality or origin of the revenue, or indeed
residence, even if partial or temporary.
87. Jurisdiction in fiscal matters and importation of
goods or merchandise normally belongs to the revenue and
customs department of the Ministry of Finance or the
Treasury. Thus revenue collection and the power to impose levies and customs duties are sanctioned by law but
enforced by the officers of the revenue department or customs officers, or indeed through other more decentralized
authorities such as cities, counties and municipalities in
respect of rates, property taxes or road taxes for vehicles
and other means of transport such as motor launches,
helicopters and aircraft. In the penultimate analysis, appeal may be made to the Minister of Finance or the Lord
Mayor of a city or other high administrative officer, whose
decision could be challenged in a court of law in legal
proceedings. Thus a State could be implicated or involved
in a proceeding before the court of another State for failure
to pay taxes or import duties in respect of income earned
on behalf of the State in the territory of that other State or
for the importation of goods into that other State without
an agreement to exempt or to waive the taxes or duties to
be collected. On the other hand, a State could, of its own
free will, participate in a proceeding in a court of another
State relating to the amount or assessment of taxes,
revenues or duties, or to the very question of its own liability for taxation by the revenue authority of the State of
the forum. In the latter instance, the State may be said to
have consented by clear conduct to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of the forum State.

3.

MARGINAL UTILITY OF AN EXPRESS PROVISION

88. A question may be validly asked as to the practical
use of a provision excepting "fiscal liabilities and customs
duties" from the principle of State immunity. Once the
exception of commercial contracts is admitted, the importation of goods in connection with a commercial transaction is clearly not exempt from the jurisdiction of the
territorial or forum State. Nor indeed is the State immune
from the jurisdiction of a court of another State in respect
of taxation for the revenue or income derived from the
trading or commercial activities conducted within the territory of that other State. There may perhaps be no great
need to include a specific provision expressly dealing with
lack of immunity with regard to "fiscal liabilities and customs duties" payable by an extraterritorial State. But for
the sake of clarity, and to put an end to lingering doubts,
there appears to be some usefulness, or at least a marginal
utility, in dissipating unnecessary hesitancy, thereby clearing the path for greater simplicity in the application of
otherwise complex rules of State immunity.
89. Furthermore, there seems to be no doubt as to the
correctness of the proposition that, where jurisdiction
exists for one State to collect revenues or duties from an
agency or instrumentality of another State, liabilities to pay
such revenues and duties are established, unless the territorial State specifically waives its power to tax for any
reason or considerations of its own free will. Proceedings
before the court of another State relating to "fiscalliabilities and customs duties" accordingly lie outside the scope
of application of State immunity, constituting as they do a
substantive exception to the general principles of jurisdictional immunities of States and their property. Conversely,
to formulate such an exception provides an opportunity to
delimit the scope and extent of its application, and hence
an opportunity to reassert and preserve immunity of State
property from some kinds of taxation, as long as it is used
as diplomatic or consular premises, and the immunity
from income taxes accorded to members of diplomatic and
consular missions under the Vienna Conventions of 1961
and 1963. 69

B. The practice of States
1. JUDICIAL PRACTICE

90. Judicial decisions against a foreign State or foreign
government agency compelling payment of taxes, dues,
charges or rates are rare. This is so not because they have
successfully invoked jurisdictional immunity or been held
to be exempt from liability to pay such taxes or revenues,
but more frequently because there is no point in refusing to
pay such taxes. The fact that another State is admitted and
permitted to run a business or use a motor vehicle in the
territory of the forum State indicates unmistakably its willingness to recognize and respect the local laws or ground
rules, including the power of the local authority to tax and
the extraterritorial State's liability to pay local taxes in
accordance with local regulations. Adjudication is but an
69

See footnote 35 above.
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ultimate recourse that need not be taken, once a State
acknowledges the supremacy of another State over its own
territory. Failure to do that may result in a more serious
conflict, entailing graver consequences.
91. There are no decided cases in the practice of most
countries, including the United Kingdom, France and Australia. A line of cases could be found in the practice of the
United States of America between May 1952, the date of
the "Tate Letter",70 and January 1977, the date ofer.try
into force of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 0/1976,
most of which concerned the possibility of levying property taxes on State property of a foreign Government.
Thus, in three parallel actions, City 0/ New Rochelle v.
Republic o/Ghana, Republic o/Indonesia, and Republic 0/
Liberia (1964),71 immunity of property from foreclosure
proceedings to satisfy real estate tax liens was recognized in
three parallel State Department notes dated 8 June 1964.
The United States Attorney was instructed to appear and
file a suggestion of immunity with the court on the ground
that the property in question was "being used as the residence of the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the
United Nations" and as such "not subject to the jurisdiction of the County Court of the County of Westchester,
State of New York". With respect to the request for action
to have the claim for taxes on the property in question
withdrawn, however, the Ambassador was informed that
"in the Department's view such property is not immune
from real property taxation under customary international
law" .1 2
92. Thus, unless otherwise agreed in a bilateral treaty,
headquarters agreement or multilateral convention, property taxes in the United States are payable, although in the
above three cases as well as in an earlier case concerning the
Kingdom of Afghanistan,13 immunity from suit was recognized in a claim against property levied upon for nonpayment of real estate taxes as a measure of enforcement of
tax collection. The State Department held a similar view in
regard to non-assessment of taxes against foreign government-owned property used for public non-commercial
purposes, namely the consulate of the Republic of Argentina in New York. In that case, Argentina was plaintiffin an
action to recover taxes assessed against its consulate in
New York. 74 The lower court held that, in the absence ofa
treaty to the contrary, a foreign State's property was not
exempt from taxation and that Argentina was not entitled
to recover real estate taxes on consular property. The
10 See the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur (see footnote I (d)
above), para. 94.

New York Supplement, 2d Series, vol. 255 (1965), p. 178.
See Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1977
(Washington, D.C.), 1979), appendix: "Sovereign immunity decisions of
the Department of State, May 1972 to January 1977", p. 1050, No. 44. The
Department of State construed section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement
of 1947 between the United States of America and the United Nations "as
not extending immunity from real estate taxes to missions to the United
NatIOns". That position was first stated in a note to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations on 23 November 1955 (ibid.).
. '1 Knocklong Corporation v. Kingdom ofAfghanistan (1957) (New York
'\,UI'pIC'lllent, 2d Series, vol. 167 (1958), p. 285); see Digest of United States
I raCllce ... , /977, op. cit., p. 1034, No. 14.
" Republic of Argentina v. City of New York (I 967)(New York SupplefII('llt. 2d Series, vol. 283 (1968), p. 389); judgment affirmed (1968) (ibid.,
\ 01 , 290 (1968), p. 706); judgment modified (I 969)(ibid., vol. 303 (1970),
P 644).
11
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Department of Justice as amicus curiae on appeal brought
to the attention of the Court of Appeals a letter dated
2 September 1965, to the effect that
The Department of State is of the opinion that under recognized principles of international law and comity· the several States of the United
States, as well as their political subdivisions, should not assess taxes
against foreign government-owned property used for public non-commercial purposes."

The New York Court of Appeals held that foreign State
property devoted to public governmental use is immune
under customary international law from local real estate
taxes, but that Argentina's claim for a refund was not
timely.
93. In another case, in which the United States sought to
enjoin a tax foreclosure sale by the City of Glen Cove
against a residence of the Permanent Representative of the
Soviet Union to the United Nations,76 the State Department stated in a letter to the Attorney General that it "accepts as true the diplomatic representations" of the Soviet
Government that the property "is used as a residence of its
Permanent Representative to the United Nations and his
deputies having the rank of Ambassador or Minister ... ".77
It would appear that the liability for taxes depended on the
discretion of the Department of State in the first place but
the actual decision, beyond the action taken by the taxing
authority, would have to come from the court of competence. The law does not appear to be clear. Relativity
abounds around the possibility of existing treaty commitments in a particular case, and yet the residual rule, in the
absence ofa bilateral arrangement, seems to hover between
the various authorities within the same Government. A
distinction was drawn between liability for taxation and
possible immunity from jurisdiction to foreclose a lien on
the property used for governmental and non-commercial
purposes, which is closer to immunity from execution but
subjection to taxation. A later case relating to attempted
taxation by local authorities of uranium stored for Japanese utility companies in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and purchased pursuant to undertakings between the Governments of Japan and the United States did not throw any
further light on this mystery. No decision was made by the
State Department as the request from the Embassy of
Japan was withdrawn on the basis of a settlement,78
94. Judicial decisions and the opinions of the executive
in the cases referred to above appear inconclusive if not
outright inconsistent. On the one hand, there appears to be
authority for the proposition that the power to tax and
liability for taxation coexist even as regards a foreign
State's property, and that the only possible exception is
consent or waiver by the territorial State established in the
form of treaty provisions. No clear precedent exists for the
15 See the letter from the Department of State's Acting Legal Adviser,
Mr. Richard D. Kearney, to the Comptroller of the City of New York,
Digest of United States Practice ... , 1977, op. cit., p. 1053, No. 48.
16 United States v. City of Glen Cove (1971) (Federal Supplement,
vol. 322 (1971), p. 149); judgment affirmed (1971) (Federal Reporter, 2d
Series, vol. 450 (1972), p. 884) .
11 See Digest of United States Practice ... , /977, op. cit., p. 1069,
No. 71.
78 Ibid., p. 1077, No. 100. See also C. Brower, "Litigation of sovereign
immunity before a State administrative body and the Department of
State: The Japanese uranium tax case", American Journal ofInternatiollal
Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 71 (1977), p. 438.

Documents of the thirty-sixth session

24

absolute immunity of diplomatic or consular premises
from taxation beyond courtesy or comity, depending on
the discretionary power of the territorial State to dispense
with the tax assessment. It is relatively certain that foreign
State property used for governmental and non-commercial
purposes would be exempt from attachment, seizure, foreclosure proceedings and other measures of execution, especially as far as the executive is concerned. Payment of
taxes already assessed would not appear to be recoverable.
95. Such practice, unsettled and unsettling as it may
seem, is no more precise elsewhere. The only other relevant
decision is probably a Canadian case decided in 1958 79
relating to an attempt by the local authority to collect rates
on premises leased on behalf of the United States for the
purpose of constructing a radar installation pursuant to a
joint defence scheme with the Canadian Government. The
Canadian Supreme Court held that the land was immune
from rates, although the decision was probably not uninfluenced by the fact that there was an express invitation by
Canada to the United States to undertake the work and that
the defence, rather than the commercial, character of the
project was emphasized.

2.

GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE

96. In a way not uncharacteristic of the Canadian and
United States decisions, which are inherently connected
with the positions taken by the political branches of the
Government, and not altogether separable from the discretionary power of the executive, governmental practice
seems to be preponderantly in favour of settlement of this
delicate point by bilateral agreements. Thus the Government of Thailand, for example, had concluded agreements,
as it is entitled to do in law and as it often does in practice,
with friendly Governments or international organizations
dispensing with the liability to pay ad valorem duties on
transfer of title deeds or reducing such fiscal liabilities by a
half. Rates can similarly be adjusted and readjusted in
accordance with the favourable treatment to be accorded
to official premises or property of Governments or international organizations used for official, governmental and
non-commercial purposes.
97. Practice therefore varies from complete exemption or
absolute immunity, to complete subjection or liability to
taxation in full, via intermediate stages of partial subjection to rates and taxes. This is also true of import duties in
Thailand, exemption from which may be accorded under
bilateral arrangements or headquarters agreements, as
fully authorized by the general enabling clause or provision
in an act in the Revenue Code, as well as by the royal decree
for customs tariff exemptions.
98. This state of flux in international practice would
appear to call for a re-examination of the entire question of
fiscal liabilities and customs duties. An attempt should
therefore be made to restate or reformulate residuary rules
in this specified area, while leaving intact the inviolability,

7. Municipality of the City and County of Saint John, Logan and Clayton v. Fraser-Brace Overseas Corporation et al.; see United Nations,
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities .. " pp. 232 et seq.

and hence immunity, of State property from all forms of
seizure, attachment, foreclosure or execution.
(a)

National legislation

99. The United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 xO
contains a provision on the point at issue. Section 11 of
that Act reads:
Exceptions ji-om immunity
II. A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to its liability for:
Ca) value added tax, any duty of customs or excise or any agricultural
levy; or
(b) rates in respect of premises occupied by it for commercial pur-

poses.

100. A similar provision is contained in section 13 of
Singapore's State Immunity Act. 1979 81 and in section 12
of Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance. 1981.82 The
United States and Canadian counterparts do not contain
parallel provisions. However, the liability of foreign
Governments to pay United States income tax is to be
regulated by income tax regulations on "Income of Foreign
Governments". The United States Department of the
Treasury's "Notice of proposed rule-making"83 provides
guidance for taxing foreign sovereigns on their income
from commercial activities within the United States.
Roughly speaking, income of foreign Governments from
investments in the United States in stocks, bonds or other
domestic securities, owned by an integral part or controlled
entity of a foreign sovereign, or from interest on bank
deposits belonging to such an integral part or controlled
entity, is exempt from taxation under section 892 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 84 whereas amounts derived from
commercial activities in the United States are taxable
under section 881 or 882. According to the proposed new
rules, certain activities are regarded as non-commercial
and income derived therefrom is exempt from taxation.
Apart from investments and interest on bank accounts or
dividends not connected with the conduct of trade or business, performances of exhibitions devoted to the promotion of acts by cultural organizations and mere purchase of
goods for the use of the foreign sovereign are not treated as
commercial.
(b) International or regional conventions
101. International or regional conventions appear to remain silent on this point. Perhaps silence was preferred,
leaving the practice to grow out of the general confusion.
Neither the 1972 European Convention on State Immun-

80

See footnote 58 above.

81

See footnote 61 above.

See footnote 62 above; see also section 12 of South Africa's Foreign
States Immunities Act, 1981 (ibid.).
83 Federal Register, vol. 43, No. 158 (15 August 1978), pp. 36111 et seq.;
see also United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . ... pp.63
82

et seq.
84 United States Code, 1976 Edition. vol. 7, title 26, p. 572.
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ity 85 nor the 1983 Inter-American Draft Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunity of States 86 contains a comprehensive provision on immunity from taxation either of the
State itself, or of its property. The inter-American draft
convention merely states:
Article 6
States shall not claim immunity from jurisdiction either:
(d) in tax matters regarding activities under paragraph one of article 5,
for property located in the forum State;

The activities in question include "trade or commercial
activities undertaken in the State of the forum".87

3.

INTERNATIONAL OPINION

102. Legal opinions are perhaps undecided or even indifferent on a number of relevant points, not knowing for
certain whether a provision dealing with this specified area
should be included in the part on exceptions. If so, the
extent or scope of the content of the exception, its qualifications and limitations will also have to be ascertained
and formulated with a reasonable measure of precision and
confidence. The draft prepared by the Committee on State
Immunity of the International Law Association and
adopted at Montreal in 1982 88 makes no pronouncement
on this significant but delicate issue. On the positive side,
progressive development of international law should include an appropriate provision.
4. A

TWILIGHT ZONE

103. This particular area of "fiscal liabilities and customs
duties" may constitute a twilight zone in the opinion of
writers, at least as to the desirability and necessity of
including a specific provision. This somewhat nebulous
area could be illuminated by articulating a draft provision
to indicate the likelihood of positive rules being adopted
on the application or non-application of State immunity in
regard to fiscal liability, including income tax, purchase or
sales tax, excise duties, ad valorem stamp duties, import
levies and duties, rates and other taxes on property. The
inclusion of such a provision would seem to be warranted.

I

C. Formulation of draft article 17
104.

Article 17 could be formulated as follows:

Article 17. Fiscal liabilities and customs duties

\

1. Unless otherwise agreed, a State cannot invoke immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another State in a
proceeding relating to its liability for:

f

\
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(a) value added tax, any duty of customs or excise or any
agricultural levy; or
(b) ad I'a/orem stamp duty or a charge or registration fee
for registration or transfer of property in the forum State;
or
(c) income tax derived from commercial activities conducted in the forum State; or
(d) rates or taxes on premises occupied by it in the forum
State for commercial purposes.
2. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall be interpreted as an
exception to the immunity of a State for its dipl.omatic and
consular premises from seizure, attachment or measures of
execution, or to allow foreclosure, sequestration or freezing
of such premises or of State property otherwist: internationally protected.
ARTICLE 18 (Shareholdings and membership of bodies corporate)
~..

General considerations

I. SCOPE OF "SHAREHOLDINGS AND MEMBERSHIP OF
BODIES CORPORATE"

105. When a State buys share or holds shares in a company constituted under the law and registered by virtue of
the company law of another State, or acquires equities or
becomes a member in an association or partnership
formed, organized or chartered under the legal system of
another State, it may be said to have entered into a legal
relationship in that other State. Physically, the State need
not leave its territory nor cross the boundary of that other
State to acquire shares, membership or partnership in any
corporation, association or society established in the territory of another State by virtue of its internal law.
106. The fact that a State holds shares or becomes a
member of a body corporate organized and operating in
another State would seem to indicate its willingness to
recognize the validity of the legal relationship it has created
or entered into under the legal system of that other State. In
so doing, the State is also bound to respect the local laws of
the State of incorporation or registration, or of the siege
social or headquarters, and to abide by the charter of the
corporation or unincorporated partnership concerned. The
purpose of article 18 is to examine and delimit the scope of
"shareholdings and membership of bodies corporate" by a
State as an exception to its immunity from the jurisdiction
of the State of incorporation or association.

2.

ApPLICABILITY OF THE LAW OF INCORPORATION AS A
SOUND BASIS FOR EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

107. In all matters relating to the relationship between
shareholders inter se or between the shareholders and the
company or body corporate of any form, the law of the
State of incorporation governs the formation, operation
and also the dissolution of the entity in question. No other
legal relationship could exist outside the purview of the law
of the State of incorporation or registration, or of the controlling centre or siege social or central of the organization
or entity. Because of the special nature of the law and the
resulting legal relationship, no other systems oflaw seem to
be applicable. Thus the exclusive application of the law of

:i
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the State of incorporation makes it difficult or impossible
to imagine the applicability of another law or another separate and independent legal system.
108. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the
exclusive applicability ofa law implies the exclusive competence of the State of incorporation. The existence of rules
of conflict of laws and private international law presupposes the possibility of a choice oflaws to be made by any
competent court or any tribunal with concurrent jurisdiction. But for a highly specialized branch of the law, such as
that relating to patents and trade marks (article 16) or
company law or law concerning bodies corporate (article
18), the jurisdiction of the State of incorporation and place
of head office of the corporate bodies is practically exclusive. No other jurisdiction seems better entitled to exercise
the specialized competence or to apply with accuracy and
consistency the complex system of company law or association law of another State, which at best would be alien
to it.
109. Thus any court foreign to the applicable law is
invariably a forum non conveniens. Only the court of the
State of incorporation or the place of head office could be a
forum conveniens or an appropriate adjudicatory tribunal.

3.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSENT TO THE EXERCISE OF SOLE
JURISDICTION BY THE STATE OF INCORPORATION

110. If the only applicable law coincides with the sole
jurisdiction of the State of incorporation and customary
international law requires other States to respect the applicable local law of the place of incorporation or of the place
of business operation, as the case may be, the presumption
is almost irrebuttable that any extraterritorial State acquiring shares in a company or membership of a body corporate established under the law of another State must
have understood and consented to be bound by the very
same law which creates the legal obligations contracted
and, failing other available jurisdictions, also agreed to the
exercise ofjurisdiction by the competent court of that legal
system in all matters relating to or arising out of the legal.
relationship connected with the company or body corporate in question. No other explanation makes any
sense.
4. AN ACQUIRED PLACE

Ill. It is thus becoming increasingly clear that, in this
particular area of "shareholdings and membership of
bodies corporate", the principle of State immunity does
not and cannot truly apply without creating a legal vacuum
which can never be filled. This area may be said to have
acquired a rightful place in the current stage oflegal developments as an inevitable and uncontested exception to the
doctrine of State immunity.
B. The practice of States

difficulty, not unlike the area of patents, trade marks and
other intellectual properties, where very few decisions
have been cited and discussed. In this area, as in others,
including that of fiscal liabilities and customs duties, in
which case-law is scanty ifnot non-existent (except for the
few instances in the United States), the noticeable absence
of judicial pronouncements does not alter the facts oflegal
developments and evolution. Other sources of State practice need to be examined to supplement what appears to be
lacking in judicial reaffirmations.

2.

GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE

(a) National legislation

113. It IS sufficiently clear, in the absence of judicial
decisions to the contrary, that in the practice of the countries which have adopted national legislation limiting or
restricting State immunity in this specified area, immunity
is denied a foreign State in proceedings relating to its
membership of a body corporate, an unincorporated body
or a partnership, and in those arising between the State and
that body or its members, or between partners. It is
interesting to note the requirement that another member
(or members) must not be a State (or States). One of the
three links or substantial connections, namely the place of
incorporation indicating the system of incorporation,
charter or constitution; the place of control; or the principal place of business (siege socia/), must be in the State of
the forum to substantiate the presumption ofconsent to the
exercise of juriSdiction by such closely connected forum.
114. Thus section 8 of the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 89 provides:
Exceptions from immunity
8. (I) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to its
membership of a body corporate, an unincorporated body or a partnership
which:
(a) has members other than States; and
(b) is incorporated or constituted under the law of the United Kingdom
or is controlled from or has its principal place of business in the United
Kingdom,
being proceedings arising between the State and the body or its other
members or, as the case may be, between the State and the other partners.
(2) This section does not apply if provision to the contrary has been
made by an agreement in writing between the parties to the dispute or by
the constitution or other instrument establishing or regulating the body or
partnership in question.

115. Similar provisions are contained in Singapore's
State Immunity Act, 1979,90 Pakistan's State Immunity
Ordinance, 1981 91 and other legislative texts.92 The
Canadian Act and that of the United States of America
appear to have included this area under the wider exception of commercial activities. 93
See footnote 58 above.
90 See footnote 61 above.
91 See footnote 62 above.
92 See, for example, section 9 of South Africa's Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 (ibid.).
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1. JUDICIAL PRACTICE

The absence of judicial decisions directly concerning these matters does not seem to present a source of real
112.
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(b) International or regional conventions

116. The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity94 and the 1983 Inter-American Draft Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunity of States 9S appear to have included this exception under a larger heading of trade or
commercial activities conducted or undertaken in the State
of the forum.

3.

INTERNATIONAL OPINION

117. International opinion is not so prolific in this area of
"shareholdings and membership of bodies corporate". The
draft convention prepared by the International Law Association's Committee on State Immunity prefers to have
this limited area of exception partially or fully covered by
the wider notion of "commercial activity".96 Even under
that larger exception, questions relating to shareholdings
and membership of bodies corporate are not always completely or wholly covered. In any event, article 12,97 as
provisionally adopted by the Commission, refers to "commercial contracts" rather than the entire field of trading or
commercial activities. Accordingly, if originally the reason
for including article 18 might have been fragile, there now
appears to be stronger justification in practice. There are
no compelling views of writers on this particular issue. 98 A
flexible attitude is therefore recommended. Jurisdiction of
the State of incorporation or 6fprincipal place of business
or control may be presumed, for without it there may be no
court competent to try the subject-matter of the litigation.
In the interest of justice, and however narrow the special
area designated under this exception may be, a provision
would be useful in any effort to codify or progressively
develop rules regarding State immunity and the extent of
their practical application.

C. Formulation of draft article 18
118. An attempt has thus been made to formulate article
18 to cover the exception of "shareholdings and membership of bodies corporate", keeping intact the freedom of
contract of the parties to opt out of the provision, and
establishing a firm link between the exercise ofjurisdiction
and the preponderant, ifnot obviously exclusive, applicability of the law of the State of the forum, which is the law of
the place of incorporation or association, or the law of the
principal place of business or of the place of control. The
draft article might be formulated as follows:

9) See section 5 of Canada's 1982 Act (see footnote 60 above), and
section 1605, subsection (a) (2), of the United States 1976 Act (see footnote
36 above).
94 See footnote 49 above.
95 See footnote 66 above.
96 See article III, section B, of the draft convention (see footnote 68
above).
97 See footnote 21 above.
98 See, for example, 1. Crawford, Rapporteur for the draft Australian
legislation on the immunities offoreign States (see footnote 63 above), in
Australian Law Reform Commission, "Foreign State Immunity Research
Paper No.4" (Canberra, 1983).
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Article 18. Shareholdings and membership
0/ bodies corporate
1. A State cannot invoke immunity from the jurisdiction
of a court of another State in a proceeding relating to the
determination of its rights and obligations arising from its
shareholdings or membership of a body corporate, an unincorporated body or a partnership between the State and the
body or its other members or, as the case may be, between
the State and the partnership or the other partners, provided that the body or partnership:
(a) has members other than States; and

(b) is incorporated or constituted under the law of the
State of the forum or is controlled from or has its principal
place of business in that State.

2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if provision to the contrary has been made by an agreement in writing between the
parties to the dispute or by the constitution or other instrument establishing or regulating the body or partnership in
question.

, i
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ARTICLE 19 (Ships employed in commercial service)

A. General considerations

1.

SPECIAL STATUS OF SHIPS

119. Ships or seagoing vessels have a special status distinct from other types of State property. In the first place,
they are endowed with a nationality. There is always a State
which exercises jurisdiction over a ship, wherever the ship
may be, and that is the flag-State or the State whose flag the
ship flies. Seagoing vessels may also have their places or
port of registration separate or distinct from their flagState. A land-locked State is entitled to have its flag. The
place of registration may serve a different legal purpose,
whereas the flag that a ship flies at least serves to indicate
her nationality, and the nationality ofa vessel in turn may
serve to decide a number of questions, including allegiance
to a sovereign State, involving its protection and the application of the laws of the flag-State, when on the high seas or
otherwise, even outside the territorial waters or exclusive
economic zones of the flag-State. A ship without a nationality is often regarded, not as a stateless ship, but as a pirate
ship, while the flag-State may disown or denounce any of
the ships flying its flag, once it is established that such a
ship is engaged in acts of piracy on the high seas or is
otherwise perpetrating an international crime known as
piracy jure gentium.
120. Apart from the usual requisite of nationality which
necessarily attaches to a seagoing vessels, the ship is also
sometimes considered as a piece of floating territory of the
flag-State. It is treated for several purposes as if it were an
extension of the landed area of the territory of the State
whose flag it flies. Although merely a fiction, the extraterritoriality of a seagoing vessel is a concept that carries
far-reaching implications in actual practice. All kinds of
legal or juristic acts may be performed or celebrated on
board a seagoing vessel, including marriage, birth, burial or
cremation, and treated as valid under the applicable laws
of the flag-State. In short, several types of civil status of
natural persons may be consummated on board this float-
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ing territory, even on the high seas. The officer who may
initiate the act is the captain or commander of the ship.
This master or skipper of the ship may exercise extensive
power of registration and administration concerning the
civil status of persons. The territorial character of a ship
even within foreign territorial waters or anchored in a
foreign port may be illustrated by the possibility of asylum
being given on board the ship and the surrender of a person
by and from the ship, in the form of extradition for an
extraditable offence in appropriate circumstances.
121. The combination of the two elements, namely
nationality and territory, makes the status of a ship unique
in more ways than one. In addition to its unique capacities
and qualities, a seagoing vessel is often personified, in the
sense that it may be likened to a natural or legal person as it
is so recognized in several legal systems. Thus, more notably in the Anglo-American and other common-law countries, a ship could be proceeded against by an action in rem
in admiralty, a distinct legal status incomparable to any
other object or any personified subject oflaw. Such a process in rem is basically directed against the ship itself,
which could be considered as coming under part IV of the
draft, concerning immunities of State property from attachment and execution. No separate treatment would be
necessary, if such were to be the case. However, it is now
the practice in common-law systems that a process in rem
against a ship, whether to repair physical damage caused by
careless navigation of such a ship or to recover moneys in
respect of salvage services, or in pursuit of a maritime lien,
followed by seizure or arrest of the same, really has the
purpose of compelling the owner to enter an appearance. 99
122. It has now become the practice even in a process in
rem in admiralty for the writ to be addressed not only to the
ship, but also to all persons interested in it, including the
owner, charterer and operator, as well as the owners of the
cargoes carried on board the vessel at the time of seizure.
Referring to the peculiarities of the procedures of British
admiralty, G. G. Phillimore remarked:
... it [the British admiralty) had peculiar procedures: it could proceed in
rem against property situated wi thin its juridiction by issuing a writ
specifically against the ship and by seizure, or it could proceed in personam
against the owner of the ship or the person actually in command. 100

123. This practice has operated to nullitY what might
otherwise have been a most effective means for a private
litigant wishing to obtain redress against the trading ships
ofa foreign State. If that practice had not existed, he might
have issued a writ in rem against the ship and secured his
redress without disturbing or indeed impleading the
foreign sovereign. But since the practice does exist, he can
only issue such a writ in rem by addressing it not only to the
ship, but inevitably also to all persons interested in it and
its cargoes. If such persons are foreign sovereigns or States
99 See the dictum of Sir Francis Jeune in The "Dictator" (1982) (The
Law Reports, Probate Division, 1892, p. 304), followed by the Court of
Appeal in The "Gemma" (1899) (ibid., 1899, p. 285, especially p. 292); cf.
Lord Justices Bankes and Scrutton in The ''Jupiter'' No. 1 (1924) (ibid.,

1924, p. 236, at pp. 241-242).
100 G. G. Phillimore, "Immunitl: des Etats au point de vue de la juridiction ou de I'execution forcee", Recueil des cours de I'Academie de droit
international de La Haye, 1925-IIl (Paris, Hachette), vol. 8 (1926),
p.461.

or Governments, they will necessarily be impleaded. Thus,
because of its personal consequences, the admiralty rule as
to a process in rem in the common-law countries, on the
face of it impersonal, has become unworkable against
vessels in which foreign States are interested. Consequently ships, though primajacie governed by rules different from those to which common law submits other movables, are in the final analysis subject to such rules, and the
courts "will not by their process, whether the sovereign is a
party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property
which is his or of which he is in possession or control" .101

2.

OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION OR CONTROL

124. If ships, with their special status and peculiarities
under the major legal systems, are also essentially property
and subject equally to rules applicable to special kinds of
movables, then the persons interested in a ship against
which a process in rem is being directed must include all
persons who are owners of the vessel or who have possession or control of it.
125. The concept of ownership is not irrelevant to the
question of nationality. Apart from the possibility ofa flag
of convenience, which may be attributed to a ship for
convenience sake and regardless of its true nationality,
several legal systems impose certain minimum requirements for a ship to have the nationality of the flag-State or
the State of its registration. Thus, in Thailand, to have Thai
nationality a ship must be owned by Thai nationals; or, if
the owner is a corporate body organized under Thai law, at
least 70 per cent of the shares must be owned by Thai
nationals. 102 On the other hand, a company could be established in Thailand and registered with Thai nationality but
with less than 70 per cent of its shares owned by Thai
nationals. However, to own a Thai vessel with the right to
fly the Thai flag, the company itself must be at least 70 per
cent Thai-owned. 103 Otherwise, the vessel could not fly the
Thai flag on the ground of insufficient ownership by Thai
nationals .
126. Similar requirements exist regarding the classification of ships as being State-owned. Ownership of a vessel
by a State will have to meet certain minimum requirements to justify the State's claim to own the vessel, substantially or principally if not wholly. Ownership by the
foreign State clearly determines the fact that a proceeding
impleads a foreign Government even if it is only incidentally against its owners. As has been seen in a different
context, the flag implies the possibility of exercise by the
flag-State of certain sovereign rights and powers or duties
of protection, but not necessarily involving impleading the
State whose flag the ship happens to fly, unless the ship
actually belongs to the flag-State. The flag flown by a ship
does not imply its ownership by the flag-State or by any
State, it merely indicates the nationality of the vessel,
101 See the opinion of Lord Atkin in The "Cristina" (1938) (The Law
Reports, House of Lords ... , 1938, p. 490).
102 See section 7 of the Thai Ships Act as amended by section 3 of the
Thai Ships Act (Third Act) (B.E. 2521).
103 If it is owned by a registered partnership, all the partners must be
Thais.
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which entails legal consequences that, to some extent and
for some purposes, could be less extensive or limited, as the
case may be. The extent of ownership of a vessel by a
foreign State may determine whether the State is being
impleaded or not when a process in rem is directed against
that ship. Because ofthe variety of requirements governing
the nationality of a ship, the ship may fly a different flag
from that of the State owning it, having been registered
under a flag of convenience or otherwise.
127. The question of possession or control of a ship is
basically relevant to the consideration of State immunities.
Possession by the State could be constructive or actual, for
instance through the captain, commanding officer, skipper
or master of the ship obeying instructions from the State.
Control could be more remote, and yet actual, through the
same medium of the captain loyal to the owner State and
following the instructions of the State or of one of its responsible agencies or instrumentalities. Persons interested
in the ship cover a wider group than the owners or coowners of the ship, including the corporation or its shareholders who are also classed as shipowners, and also owners or assignees of cargoes laden on board the vessel when
seized, and charterers, operators or those responsible for
the operation and navigation of the ship, be it the master
and his crew or others. A State can thus remain in possession or control ofa vessel through its captain, commanding
officer or master and crew. A charter-party may contain
provisions indicating the division of control according to
whether it is a bare-boat charter or a charter-party for
certain portions or containers or parts of the vessel, with or
without the crew or master.

3.

CLASSIFICATION OF VESSELS

128. It would seem pertinent to touch briefly upon the
classification of vessels, especially for the purpose of
immunities. Whatever the criterion-ownership, possession or control-a warship or man-of-war in active service belongs to a category of State-owned or State-operated
ships or public vessels which enjoy extensive immunities
from jurisdiction, arrest, detention and execution by the
court of any other State, apart altogether from the wideranging sovereign power that a warship could display even
on the high seas and through territorial waters. Vessels of
war belong to the armed forces of the State, adding to its
military strength and might, and as such lie outside the
reach and jurisdiction of the courts of other States. This
rule is applicable whether or not the ship is owned by the
State. The fact ofits service is determinative of its immunity. Its employment or commission as a man-of-war vests
upon the vessel the character ofa warship independently of
its ownership at any particular moment. The ship could be
commissioned under a requisition decree, chartered,
bought on hire-purchase or made available on loan from
another Government or a private party, so long as it is
employed or used by the State as a man-of-war for purposes of national defence.
129. In international law, in time of peace or even in the
event of an armed conflict, warships or men-of-war have a
special status, special privileges, and admittedly cannot be
proceeded against, unless they have been decommissioned
or condemned as lawful prizes by a prize-court, an insti-
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tution which has gone out of fashion. 104 Ordinarily, nowadays, since war is outlawed and the current instances of
armed conflicts offer little or no illustration of such a possibility of adjudication of lawful prizes, it would not be
unrealistic to regard such customs and tradi tions of prize as
having fallen into desuetude.
130. The nature or character of service or employment of
vessels appears therefore to afford a decisive criterion for
classifying them. Warships or men-of-war of all types,
including battleships, cruisers, destroyers, government
yachts, submarines, auxiliary vessels, military transports,
hospital ships, supply ships, etc., constitute a class apart,
for which immunities from jurisdiction as well as from
seizure and execution seem to have been well settled
beyond controversy.105 Other types of ships stand in need
of a more precise designation or division for the different
purposes for which ships are to be classified. Thus ships
have been classified as public vessels or private ships
according to the criterion of ownership, i.e. State-owned or
privately-owned, or according to their service or use (a) as
ships employed or used exclusively on governmental and
non-commercial service, including the cargoes carried by
such vessels not being subject to seizure, attachment or
detention, 106 or (b) as ships owned or operated by a State for
commercial and non-governmental purposes, which are
assimilated to private vessels. 107
131. Ships have also been classified, for the purposes of
the law of the sea, as (a) warships on the high seas, having
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State
other than the flag-State, (b) ships owned or operated by a
State and used only on governmental non-commercial service, which are assimilated to warships, and (c) government vessels operated for commercial non-governmental
service, which are assimilated as far as possible to private
merchant vessels without immunity of any kind. lOB The
classification adopted in the 1958 Geneva Conventions on
the law of the sea 109 appears to have been confirmed, ifnot
strengthened, by the classification adopted in the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,110 of
which article 236, entitled curiously enough "Sovereign
104 See, for example, The "Twee Gebroeders" (ISOO) (c. Robinson,
Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Admiralty
(London), vol. III (IS02), p. 162); The "Helen" (1801) (ibid., p. 224); The
"Porto Alexandre" (1920) (The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920,
p.30).
105 See, for example, article 3 of the 1926 Brussels Convention (paragraph 203 below).
106 See, for example, article I of the 1934 Additional Protocol to the 1926
Brussels Convention (paragraph 206 below).
107 See, for example, article I of the 1926 Brussels Convention (paragraph 20 I below).
108 See, for example, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone (Geneva, 29 April 1958) (United Nations, Treaty Series.
vol. 516, p. 205), and the Convention on the High Seas (Geneva, 29 April
1958) (ibid., vol. 450, p. II).
109 The General Assembly by its resolution II 05 (XI) of 21 February
1957, convened an international conference of plenipotentiaries to examine the law of the sea. The conference held at Geneva from 24 February
to 27 April 1958, prepared and opened for signature four conventions, of
which the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and
the Convention on the High Seas have direct bearing on the immunities of
public ships.
110 See Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, vol. XVII (United Nations publication, Sales No.
E.S4.V.3), p. 151, document NCONF.62/122.
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immunity", assimilates the status of vessels or aircraft
owned or operated by a State and used, at the time, only on
governmental non-commercial service, to that of any warship or naval auxiliary} II

4.

THE EXTENT OF STATE IMMUNITY

132. The above general considerations serve in some
small way to illustrate the relevance and extent of involvement of the question of State immunity in respect of Stateowned and State-operated vessels. The basis for immunity
from jurisdiction as well as from seizure, attachment and
detention appears to lie in the actual operation or employment of the vessels by the State on governmental noncommercial service, thus leaving exposed to the normal
exercise of local or territorial jurisdiction by the courts of
competence all public vessels or vessels owned or operated
by a State and used by it exclusively on non-governmental
and commercial service. It is the purpose of the present
study to examine the practice of States, both judicial and
governmental, in order to .scertain the precise extent of
immunity to be recommended or recognized in respect of
ships employed by a State exclusively on commercial and
non-governmental service. To what degree or extent can it
be said that the position of such government-owned or
government-operated vessels, used exclusively on com-,
mercial non-governmental service, is to be assimilated to
that of privately owned or privately operated merchant
marine or trading vessels?
133. It is also relevant to examine the possible use of
public vessels in the carriage of goods and passengers for
governmental and non-commercial services, such as the
carriage of mail, the performance of a postal service,1I2 or
the carriage of food supplies by government ships or even
warships to relieve a famine-stricken area, or medical supplies for a disease-ridden population. The nature of the
service, namely the carriage of goods and passengers on
ordinary commercial lines, seems fairly simple and
straightforward, but the purpose of the supply or transport
of foodstuffs, medicine and manpower may bear no relation to any commercial pursuit or gain, yet such carriage
is designed more significantly to ensure the livelihood and
welfare of a people, which is a legitimate government function and concern, as distinct from a commercial or trading
transaction and as opposed to commercial service or
operation. Legal developments traceable in the judicial
and governmental practice of States will afford a serviceable guide in the planning and preparation ofa draft article
on this important aspect of the topic. It will also be seen to
what extent the exercise of jurisdiction by a competent
court of the local or territorial State will implead a foreign
sovereign, and to what extent the foreign sovereign could
be said to have consented to the exercise of such jurisdiction as against State-owned or State-operated ships used
exclusively on commercial non-governmental service, and
the relationship this question may have with the question
of immunity of State property in general from attachment
and execution.
III Article 236 is contained in section 10 of part XII, entitled "Protection and preservation of the marine environment."
112 See, for example, The "Parlement beige" (\880) (The Law Reports,
Probate Division, vol. V (1880), pp. 219-220),

5.

THE BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

134. It is admittedly outside the scope of the present
inquiry to examine the legitimacy of claims lor the cxcrcise
of jurisdiction by the courts of a State in any given set of
circumstanC(~s. The question of the appropriateness of or
justification for the exercise of such jurisdiction is a matter
essentially and primarily within the exclusive domain ofa
sovereign State. Of course, the jurisdiction of a State is not
unlimited; there are some clear territorial limitations, and
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is in principle
subject to the rules not only of private international law,
but also of the law of nations or public international law.
However, this question will not be directly examilled in the
present study, as it is a question that must recur in any
event, whenever there is an exercise of jurisdiction by a
court ofa State beyond the bounds of its national frontiers
or territorial confines. It belongs, therefore, to the much
larger subject of the scope and content of jurisdiction as an
aspect of the sovereign authority of a State.
135. The points at issue, of which there are several in this
particular connection, appear singularly inherent in the
peculiarities of admiralty rules in the common-law countries, which permit a process in rem against a vessel, followed by its seizure, as a foundation for the commencement of an action or a legitimate ground upon which to
found and exercise jurisdiction. Thus the physical presence
of a ship within a harbour or port, or indeed lying anchored
in territorial waters, could provide a firm ground for starting a process in rem or an action to seek relief for damages
for collision at sea, or salvage services, or a salvor's or
repairer's lien on the vessel. But British admiralty rules
contain more points of obscurity than readily imaginable.
For instance, the foundation ofjurisdiction need be neither
real nor indeed personal,' it may often be a mere kinship or
association. Through a thread of common ownership, for
example, the law could fasten liabilities, both in rem and in
personam, it would seem, on an entirely different ship not
identified in any way with the ship in dispute which was at
fault or the ship for which salvage services had been rendered, except by the relationship of mere sharing of common owners, or the association with the same fleet of
ships-the sisterhood, as it is sometimes strangely called,
of ships of the same fleet or company. This fiction of sistership jurisdiction, strange as it may seem, has afforded
practical grounds and provided a convenient basis for the
aggrieved party to commence an action or process in rem in
admiralty against a sister ship in respect of the wrongs or
harms done by another sister ship.113 Without commenting
on the pros and cons of the rationale for such sister-ship
jurisdiction, suffice it to recognize that, in the legal practice
of States, the basis for jurisdiction seems incredibly wide,
but nevertheless reasonably practical and flexible.

B. The practice of States
I.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

136. It should be observed at this point that the practice
of States with regard to State imm unity in general started in
III See, for example, The "[ Congreso del Partido"(l981)(footnolc 173
below).
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many countries almost inevitably with the recognition of
the immunities of public armed ships. Thus the immunities of States, as a whole and in all subsequent manifestations, were first recognized in connection with men-ofwar. The immunities of public warships in foreign ports
and territorial or national waters became established as
early as 1812 in the celebrated case concerning a libel in
rem against the schooner exchange. which had been seized
by persons acting under a decree issued by Napoleon I
and subsequently converted into a public armed ship, then
lying in the port of Philadelphia. In the classic case,
The Schooner "Exchange" v. McFaddon and others. 114
Chief Justice Marshall considered public armed ships as
constituting a part of the military force of the nation,
and accepted as "a principle of public law, that national
ships of war, entering the port ofa friendly power, open for
their reception, are to be considered as exempted by
the consent of that power from its jurisdiction".lls

137. This classic dictum of Chief Justice Marshall could
scarcely be said to have derived from the desire on the part
of a colonial Power or a developed country to perpetuate its
subjugation of Asian or African peoples or its domination
of foreign territories, or indeed to maintain its superiority
over newly emerged States. If anything, the exact reverse
seems much closer to the truth. Thus Jean Hostie, writing
on the case-law of the American Supreme Court for that
period 116 when the United States was just a newly born
State, had this to say about the sensitive awareness of its
own national sovereignty and independence:
This same solicitous concern for its independence - quite natural for a
young State. especially as it was the first colonial State to become sovereign, ... and quite justifiable. given the external circumstances and the
novelty of the constitutional experience - this same concern is reflected in
a doctrine that was to have a major role in the case-law of the Supreme
Court.'''

138. This decision of the United States Supreme Court is
therefore remarkable in that it laid down for the first time,
in no uncertain terms, the principle of State immunity in
general and the immunities of men-of-war in particular. I IS
It represented a timely recognition of the equality of States
at a time when the European Powers were not predisposed
to accept such absolute equality for all States, although
subsequent practice made it abundantly clear that an
alternative, either in the form oflegal inequality or super-

I
I

114 W. Cranch. Reports o/Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme
Court 0/ the United States (New York). vol. VII (3rd ed.) (191 I).

p.116.
lIS
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I

Ibid., pp. 143 and 145-146.
See also Glass v. The Sloop "Betsey" (1794)(A. J. Dallas, Reports 0/

Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Several Courts o/the United States and 0/
Pennsylvania (New York), vol. III (2nd ed.) (1912), p. 6); Church v. Hub·
bart (1804) (Cranch, op. cit., vol. II (3rd cd.) (1911). p. 187); The "Antelope" (1825) (H. Wheaton. Reports 0/ Cases Argued and Adjudged in the
Supreme Court o/the United States (New York). vol. X (4th ed.) (1911), pp.
66 and 122).
117 J. Hostie. "Contribution de la Cour supreme des Etats-Unis au
developpement du droit des gens". Recueil des cours ... , 1939-111 (Paris.
Sirey). vol. 69 (1939). pp. 282-283.
118 The decision ofChiefJustice Marshall in The Schooner "Exchange"
was cited by the English Admiralty Court in The "Prins Frederik" (1820)
(J. Dodson. Reports o/Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of
Admiralty (London), vol. II (1815-1822) (1828). p. 451).
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iority of the major Powers before the law, would be unacceptable. The principle enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall received judicial endorsement and governmental
approbation in subsequent State practice. It was discussed
at length in the United Kingdom after 1820,119 until finally
confirmed in The "Constitution" (1879).120 In France, the
Foreign Minister made a declaration to the same effect less
than a decade later in relation to a case concerning the Ville
de Victoria and the Sultan (1887).121 In Germany, the same
principles were applied in 1891 in a case concerning a
Chilean ship, the Presidente Pinto, and in 1901 in a case
relating to the Assari Tewfik. a Turkish vessel. 122
139. At that time, international law was still essentially
and exclusively of European origin. But the innovation by
the American Supreme Court had begun a series of encouraging breakthroughs to update and internationalize
the process of international law-making. If States were to
be regarded as equally sovereign and none could have nor
exercise jurisdiction over the others, the very first case of
likely contact, or indeed conflict or overlapping of sovereign authority or jurisdiction, between States could not
have actually occurred unless one State moved into the
territorial confines of another. Normally no territory of a
State could overlap that of another State. But the mobility
of seagoing vessels and the fiction of their territoriality
provided precisely for this eventuality. It was therefore not
surprising that the doctrine of State immunity first came to
be recognized and accepted as a proposition oflaw in cases
involving "floating territory" of one State which happened
to sail into the territorial or national waters of another
State, with the result that the principle of sovereign equality could not permit the exercise of jurisdiction by the
territorial sovereign over the floating territory, which
formed part of the armed forces of another, equally sovereign State. This was actually how the basic principle of
State immunity or sovereign immunities of States in general came to be recognized and settled as a natural outcome
of international intercourse and an inevitable principle of
international law. The first concrete illustration of its
application is to be found in cases of public armed vessels
or warships. The likelihood of their movement into the
territory of another State was self-apparent, owing to the
inherent nature of their mobility across national maritime
frontiers.
140, Gradually and progressively, the principle of State
immunity which was first applicable to warships was
actually applied to the State itself, its organs, agencies and
others instrumentalities. Other public ships, not answering
the definition of warships, nor used for defence purposes,
were later accorded the same jurisdictional immunities, so
long only as they were public vessels, or ships owned or
operated by a State for public purposes or employed on
governmental and official or non-commercial service.
119 The "Prins Frederik" (I 820) (see footnote 118 above). It was admitted by the parties that the Prins Frederik was a public ship of war, anne en
flute, owned by the King of the Netherlands and employed in the carriage
of spices and other goods.
120 The Law Reports, Probate Division, vol. IV (1879), p. 39.
121 See G. Gidel, Le droit international public de fa mer (Paris, Sirey).
vol. II (1932), p. 303.
122 See C. Baldoni. "Les navires de guerre dans les eaux territoriales
etrangeres", Recueil des cours ... , 1938-111 (Paris, Sirey). vol. 65 (1938).
pp. 247 et seq.
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Thus it came about that the immunities originally granted
to States in respect of their public armed vessels were subsequently extended, notably in Anglo-American case-law,
to all kinds of public ships which, at the outset, were not
employed on commercial service but were later used for
the carriage of cargoes as freight earners or in the carrying
trade. Since the First World War, it has become common
practice among modern coastal States to keep a merchant
fleet or create and maintain a merchant marine in order
better to promote the national economy and external or
overseas trade in the severely competitive international
markets of the world. In view of these ever-increasing
maritime commercial activities of States, it has become
more and more questionable whether the tendency to
extend immunities in a sweeping manner could bejustified
on any logical or juridical grounds, if such an extension
finds no firm support in the overall practice of States in
general.
141. It is in the light of this question that the closest
attention should be paid to contemporary State practice
regarding the matter under consideration. It is not without
interest to note that the practice of States has been neither
logically consistent nor progressively harmonious. In fact,
the attitude of one and the same State is often different as a
claimant of immunity for its own merchant fleet, when it
demands complete and unquestioning concession of State
immunity in any circumstances, from when it displays
more judicious deliberation and restraint in the recognition and granting of like immunities for foreign public
vessels operated and employed by a State or one of its
agencies exclusively on commercial and non-governmental service. It will be seen whether there is room for consistency or harmony, ifnot uniformity, in the general practice
of States, taking into account the different political and
economic structures and ideologies prevailing in various
legal and social systems and the intermittent interplay of
the concept and practice of reciprocity.
2.

JUDICIAL PRACTICE

(a) A brief historical sketch of relevant practice

142. As has been noted in the general observations
above, the immunities of States in respect of their public
armed vessels were the first to have receivedjudicial recognition, as early as 1812,123 followed by recognition and
endorsement in the practice of States. At that time, States
were still employing their ships mainly for the purposes of
defence. Even the protection of overseas trade with their
colonial territories had an imperial ring sufficient to conjure up the official function of national defence or protection of the ships flying their flags. Such protection was
considered necessary in international or foreign waters
infested by countless fleets of pirate ships hunting for prey
and bounty. Ships owned and operated by States originally
had this basic function of policing the sea-ways or patrolling the sea lanes to ensure the safety of maritime transport
or the safe conduct and undisturbed freedom of navigation
for national ships.
123 See The Schooner "Exchange"v. McFaddon and others (I S12)(footnote 114 above).

143. Later on, States found it necessary and convenient
to employ public ships not only to suppress piracy on the
high seas, or outwardly to protect vessels flying their flags
in peacetime as well as to engage in time of war in the arrest
and seizure of foreign neutral or enemy ships as lawful
prizes, but more practically in the performance of other
public duties not necessarily connected with national defence, such as postal services,124 or to serve as government
pleasure yachts,12S or as patrol boats to suppress illegal
traffic or trade. 126 Immunities of public armed ships were
gradually extended to all such vessels employed on public
or governmental service. However, the First World War
had necessitated the new practice. In order to ensure the
supply of vital goods for areas affected by enemy blockade,
Governments had to engage directly in the carriage and
transport of such supplies as food, medicines, oil and other
necessities for the sustenance of human life. The end of the
First World War left States with seagoing vessels, freighters
and tankers on hand, either publicly owned or privately
owned but requisitioned, or seized from enemy fleets, to
fulfil the wartime needs of the nation. Once engaged in the
maritime trade and keenly a\\'are of the need for such services, it was difficult for maritime nations to disengage
themselves at the close of hostilities and to return to normalcy as if the war had never happened. The question to be
asked in connection with the judicial practice of States is
whether, and to what extent, vessels owned or operated by
States exclusively on commercial and non-governmental
service would be accorded immunities from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State.
144. The practice of various legal systems in the past
appears to reveal a substantial reluctance to give full recognition to the need for such unqualified immunities. The
qualification of immunities appears to have been centred
on the nature of the service or the exclusive use of the
vessel by a State for trading purposes, that is to say on
commercial and non-governmental service. It is both crucial and useful to examine the judicial practice of States
having the most favourable inclination towards an unqualified doctrine of State immunity. It should be borne in
mind that, in some countries, such as in socialist legal
systems, where government practice clearly favours an
absolute rule of sovereign immunity for ships owned by the
State itself regardless of their employment or the nature of
their service, there has nevertheless been no judicial practice supporting the converse situation, where foreign States
could be given recognition or accorded appropriate immunities for their vessels, however employed or regardless
of the nature of their service. As no other judicial system
could be said to have gone as far as the British and United
States systems, it is only appropriate that the present investigation of judicial practice should begin with the so-called
Anglo-American practice.
(i) United Kingdom

145. The case-law of the United Kingdom is probably the
richest in the field of State immunities in respect of public
124 For example, in The "Parlement beige" (18S0) (see footnote 112
above), immunity was recognized for a mail packet.
12S See, for example, The "Newballle" (IS85) (The Law Reports. Probate
Division. vol. X (1S85), p. 33).
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vessels. It has indisputably shown the greatest propensity
towards absolute or unqualified immunity in regard to
State-owned or State-operated vessels. But this propensity
belongs now to a remote past which is not likely to recur.
As has been noted (paragraph 121 above), a process in rem
against a ship, followed by arrest or detention, is considered to implead the owner. However, a process in rem,
not followed by arrest or detention, could proceed against a
vessel not owned by a foreign State but requisitioned by it.
An historical survey of English case-law regarding immunities of foreign public vessels reveals an interesting
phenomenon of uncertainty and changing positions in the
practice of the courts.
146. English case-law began with a period of uncertainty
from 1800 to 1873. Early nineteenth-century cases were
concerned with prize law. 127 The "Prins Frederik"
(1820) 128 was probably the first case involving a public ship
of war, arlne en flute, owned by the King of the Netherlands; but the dispute was finally settled out of court by
arbitration. Reported cases before 1873 had little or no
bearing on public vessels employed in trade, since States
had not generally employed their ships in the carriage of
merchandise for freight. Cases like The "Marquis ofHuntley" (1835),129 The "Athol"(1842) 130 and The "ThomasA.
Scott" (1864)131 were either concerned with ships of war or
related to questions of municipal rather than international
law.
147. The second period was from 1873 to 1880, that is to
say between The "Charkieh" (1873) \32 and The "Parlement beIge" (1880).133 This could be considered as corresponding to the acceptance ofa restrictive rule of immunity.
Sir Robert Phillimore, an unsurpassed authority on British
admiralty law in the nineteenth century since Lord Stowell,
held that the commercial nature of the service or employment of the vessel disentitled it to State immunity. Since
the Charkieh was, inter alia, engaged in trading ventures, it
was not accorded immunity. Another lesser ground for
rejecting immunity was the fact that it was owned by the
Khedive of Egypt, probably in his private capacity. Furthermore, it was chartered to a British subject at the time
126 See, for example, The "Dictator" (1892) (footnote 99 above); The
"Gemma"(1899) (ibid.. ); and The "Jassy" (I 906) (The Law Reports. Probate Division. 1906. p. 270).
127 See, for example, The "Twee Gebroeders" (1800) (footnote 104
above); The "Helen "(1801) (ibid.); The "Anna" (1805) (C. Robinson, op.
cit .• vol. V (1806), p. 373); The "Comus"(ISI6), referred to in connection
with The "Prins Frederick" (Dodson, op. cit .• vol. II (1815-1822), p. 464).
Cf. The "Charkieh" (1873) (footnote 132 below) and The "Thomas A.
Scol/" (1864) (The Law Times Reports (London), vol. X (March-September 1864), p. 726).
128 See footnote 118 above.
129 J. Haggard, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High
COlin of Admiralty (London), vol. III (1833-1838) (1840), p. 246.
130 W. Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High
COllrt of Admiralty (London), vol. I (1838-1842) (1844), p. 374. See also
The "Swallow" (1856) and The "Inflexible" (1856) (M. C. Swabey, Reports
of Cases Decided in the High COllrt of Admiralty. 1855-1859 (London,
1860), pp. 30 and 32); and The "Ticonderoga" (1857) (Swabey, op. cit .•
p.215).
131 See footnote 127 above, in fine; the term "ships of war" was held to
include a transport owned by a State.
132 The Law Reports. High Court ofAdmiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts.
vol. IV (1985), p. 59; see also C. F. Gabba in Journal du droit international
prive (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 17 (1890), p. 41.
113 See footnote 138 below.
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the proceeding had started. Sir Robert Phillimore, in his
oft-cited dictum, stated per curiam:
... No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no
dictum of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to authorise a
sovereign prince to assume the character of a trader, when it is for his
benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a private subject to throw ofT,
if I may so speak, his disguise, and appear as a sovereign, claiming for his
own benefit, and to the injury ofa private person, for the first time, all the
attributes of his character. 134

148. The reign of restricted immunity was confirmed in
regard to the domestic sovereign in The "Cybele"( 1877) \3S
by Sir Robert Phillimore himself, who also, in the later case
of The "Constitution" (1879),136 distinguished between an
American vessel of war entitled to immunity, although at
the critical time it was carrying cargo for the Paris Exhibition, and a public ship employed for commercial purposes,
which would not be accorded jurisdictional immunity. Sir
Robert Phillimore went a step further in the more controversial case The "Parlement beIge" (1879),137 concerning a
ship used only partly, not exclusively, for commercial purposes.
149. His decision rejecting immunity was reversed in
1880 \38 by the Court of Appeal, which, per Lord Justice
Brett, accorded immunity on the grounds, inter alia,
that
. .. the ship has been mainly used for the purpose of carrying the mails,
and only subserviently to that main object for the purposes of trade. The
carrying of passengers and merchandise has been subordinated to the duty
of carrying the mails. 139

Besides, the Parlement beIge was intrinsically a mail
packet, owned by the King of Belgium in his sovereign
capacity, and at no time was it exclusively employed on
commercial and non-governmental service. Nevertheless,
the reversal of Sir Robert Phillimore's decision by the
Court of Appeal in 1880 marked a decline in the attractiveness of the restrictive doctrine and, owing to a system
of rigid adherence to stare decisis, the 40-year period following The "Parlement beige" (1880) 140 until 1920 has
been characterized perhaps less accurately as a period of
uncertainty, with a tendency in favour of a more unqualified rule of State immunity. The uncertainty was more of
an erroneous appreciation of the true nature of the service
or the preponderant employment of the Parlement beige in
the carriage of mail. In addition, under the bilateral treaty
then in force between Belgium and the United Kingdom,
134 The Law Reports. High Court of Admiralty ...• vol. IV (1875),
pp.99-100.
135 The Law Reports. Probate Division. vol. II (1877), p. 224. See also
Young. Master ofSS "Flirnesia" v. ss "Scotia" (1903)(The Law Reports.
House of Lords . ..• 1903. p. 505).
136 See footnote 120 above.
137 The Law Reports. Probate Division. vol. IV (1879), p. 129. After
reviewing English and American cases, Judge Phillimore concluded that
the Parlement beIge was neither a ship of war nor a pleasure-boat and was
thus not entitled to immunity.
138 Ibid.. vol. V (18S0), p. 197.
139 Ibid.. p. 220.
140 See footnote 138 above. See also F. Wharton, "Le cas du vapeur
postal: Ie Parlement beige". Revue de droit international et de /egisla/ion
comparee (Paris). vol. XII (IS80), p. 235.
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mail packets such as the Parlement beIge, regardless of its
subsidiary employment, which was partly commercial,
were to be treated as men-of-war for the purposes of jurisdictional immunities. 141 Lord Justice Brett, after an intensive review of earlier cases, recognized that
... as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign
authority .... each and every one declines to exercise by means of its courts
any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or
ambassador of any other State. or over the public property" of any State
which is destined to public use" .. 142

150. The principle thus laid down does not appear to be
incompatible with a restrictive view of immunity, for the
public property of a foreign State is further required to be
destined for public use (publicis usibus destinata) or in use
for public purposes in order to be entitled to State immunity. The case Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878) 143 was therefore
cited in support of the view that the public property of a
foreign sovereign in use for public purposes was exempt
fr )m the jurisdiction of English courts. The requirement of
public use or public purposes of the public property was
weakened by a further dictum of Lord Justice Brett in The
"Parlement beIge", which contained a suggestion that a
declaration of a foreign sovereign as to the nature or
character of the use of his public property was determinative and was binding on the courts. 144 This suggestion was
subsequently overruled by English courts in a series of
much more recent cases, the first of which was Juan
Ysmael & Co. Inc. v. Government of the Republic o/Indonesia (1954).145 In the meantime, 'however, a more unqualified rule of State immunity continued to assert
itself in British practice in all its various aspects, except
directly on the point under investigation, namely the
exclusive use of public vessels on commercial and nongovernmental service.
151. In the 40 years that followed The "Parlement beIge"
(1880), which have been classified as a period of un~er
tainty with a favourable tendency towards absolute Immunity, and also for a few years after, a series of cases were
decided which clarified a number of salient points regarding procedures in admiralty and the circumstances in
which it could be said whether or not a foreign sovereign
would be impleaded in a process in rem against a ship not
141 Article VI ofthe postal Convention of 17 February 1876 between the
United Kingdom and Belgium provides:

"VI. ...

"These vessels shall be considered, and treated ... , as vessels of war,
and be there entitled to all the honours and privileges which the interests and importance of the service in which they are employed
demand.
(British and Foreign State Papers. 1875,1876 (London), vol. LXVII
(1883), p. 21). See also, concerning foreign mail packets, Lord McNair,
International Law Opinions (Cambridge, University Press), vol. I (1956),
pp. 95 et seq.
142 Loc. cit. (footnote 138 above), pp. 214-215.
143 The Law Reports. Chancery Division, vol. IX (1878), p. 351. The case
concerned quantities of shells bought in Germany by the Emperor of
Japan. The shells were destined for use in guns to be fitted to battleships
forming part of the Japanese imperial fleet.
144 Loc. cit. (footnote 138 above), pp. 212-213.
145 The Law Reports. Houseo/Lords . ... 1955. p. 72. Cf. the Hong Kong
Aircraft case (1953) (ibid.. 1953. p. 70).

owned by a foreign sovereign, but in his possesion, without
other interests such as the right to possess.1 46 Thus it follows that actions in rem could be brought against privately
owned vessels at any time regardless of the actual employment by the State, provided that the proceedings did not
relate to the activities of the State operating them, while
actions in personam were equally permissible against the
private owners in respect of acts unconnected with the
employment by the State. 147 A writ in rem could be issued
against a privately owned vessel which did .nothing to
interfere with the use of the vessel by the sovereIgn State. 148
An action in rem could be instituted against a requisitioned
ship, but no arrest could be made while it was in public
service or use or in the possession of a foreign Government. 149 It appears that the real purpose of this "suspended
action in rem" was to enable a writ to issue, to prevent the
running of time against the plaintiff, who would thus be
able eventually to call the owner to account with the possibility of attaching the property when it reverted to him. ISO
It follows that, after the termination of public service of a
privately owned vessel, actions in rem which had been
suspended could now proceed against the vessel inasmuch
as they did not touch the personal liability of the foreign
Government. Thus actions for salvage services have been
allowed, while actions for damage by collision during the
employment of the ship by a foreign State have been set
aside for impleading the foreign State, as the State was
responsible for the safe navigation of the ships, while in the
former case the private owners had benefited from the
salvage services. 151 Lastly, it should also be noted that no
maritime lien could attach to privately owned ships while
in the public service of a foreign Government. IS2 Preexisting maritime liens, prior to requisition or charter of a
ship by the State, would be suspended during the term of
State employment, after which they would once again
become operati ve. IS3
146 See, for example, The "Broadmayne" (1916) (Annual Digest o/The
Times Law Reports (London), vol. XXXII, p. 304); The "Messicano"
(1916) (ibid., p. 159); The "Erissos" (1917) (Lloyd's List (London), 23
October 1917); The "Eolo" (1918) (The Irish Law Reports. vol. 2, p. 78);
The "Crimdon" (1918) (Annual Digest o/The Times Law Reports, vol.
XXXV p. 81)' The "Koursk" (1918) (Lloyd's List, 19 June 1918); The
"Espoz~nde" <1918) (ibid., 18 and 25 February 1918); and The "Jupiter"
No.1 (1924) (see footnote 99 above, injine. and Annual Digest .. .. 19251926 (London), vol. 3 (1929), p. 136, case No. 100).
147 See, for example, The "Messicano" (1916), The "Erissos "(1917) and
The "Crimdon" (1918) (cases referred to in footnote 146 above).
148 See the opinion of Judge Hi1I in The "Crimdon" (1918), (footnote
146 above).
149 See the opinion of Sir Samuel Evans in The "Messicano" (1916)
(ibid.).
150 See The "Gagara"(1919) (The Law Reports, Probate Division. 1919.
p. 95, especially p. 101). In this case, immunity was. accorde~ to a. sh.ip
requisitioned by the Estonian Government and whl~h remamed m ,Its
possession. Cf. the opinion expressed by Lord Justice Bankes In Ihe
"Jupiter" No. I (1924) (footnote 99 above), and the refusal of immunity in
The "Jupiter" No.2 (\ 925) (The Law Reports, Prob~te Division. 1925. p.
69), where the Soviet Government was no longer In possession of the
Jupiter and claimed no interest in it.
151 See The "Meandros" (1924) (The Law Reports. Probate Division.
1925. p. 61). The owners were held liable for the salvage services rendered.
152 See The "Sylvan Arrow" (1923) (ibid.. 1923. p. 220). The personalized liability in rem ofa ship for a delict depended on the amenability to the
local jurisdiction of the persons operating it.
153 See also The "Tervaete" (1922) (ibid.. 1922. pp. 197 and 259); The
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152. It is interesting to note that, on the eve of 1920,
Judge Hill made a suggestion in The "Annette"; The
"Dora" (1919) 154 that a ship chartered or requisitioned by a
Government and merely employed in ordinary trading
voyages was to enjoy no immunity. This commendable
suggestion was rejected by the Court of Appeal the following year in The "Porto Alexandre" (1920).155 The Porto
Alexandre was formerly a German privately-owned vessel
named the Ingbert, adjudged lawful prize by the Portuguese Prize Court in 1917. She had earlier been requisitioned by the Portuguese Government and handed over
to the Committee of Services of the Transportes Maritimos
do Estado (TMDE) 156 and had since been employed exclusively in ordinary trading operations, earning freight for
the Government. In the Admiralty Division of the High
Court, Judge Hill declined jurisdiction, setting ~side the
writ in rem against the ship, her cargo and freight, and
against her owners in so far as the ship and freight were
concerned, pointing out the undesirability of ~uch hard
cases, but having to assert then what he "conceived to be
the law".157 Absolute immunity was applied with reluctance. The Court )f Appeal showed no less hesitation in
confirming this decision. Lord Justice Bankes felt the difficulty but deemed himself, rightly or wrongly, bound by
the decision of the same court in The "Parlelnent beIge". 158
Lord Justice Warrington was ofa similar opinion. 159 Lord
Justice Scrutton appreciated the difficulty and shared the
doubts felt by Judge Hill in the court below, but refused the
judicial remedy sought and went out of his way to suggest
some practical remedies which were extra-legal. H.e observed: "no one can shut his eyes, now that the fashIOn of
nationalization is in the air ... and if these national ships
wander about without liabilities, many trading affairs will
become difficult" .160 The phrase publicis usibus destinata
was much discussed, while on the whole Judge Hill and the
Court of Appeal appear to have gratuitously declared
themselves bound by the authority of The "Parlement
beIge". The principles favouring an absolute view of State
immunity as laid down in The "Porto Alexandre" ~ere
admitted by counsel in The "Jupiter"No. I (1924) 161 Without any argument and were applied in subsequent cases,
"Utopia" (1893) (The Law Reports, House of Lords . .. , 1893, p. 492),
especially the opinion of Sir Francis Jeune (pp. 497 and 499); and The
"Castlegate" (1892) (ibid., p. 38), especially the opinion of Lord Watson
(p.52).
IS4

The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1919, p. 105 especially pp. 112-

113.
Ibid., 1920, p. 30.
156 An organization similar to the United States Shipping Board
(USSB).
157 The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920, p. 31.
158 Lord Justice Bankes stated:
ISS

"But in modern times sovereigns have taken to owning ships, which
may ... be employed as ordinary trading vessels engaged in ordinary
trading. The fact of itself indicates the growing importance ?,f the particular question, if vessels so employed are free from arrest. (ibId., p.
34.)

Ibid., pp. 35-36.
Ibid., pp. 38-39. An accurate resume of the position in. ~nglish caselaw before 1921 is given in A. D. McNair, "Judicial recogmtlOn of States
and Governments and the immunity of public ships", British Year Book of
Illlernational Law, 1921-22 (London), vol. 2, p. 74 (d) and (e); cf. W. R.
Bisschop, "Immunity of States in maritime law", ibid., 1922·23, vol. 3,
p.159.
159

160

161

See footnote 99 above.
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such as Campania Mercantil Argentina v. United States
Shipping Board (1924).162 This rule was applied in a long
line of recognition cases during the Spanish civil war.163
153. The next period in the history of English case-law on
the point under review started with The "Cristina"
(1938).164 It was another period of uncertainty, with tendencies towards more and more restrictions, culminating in·
the final confirmation of absence of State immunity in
respect of ships employed by a foreign State exclusively
on commercial and non-governmental service. The
"Cristina" was a turning-point in 1938; the vessel was in
use for public purposes and not employed in trading
voyages. The five Law Lords in the House of Lords took
occasion to express their views on the question. State
immunity was allowed for privately owned ships chartered
or requisitioned by foreign States. It was held, per
Lord Atkin, that the courts would not, by their process,
seize or detain "property which is ... [the sovereign's] or
of which he is in possession or control".165 In his view,
immunity would have applied also to public property used
for purely commercial purposes. That view was shared
also by Lord Wright, approving the correctness of
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in The "Porto
Alexandre" (1920) 166 and the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in The "Pesaro" (1926),167 but observing:
"This modern development of the immunity of public
ships has not escaped severe, and, in my opinion,
justifiable criticism on practical grounds of polic~, at
least as applied in times of peace. "168 Lord Macmillan
reserved his opinion, and expressed his doubts:
I confess that I should hesitate to lay down that it is part of the Law of
England that an ordinary foreign trading vessel is immune from civil
process within this realm by reason merely of the fact that it is owned by a
foreign State, for such a principle must be an importation from intcrnational law and there is no proved consensus of international opinion or
practice to this effect. 169

154. This marked absence of consensus of international
opinion or practice seems to go a long way towards denying
any pre-existing principle of State immunity for vessels
employed by foreign Governments exclusively in trading

162 Law Journal Reports, 1924, King's Bench Division (London), vol. 93,
p. 816; Annual Digest ... , 1923-24 (London), vol. 2 (1933), p. 138, case
No. 73.
163 See, for example, The "El Condato"(1937) (Lloyd's List Law Reports
(London) vol. 59 (1937), p. 119); The "Rita Garcia" (1937) (ibid., p. 140);
The "Arr~iz"(1938) (ibid.. vol. 61 (1938), p. 39); The "El Neptuno"(1938)
(ibid., vol. 62 (1938), p. 7); The "Arantzazu Mendi" (1939) (The Law
Reports, House ofLords ... ,1939, p. 256); The "Abodi Mendi"(1939)(The
Law Reports. Probate Division, 1939, p. 178); The "Kabalo" (1940)
(Lloyd's List Law Reports, vol. 67 (1940), p. 572). See also Annual Digest
...• 1938-1940 (London), vol. 9 (1942), cases Nos. 25 and 88-92.

164 The Lal>' Reports, House of Lords . .. , 1938, p. 485. See also H.
Lauterpacht, "The Cristina", The Law Quarterly Review (London). vol.
LIV (1938), p. 339; F. A. Mann, "Immunity of foreign States", The
Modern Law Review (London), vol. II (1938-1939), p. 57; R. Y. Jennings,
"Recognition and sovereign immunities", ibid., p. 287; notc in The British
Year Book of International Law, 1938 (London), vol. 19, pp. 243-249.
16S

The Law Reports, House of Lords . .. , 1938, p. 490.

166

See footnote 155 above.

167

See footnote 179 below.

168

The Law Reports, House of Lords . ... 1938, p. 512.
Ibid., p. 498.
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courts to deny an immunity which our government has
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds
which the government has not seen fit to recognize."193
American judges were predisposed to regard the interpretation of a foreign State's use of its vessels as a matter of
diplomatic rather thanjudicial determination. 194 The judicial primacy in this field has therefore been relegated. The
trend in the Supreme Court in favour offollowing the lead
of the political branch of the Government in this connection is significant in view of the restatement of the policy of
the United States Government limiting immunity in certain classes of case, as enunciated in the famous Tate Letter
of 19 May 1952. 195
161. The Tate Letter put an end to any lingering doubts
regarding the policy to be followed by the executive, as well
as by the courts. Restricted immunity based on a distinction between public acts Uure imperii) and private acts
Uure gestionis) was adopted and the practice of the State
Department of making suggestions of immunity gradually
developed. The role of the judiciary became that of a "second chamber''' and the practice of pre-trial by the political branch of the Government grew, until it became too onerous to maintain. 196 Thus the legislative branch of the
Government intervened to restore a new balance in the
form of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. 197
The determination of questions of jurisdictional immunities and their extent was once again restored to the original
authority. namely the judiciary, with far less likelihood of
interventions by the executive branch of the Government. 198 What is clear, however, is that, since the Tate
Uniled SImes Reporls. vol. 324 (1946), p. 30, at p. 35. Cf. the opinion
of Chief Justice Stone in Ex parte Republic oj Peru (1943) (ibid., vol. 318
(1943), p. 578. at pp. 588-589). See also F. W. Stone Engineering Co. v.
Petroleos .\lexicallos (1945) (Pennsylvania State Reports, vol. 352 (1946),
p. 12; Annual Digest ... , 1946 (London), vol. 13 (1951), p.76, case
No.31); Uniled States oj Mexico et al. v. Peter Schmuck et al. (1944)
(Reports oJCases Decided in the Court of Appeals oJthe State oJNew York,
vol. 293 (1945). p. 264; Annual Digest ... , 1943-1945 (London), vol. 12
(1949), p. 75, case No. 21); A. B. Lyons, "The conclusiveness of the 'suggestion' and certificate of the American State Department", The British
Year Book oj IllIernational Law, 1947 (London), vol. 24, p. 116.
194 For example, in The "Maipo"(1919) (The Federal Reporter, vol. 259
(1920), p. 367). Judge Hough considered that, if a Government engaged in
trade, it should be subject to the same liabilities as private individuals, but
this would invoke the Chilean Government's interpretation of what was a
public function. It was, as such, a matter of diplomatic ratherthan judicial
determination. C£ The "Roseric" (1918) (footnote 192 above).
195 The Department oj State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. XXVI,
No. 678 (23 June 1952), pp. 984-985. See also W. W. Bishop, Jr., "New
United States policy limiting sovereign immunity", The American Journal
oj International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 47 (1953), p. 93.
196 Pre-1976 judicial practice was to a greater or lesser extent influenced
by the "views" or "suggestions" of the executive branch of the Government, especially when they were favourable to the granting of immunity.
See Chemical ./o,,'atural Resources v. Republic oj Venezuela (1966) (International Lall Reports (London), vol. 42 (1971), p. 119); Isbrandtsen Tankers v. President oj India (1970) (International Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.). vol. X, No.5 (September 1971), p. 1046); Amkor Corporation
v. Bank oj Korea (1969) (International Law Repo'ts (Cambridge), vol. 53
(1979), p. 291).
191 See footnote 282 below.
198 The procedure still exists for foreign Governments to ask the State
Department to intervene through the Department of Justice as amicus
curiae. See, for example, Maritime International Nominees Establishment
v. Republic oj Guinea (1982) (footnote 38 above), in which the United
States of America was an intervener; the conclusions of the United States
are reproduced in International Legal Materials (Washington. D.C.), vol.
XX, No.6 (November 1981), pp. 1436 et seq.
19J

Letter (1952), it has become settled law in the practice of
the United States that State ships operated exclusively on
commercial and non-governmental service are not granted
immunities from seizure, attachment or detention.
162. It should also be observed that, even prior to and
during the period between Berizzi Brothers Co. v. SS
"Pesaro"(1926) 199 and the dictum of Chief Justice Stone in
Republic 0/Mexico et al. v. Hoffinan (1945),200 when ships
employed by foreign Governments exclusively on commercial and governmental service were accorded immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts, immunity
was subject to further restrictions and qualifications. Unlike English practice, which gave prominence to ownership
by a foreign sovereign, United States practice based immunity on actual possession. Thus immunity was recognized if the ship was either owned and possessed, or merely
possessed and controlled or managed by a foreign Government, as in The "Roseric"(1918)201 and The "Carlo Poma"
(1919).202 Conversely, immunity was denied in cases like
The "Attualita" (1916) 203 and The "Beaverton "; the
"Daisai Maru" {l919),204 where the ship in question was
neither owned, nor r )ssessed, nor operated by the State,
though it was chartered or requisitioned by it. The requirement of actual possession as evidence of dedication to
public service was regarded as determinative. In United
States law, property does not necessarily become a part of
the sovereignty because it is owned by the sovereign. To
make it so it must be devoted to the public use and must be
employed in carrying on the operations of the Government,2°s
163. There are also strict requirements as to the methods
of claiming immunity in United States practice. Not only
must immunity be positively claimed, but also it must be
properly claimed according to the lex /ori. 206 Immunity
would not be considered d'office or proprio motu but must
be claimed through a proper channel, otherwise it could
not be considered by reason of inadmissibility of evidence. 207 Immunity of a public ship may be effectively
See footnote 179 above.
See footnote 193 above.
201 See footnote 192 above.
202 See footnote 184 above.
20J See footnote 181 above. See also The "Mina"; the "Altualita "(1917)
(The Federal Reporte" vol. 241 (1917), p. 530). Cf. Maru Navigation Co. v.
Societa Commerciale Italiana di Navigazione (1921) (ibid., vol. 271 (1921),
p.97).
204 The Federal Reporter, vol. 273 (1921), p. 539; this decision followed
United States v. Wi/de, (1838) (The Federal Cases, vol. 28 (1896), p. 601,
case No. 16,694) and The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24 (1916) (The
Federal Reporter, vol. 231 (1916), p. 365).
205 Opinion ofChieflustice Waite in The "Fidelity"(1879) (sec footnote
182 above); see the opinion of Chief Justice Stone in Republic ojMexico et
af. v. Hoffman (1945) (ioc. cit. (footnote 193 above), p. 37). See also The
"Davis" (1869) (Wallace, op. cit., vol. X (1909), p. 15); Long v. the "Tampico" (1883) (The Federal Repo'ter, vol. 16 (1883), p. 491, especially
pp. 493-494); The "Uxma/" (1941) (Federal Supplement, vol. 40 (1942),
p. 258); The "Katingo Hadjipatera" (1941) (ibid., p. 546; on appeal, Federal Reporter, 2d Series, vol. 119 (1941), p. 1022; and United States
Reports, vol. 313 (1941), p. 593); The "Ljubiea Matkovic" (1 943)(Federal
Supplement, vol. 49 (1943), p. 936).
206 Unlike United States practice, British courts, instead of qualifying
the methods of claiming immunity, have laid down stricter requirements
for a valid waiver of immunity.
201 Societa Commerciale Italiana di Navigazionc v. Maru Navigation
Co. (The "St. Charles ", The "Tea", The "Armando") (1922) (The Federal
199
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claimed through the diplomatic channel,208 or by direct
intervention of the foreign Government concerned ;209 alternatively, the public status of the ship may be brought to
the notice of the courts by the State Department. 2lO Immunity has been withheld where the claim was represented
by the master of the ship or by private counsel,211 or by a
consuFI2 or by an ambassador of a third country.213

165. Before the First World War, French courts appear to
have applied a principle of unqualified immunity. Since
then, the contradiction between the principle ofinviolability of State-owned property 217 and the application of the
distinction between actes de puissance publique and actes
de gestion privee or actes de cOillmerce 218 has given rise to
considerable inconsistency in the judicial practice of
France with regard to the immunity from arrest and attachment offoreign public vessels employed exclusively in

(iii) France

commerce-dans un but commercial et non gouvernemental. In The "Campos" (1919),219 The SS "Balosaro"
(1919) 220 and The "Englewood" (1920), m there were traces

164. The position of public vessels in France is different
from that in the Anglo-American world. France does not
recognize admiralty actions in rem. Damage resulting from
the use of government vessels generally entails actions in
personam against the State owning the ships or the captain
commanding the vessels. 214 Immunity of public ships per
se is considered only in connection with their liability to
seizure, either in a saisie conservatoire or prfdiminaire or
preventive, or in a saisie executoire or execution or definilive. 215 Owing to certain technicalities of a saisie conservaloire, attachments of public vessels have been frequent,
while cases arising from a saisie executoire have been comparatively rare,216 and would have closer relations to part
IV of the draft articles than to the present study.
Reporter, vol. 280 (1922), p. 334); The" Uxma/" (1941) (see footnote 205
above).
20' See, for example, The "Maipo" (1918) (The Federal Reporter,
vol. 252 (1919), p.627); The "Maipo" (1919) (ibid., vol. 259 (1920),
p.367); The "Rogdai" (1920) (ibid., vol. 278 (1922), p.294); Berizzi
Brothers Co. v. SS "Pesaro"(1926) (footnote 179 above). The "Secundus"
(1926) (The Federal Reporter, 2d Series, vol. 13 (1926), p. 469; ibid.,
vol. 15 (1927), p. 711).
209 Fields v. Predionica i Tkanica (1941) (Nell' York Supplement, 2d
Series, vol. 31 (1942), p. 739).
210 The "Florence H." (1918) (The Federal Reporter, vol. 248 (1918),
p. 1012); The "Lake Monroe" (1919) (United States Reports, vol. 250
(1923), p. 246); The "Western Maid" (1922) (see footnote 182 above).
211 See, for example, Ex parte in the Matter of Muir, Master of the
"Gleneden"(I92I) (footnote 185 above); The "Roseric" (1918) (footnote
•192 above).
212 See, for example, The "sao Vicente", The "Murmugao"-Rose v.
Transportes Maritimos do Estado (1922) (The Federal Reporter, vol. 281
(1922), p. III); The "sao Vicente"-Transportes Maritimos do Estado v.
T. A. Scott Co. (1924) (ibid., vol. 295 (1924), p. 829).
211 See, for example, The "Gill DJemaf" (1920) (1922) (The Federal
Reporter, vol. 296 (1924), pp. 563 and 567); The "Gul Djemal" (1924)
(['nited States Reports, vol. 264 (1924), p. 90). During suspension or severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey, the
Spanish Ambassador could not claim immunity for a merchant ship operated by the Turkish Government. Such a claim should be made through
the United States Department ofStatc.
114 See, for example, The "Hungerford" (1918) (1919) (footnote 222
below); cf. E. W. Allen, The Position ofForeign States before French Courts
(New York, Macmillan, 1929); and C. J. Hamson, "Immunity of foreign
States: the practice of the French courts", The British Year Book of International Law, 1950 (London), vol. 27, p. 293.
215 A saisie conservatoire is by way of cautio judicalUm solvi, i.e. security
for judgment. In commercial cases, any creditor who has a reasonable fear
of the debtor's insolvency may apply for such a saisie without the appearance of the defendant. A saisie execution is an attachment in execution
of a judgment rendered against the owner or possessor of the property
seized.
216 A saisie prelim ina ire is afail accompli before the owner has a chance
to assert his public status, while a saisie conservatoire against State-owned
property is generally not allowed. See Veuve Caratier- Terrasson v. Directwn generale des chemins de fer d'Alsace-Lorraine (1885) (Dalloz, Reclleil
1>('llOdiqlle et critique de jurisprudence, 1885 (Paris), part I, p. 341);
lIal/ ar('/ v. Ephrussi (1889) (Journal du droit international prive (Clunet)

of a more absolute principle being applied, as it was held
that ships employed by foreign States for trading purposes
could not be seized or attached,
166. Such traces were overshadowed by the distinction
formulated in The "Hungerford" (1918) by the Tribunal de
commerce of Nantes between State ships employed for
public purposes and vessels employed in ordinary trading
voyages. Although the judgment of the commercial court
was reversed by the Court of Appeal ofRennes (1919), the
distinction formulated was restated and adoI .ed, At the
time the proceedings started, the Hungeljord, a merchant
ship requisitioned by the British Admiralty, was carrying a
cargo of wheat and wool for the British and French
Governments. It was therefore conceivable, as was found
by the Court of Appeal ofRennes, that the Hungerford was
employed in public law activities. 222 The distinction was
upheld in a number of subsequent cases.223
167. It is of interest to note that, although France had
signed the 1926 Brussels Convention, but was not to ratify
it until 1955, the Tribunal de commerce of La Rochelle,
in Etienne v. Gouvernement des Pays-Bas (1947),224
(Paris), vol. 16 (1889), p. 461); but see J. G. Castel, "Immunity ora foreign
State from execution: French practice", The American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 46 (1952), p. 520.
217 See, for example, The "Campos" (1919) (Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 46 (1919), p. 747; Revue internationale du
droit maritime (Paris), vol. XXXII (1920-1921), p. 600) .
218 See the cases cited in Annual Digest . .. , 1938-1940 (London), vol. 9
(1942), pp. 241-242.
lt9 See footnote 217 above; G. Ripert was of the opinion in this case that
a vessel employed by the Brazilian Government for commercial purposes
could not be attached (Revue internationale du droit maritime (Paris),
vol. XXXIV (1922), p. 19).
220 La Gazette des Tribunaux, 1920 (Paris), part. 2, p. 93.
2lt Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 47 (1920), p. 621 ;
Revue internationale dll droit maritime (Paris), vol. XXXII (1920-1921),
p. 602: the Tribunal civil of Bordeaux lifted the attachment of the vessel
Englewood, which was owned by the United States Government. See also
The "Glenridge" (1920) (Revue internationale du droit maritime,
vol. XXXII (1920-1921), p.599); The "Avensdaw" (1922) (ibid.,
vol. XXIV (1922), p. 1074).
12l Sociell? maritime auxiliaire de transports v. Capitaine du vapeur
anglais "Hungerford" (1918) and Capitaine Seabrook v. Societe maritime
auxiliaire de transports (1919) (Rente internationale du droit maritime
(Paris), vol. XXXII (1920-1921), p. 345). With regard to the immunities of
requisitioned ships, contrast the judgments concerning the Axpe Mendi
(Rousse et Maber v. Banque d'Espagne et aulres (1937)) and the 1txas Zuri
(Societe Cementos Resola v. Larrasquil1l el Etat espagnol (1937» (Jollrnal
du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 65 (1938), pp. 53 and 287).
113 See, for example, Hertzfeld v. Dobroj/otte (1930) (Journal du droit
international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 57 (1930), p. 692); lfertz/eld v. Union
des Republiques socialistes sorietiqlles (1938) (ibid., vol. 65 (1938),
p. 1034).
224 Case concerning the vessel Ittersllm (Recueil Dalloz, 1948 (Paris),
p.84).
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expressed its approval of the principles of the Convention limiting immunity in regard to public ships engaged
in commercial activities, although jurisdiction was
declined in that case on the ground that the Ittersum was
employed by the Netherlands for political purposes, namely
the carriage of wheat for revictualling the country.

corded to a government ship employed for commercial
purposes. The reversal of the absolute rule of immunity
was pronounced in The "Visurgis"; the "Siena" (1938),m
in which the extent and limits of the immunities of public
vessels both before and after the Brussels Convention
and its Additional Protocol were fully discussed. 233

(iv) Germany

(v) Netherlands

168. Before the First World War, German courts appear
to have applied the principle of unqualified immunity with
little hesitation. 22S War vessels were accorded complete
immunity.226 By the close of that war, the legal status of
Government-owned vessels employed in trade was judicially determined. In the few years following the end of
the war, immunity was recognized for foreign State ships
even when engaged in commercial activities. In The
"Schenectady" (1920),227 the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) dismissed an appeal against immunity from seizure
and attachment of a vessel owned by the United States of
America for failure to deliver some 100 bales of cotton as
contracted. The same court affirmed the decision of the
higher regional court (Oberlandesgericht) in The "Ice
King" (1921) 228 and upheld immunity, although the vessel
was operated by the United States Shipping Board (USSB)
for commercial purposes. On the same day, the court
reversed the judgments of the lower courts in The "West
Chatala" (1921),229 granting immunity to another ship
employed by USSB on the ground that the American line
was acting merely as agent for the United States Government.
169. In The "Coimbra" (1923),230 the regional court
(Landgericht) affirmed an order of attachment against a
vessel apportioned to Portugal after the First World War,
but equipped and maintained by a private company.
Assuming that the practice of German courts during the
decade that followed the war tended to favour an absolute
view of immunity, that tendency was reversed by Germany's ratification of the 1926 Brussels Convention, at
least in so far as public ships and cargoes were concerned.
The "Oituz" (1930)23\ was probably the last case in which
The "Ice King" was followed. There, immunity was ac-

170. Before the First World War, State immunities were
not recognized by Netherlands courtS. 234 In 1917, the
executive filled the gap by introducing a general enactment
recognizing the immunities of foreign States in accordance
with international law. 235 In 1921, immunity was admitted
by the courts in regard to acts jure imperii. 236 In regard to
public ships, it appears from two leading cases 237- one of
which was, however, decided before the entry into force of
the 1926 Brussels Convention - that State-operated vessels
employed in trade would be accorded immunity from
arrest and that the distinction between the private and
public character of the service of the ship was irrelevant.
On the other hand, since the entry into force of the Brussels
Convention and the Netherlands' deposit of its instrument
of ratification, there has been no question that such
immunity would no longer be recognized except to the
extent and subject to the limitations provided in the Brussels Con ven tion. 238

The Position of Foreign States before
German Courts (New York, Macmillan, 1928). See also Heizer v. KaiserFranz-Joseph-Bahn A.G. (1885) (Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt fur das
Konigreich Bayern (Munich), vol. I (1885), pp. 15-16). Cf. article 7 of the
m See, for example, E. W. Allen,

Harvard Law School draft convention on competence of courts in regard to
foreign States (Supplement to The American Journal ofInternational Law
(Washington, D.C.), vol. 26 (1932), pp. 533-534).
226 See, for example, The "Ismir"; the "Assari Tewjik" (1901) (Zeitschrift fur Internationales Privat- und (jiJentliches Recht (Leipzig),
vol. XIII (1903), p. 397).
227 Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung (Hamburg), vol. XLII (1921), p.76,
No. 38.
228 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Berlin), vol. 103
(1922), p.274, No. 82; Revue internationale du droit maritime (Paris),
vol. XXXIII (1922), p. 868.
229 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts ... , vol. 103 (1922), p.280,
No. 83; Revue internationale du droit maritime, vol. XXXIV (1922),
p.668.
2)0 Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung (Hamburg), vol. XLIV (1923), p. 178,
No. 101; Revue de droit maritime compare (Paris), vol. 4 (1923), p. 89.
231 Juristische Wochenschrift (Leipzig), vol. 60 (1931), p. ISO, No.6;
Annual Digest ... , 1929-1930 (London), vol. 5 (1935), p. 129.

(vi) Italy
171. Italy has been regarded as being foremost among
States which have adopted a restrictive view of immunity
from the very beginning. The distinctions between alli
d'impero and aUi di gestione and between the State as ente
politico and ente civile were recognized by Italian courts as
early as 1886. 239 Apart altogether from this restrictive practice, the problem of State immunities in respect of public
vessels employed in trade does not arise in Italian law,
owing to certain peculiarities ofthe intemallaw. The personification of seagoing vessels has been pushed to its log232 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts ... , vol. 157 (1938), p. 389,
No. 62; Revue de droit maritime compare (Paris), vol. 39 (1939), p.50;
Annual Digest . .., 1938-1940 (op. cit.), p. 284, case No. 94. An action in
rem was permissible, although the arrest of the ship while it was in the
service of a foreign State was not allowed.
233 For further discussion of the application of the Brussels Convention,
see paragraph 207 below.
234 See Phillimore, lac. cit. (footnote 100 above), pp.466-467.

m See, for example, article 13 (a) of the Act of Parliament of 26 April
1917 (Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (The Hague, 1917),
No. 303).
236 Union of South Africa v. Herman Grote (1921) (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Zwollen, 1921), p. 849; Annual Digest. .. , 19/9-1922 (London),
vol. I (1932), p. 22, case No.8).
231 F. Advokaat v. /. Schuddinck & den Belgischen Staat (1923) (Weekblad van het Recht (The Hague), No. 11088; Annual Digest . .. , /923-1924
(London), vol. 2 (1933), p. 133, case No. 69); and The "Garbi" (1938)
(Weekblad van het Recht en Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Zwollen, 1939),
No. 96; Annual Digest ... , 1919-1942 (London), vol. II (1947), p. 155,

case No. 83).
238 See paragraphs 199 et seq. below.
139 See, for example, Gllttieres v. Elmilik (1886) (II Foro Italiano
(Rome), vol. XI, part I (1886), p. 913, especially pp. 920-922.
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ical extreme, so that, with the exception of ships of war,
seafaring vessels within Italian waters are amenable to the
jurisdiction ofItalian courts and are governed by the same
law as private persons. 240 It should be further noted that
Italy has also ratified the 1926 Brussels Convention and
consistently followed the principle enunciated therein.
(vii) Belgium
172. In Belgium, as in France, the problem of immunity
of public ships arises only in connection with the inviolability or exemption from seizure, arrest and attachment
of property of foreign Governments. In this connection, it
appears, quite contrary to the established practice of Belgian courts in favour of a restrictive view of immunity
from jurisdiction,241 that, since the First World War and
until recently,242 the immunity of public property from
attachment and execution has been regarded as absolute.
In the cases concerning the J oulan (1920) 243 and the Lima
and the Pangim (1921),244 it was held that a public vessel in
use for commercial purposes did not lose its immunity
from arrest by way of attachment or execution. It was alSO
held in a number of cases that the act of requisition by a
foreign State was an actum imperii over which Belgian
courts had no jurisdiction. 245 The position of State-trading
vessels was brought into line with the principle of restricted
immunity by Belgium's ratification, both international
and constitutional,246 of the Brussels Convention. A direct
application of this Convention is to be found in Saez

,.0 See,

for example. the case concerning the collision between the
Soviet vessel Plekhano{{and the Italian vessel Generale Petiti: Societa di
Nal'igazione Generale' "Gerolimich" v. Rappresentanza commerciale
del/'URSS in ltalia (court of first instance, 1934, and Court of Appeal of
Genoa, 1936) (Ril'ista di dirillo internazionale (Rome), 27th year (1935),
p. 419; ibid.. 30th year (1938), p. 226), and Rappresentanza commerciale
del/'URSS v. Sofieta di Navigazione Generale "Gerolimich" (Court of
Cassation, 1938) (II Foro Italiano (Rome), vol. LXIII (1938), p.1216;
RiI'ista del dirillo della navigazione (Rome), vol. IV -I (1938), p. 460, with a
note by R. Quadri; II Dirillo maritimo (Rome), 40th year (1938), p. 465,
with a note by B. Bissaldi: Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris),
vol. 66 (1939), p. 180; Revue de droit maritime compare (Paris), vol. 39
(1939), p. 190;Annllal Digest. .. , 1938-1940 (op. cit.), p. 247, case No. 84).
See also Phillimore, loc. cit. (footnote 100 above).
241 See, for example, Etat du Perou v. Kreg/inger (1857) (La Belgique
judiciaire (Brussels), vol. XVII (1959), p. 331).
242 See, for example, Socobelge et Etat beige v. Etat hellenique, Banque
de Grece et Banque de Bruxelles (1951) (Journal du droit international
(Clunet) (Paris), vol. 79 (1952), p. 244).

West Russian Steamship Company Ltd. V. Capitaine SucksdorfJ
(Pasicrisie beige, 1922 (Brussels), part 3, p. 3; Annual Digest . .. , 19191922 (op. cit.), p. 152, case No. 103).
244 Etat portugais v. Sauvage (Journal du droit international (Clunet)
(Paris), vol. 49 (1922), p. 739; Annual Digest ... , 1919-1922 (op. cit.),
243

p. 154, case No. 104).
245 See, for example, Brasseur et consorts v. Repub/ique hellenique et
Societe Socobel (Tribunal civil of Anvers, 1932) (Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 59 (1932), p. 1088), (Court of Appeal of
Brussels, 1933) (Pasicrisie beige, 1933 (Brussels), part. 2, p. 197; Annual
Digest ... , 1931-1932 (London), vol. 6 (1938), p. 164, case No. 85); Capi·
taine Urrutia et capitaine Amollobieta V. Martiarena et consorts (1937)
(Revue de droit maritime compare (Paris), vol. 38 (1938), p. 69; Annual
Digest ... , 1935-1937 (London), vol. 8 (1941), p. 237, case No. 94).

See the Act of 28 November 1928 for the introduction into Belgian
law of provisions corresponding to those of the 1926 Brussels Convention
(Recuei/ des lois et arretes royauxde Belgique, 1929, p. 74); cf. the note by
M. R. Hennebicq concerning the Socobelge case (lac. cit., footnote 242
above).
246
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Murua v. Pinillos et Garcia (1938),247 in which the Court of
Appeal of Brussels permitted the arrest of a vessel employed by Spain in trading.

(viii) Egypt
173. The mixed courts of Egypt have been consistent in
denying immunity to foreign States with regard to their
actes de gestion privee, jure gestionis. 248 The same is true
regarding government ships. It was held in Capitaine Hall
v, Capitaine Bengoa (1920)249 that the immunity of a public ship applied only where the act complained of was performed in the exercise of the powers of the State in its
public capacity, and not where a civil wrong had been done
by an employee of the State in the management of its
private interests. As regards the nature of the service of
public ships, the courts have been somewhat arbitrary in
giving immunity in one case to merchant ships chartered
for the transport of troops 250 and denying it in another case
concerning a public ship employed in the carriage of pilgrims, although the ship was designed for coastal defence. 251 On the other hand, the seizure of two Egyptian
vessels by the Soviet Government was held to be outside
Egyptian jurisdiction, for the act of seizure was a clear
manifestation of the sovereign authority of the Soviet
Union.
(ix) Portugal
174. In The "Cathelamet" (1926),252 the Court of Appeal
of Lisbon exercised jurisdiction in respect of a vessel of
commerce owned and employed by the United States
Shipping Board for trading purposes. On the other hand, in
1920, immunity was claimed by the Portuguese Government in connection with an attempted seizure of the Porto
Alexandre, a ship employed by the Transportes Maritimos
do Estado wholly in commercial activities (see paragraph
247 Revue critique de droit international (Paris), vol. XXXIV (1939), p.
317; forthejudgrnent of the Court of Cassation (1939), see Pasicrisie beige,
1939 (Brussels), part 2, p. 116; Annual Digest ... , 1938-1940 (op. cit.),
p. 289, case No. 95.
248 See Gouvernement egyptien V. Chemins de fer de l'Etat palestinien
(1942) (Bulletin de /egislation et de jurisprudence egyptiennes (Alexandria),
vol. 54(1941-1942), part 2, p. 242; Annual Digest. .. , 1919-1942 (op. cit.),

p. 146, case No. 78).
249 The "Sumatra" case (Bulletin de /egislation et de jurisprudence egyp·
tiennes, vol. 33 (1920-1921), p. 25; Journal du droit international (Clunet)
(Paris), vol. 48 (1921), p. 270; Annual Digest, .. , 1919-1922 (op. cit.),

p. 157, case No. 107),
250 Stapledon & Sons v. S. E. Ie Premier lord de l'Amiraute britannique
(1924) (Gazelle des tribunaux mixtes d'Egypte (Alexandria), vol. XIV
(1923-1924), p. 253; Annual Digest ... , 1923-1924 (op. cit.), p. 140, case

No. 74),
251 Sagliello v. Tawill (1923) (Gazelle des tribunaux mixtes d'Egypte,
vol. XIV ... , p. 252; Annual Digest .. ., 1923-1924 (op. cit.), p. 144, case
No. 77). See also The National Navigation Company of Egypt v. Tavou·
laridis et Cie (1927) (Gazelle des tribunaux mixtes d'Egypte, vol. XIX
(1928-1929), p. 251),

m Gazeta Judicial (Ponta Delgada, Azores), vol. II, No. 170, 2nd
series, p. 68; Annual Digest .. " 1925-1926 (London), vol. 3 (1929), p. 184,
case No. 133. See, however, The "Curvello"(1922) (Gazeta da Relariiode
Lisboa, vol. 18, p. 36), in which a Brazilian State·owned ship carrying
passengers and goods, as well as government mail, was entitled to immunity from jurisdiction and seizure.
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152 above). There appears to be an inconsistency between
the judicial practice and the practice of the executive
branch of the Government in the recognition or granting of
immunity, on the one hand, and in making a like claim on
behalf of the State, on the other.
(x) Scandinavian States

175. From the few reported cases available,2S3 it can be
gathered that the distinction between acts jure imperii and
acts jure gestionis has been recognized and accepted in the
practice of the Scandinavian States. 254 In Norway, the
immunities from attachment and execution of merchant
ships employed in commerce have been upheld so long
only as the vessels remained in the possession of the foreign
Governments.255 In Sweden, in the well-known case of The
"Rigmor" (1942),256 the Supreme Court, applying the 1926
Brussels Convention, upheld the immunity from arrest of a
vessel requisitioned by the Norwegian Government and
appropriated to the public service of the British Ministry of
War Transport. When the proceedings started, the Rigmor
was in the possession of the British Government and
employed by it in the carriage of non-commercial cargo for
public purposes. It may be added that Denmark, Sweden
and Norway were among the 13 countries that ratified the
1926 Brussels Convention before the Second World War,
and that Norway has actually applied the principles of the
Convention in two interesting cases concerning Norwegian
ships requisitioned by German occupying authorities.
176. Thus, in a case decided in 1949 concerning the
Fredrikstad, a Norwegian ship requisitioned by German
occupation authorities in Norway, the Supreme Court held
that no maritime lien could attach to ships employed by an
occupying power for State purposes in respect of collision,
on the ground that no execution could be levied against the
ships so used. The distinction was maintained between
public ships being used exclusively for State purposes and
other ships.257 On the other hand, in AIS Irania under
Public Administration v. AIS Franmaes mek. Verksted
m Cf. H. Lauterpacht, "The problem of jurisdictional immunities of
foreign States", The British Year Book ofInternational Law, 1951, vol. 28,
pp.264-265.
254 See, for example, A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law (London. Longmans, 1947), p. 190; F. Castberg, Folkerett (Oslo, Lindkvist,
1948). p. 100. See also Co mite maritime international, Bulletin No. 57.
Conference de Londres (octobre 1922) (Anvers, 1923), pp. 122 et seq. and
p. 194, concerning, in particular, trading vessels; and the more recent work
of L. Pelin, Statsimmunitetens omfattning (Juridiska Fiireningen i Lund
No. 29), Acta Societatis Juridicae Lundensis (1979).
255 The "Guernica" (1938) (Norsk Retstidende, 1938 (Oslo), p.584;
Annual Digest ... , 1919-1942 (op. cit.), p. 139, case No. 73); and The
"Hanna J" (1948) (Norsk Retstidende, 1948, p. 706; Annual Digest . .. ,
1948 (London), vol. 15 (1953), p. 146, case No. 46).
256 See The American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.),
vol. 37 (1943), p. 141; Annual Digest ... , 1941-1942 (London), vol. 10
(1945), p. 240, case No. 63. See also Russian Trade Delegation v. Carlbom
No.2 (1944) (Nytt luridiskt Arkiv, 1944 (Lund), p. 269; Annual Digest . .. ,
1943-1945 (op. cit.), p. 112, case No. 31). The court dedinedjurisdiction
against the Toomas on the ground that the vessel was in actual possession
of the Soviet Union and that the seizure was in execution of a judgment
against the master of the Toomas and not against the Soviet Union, so that
the law implementing the 1926 Brussels Convention was inapplicable.
257 Fredrikstad Havnevesen v. AIS Bertelsens mek. Verksted (1949)
(Norsk Retstidende, 1949, p. 881; International Law Reports, 1950
(London), vol. 17 (1956), p. 167, case No. 42).

(1950),258 it was held by the Court of Appeal that a Norwegian ship requisitioned by German authorities could be
detained by a Norwegian shipyard in respect of repairs
carried out on the ship by order of the German authorities,
the latter having failed to pay for the repairs. The ship in
question was found not to have been used exclUSively on
governmental and non-commercial service, as provided in
the 1926 Brussels Convention, having been employed for
the transport of edible fats to merchants in Norway.2S9
(xi) Latin-American States
177. It would be presumptuous to refer to the practice of
Latin-American States in a generalized way. There seems
to be a clear indication in the practice of some of the Latin
American systems limiting State immunity with respect to
State ships engaged in trade, In Argentina, two decisions
clearly illustrate this. In The "Cokato" (1924),260 the Federal Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction over a Government-operated vessel engaged in trade despite its ownership by the United States Shipping Board. On the other
hand, in The "Ibai" (1937),261 the same court declined
jurisdiction against a Spanish requisitioned ship on the
grounds, inter alia, that its voyage was not of a commercial
nature and that it was employed for national defence,
which had nothing to do with speculation or gain, but was
prompted by the necessity of providing efficiently for the
defence of the State. 262 It may be added that, by 1938,
Chile 263 and Brazil 264 had deposited their ratifications of
the 1926 Brussels Convention.
(b) A tentative indication

178. The preceding survey of legal developments in the
judicial practice of States does not in itself furnish conclusive evidence of an established set of rules of interna258 Nordiske Dommer i Sjofartssaker, 1950 (Oslo), p. 181; International
Law Reports, 1950 (op. cit.), p. 168, footnote I.
259 By comparison with English admiralty practice, the two cases could
be distinguished on the further ground that the former was a collision case,
in which allowing a maritime lien would have impleaded the foreign
sovereign, while the latter concerned repairs effected on a privately owned
ship, and upholding immunity would have allowed unjust enrichment in
favour of the private shipowner for the repairs.
Jurisprudencia Argentina (Buenos Aires). vol. 14, p. 705: Annual
Digest . . " 1923-1924 (op. cit.), p. 136. case NO.7!.
261 Ibarra y Cia v. Captain ofthe "Ibaf" (Fa/los de fa Corta Suprema de
Justicia de fa Nacion (Buenos Aires), vol. 178, p. 173; Revue de droit
maritime compare (Paris), vol. 38 (1938), p. 50; Annual Digest . .. ,19351937 (London), vol. 8 (194\), p.247, case No. 100; Annual Digest . .. ,
1938-1940 (op. cit.), p. 293, case No. 96).
262 See also Gobierno de ltalia v. Consejo Nacional de Educacion (1940)
(Jurisprudencia Argentina, vol. 71, p. 400; Annual Digest .. ., 1941-1942,
(op. cit.), p. 196, case No. 52).
263 See, for example, Pacey v. Barroso (1926) (Revista de dereeho, jurispruden cia y eieneias sociales y Gaceta de los Tribunales (Santiago, Chile),
vol. 25, parte II, p. 49; Annual Digest ... , 1927-1928 (London), vol. 4
(1931), p.369, case No. 250); and the Chayet case (1932) (Revista de
dereeho . .. y Gaeeta de los Tribunales, vol. 30, p. 70; Annual Digest . . "
1931-1932 (op. cit.), p. 329, case No. 181).
264 See, for example, The "Lone Star" (1944) (Diario da Justil;:a (Rio de
Janeiro), No.45 (24 February 1945), annex; Annual Digest . .. , 1947
(London), vol. 14 (1951), p. 84, case No. 31); and the Gilbert case (J 944)
(Diario da Justir,:a (Rio de Janeiro), No. 190 (21 August 1945), annex;
Annual Digest ... , 1946 (London), vol. 13 (195\), p. 86, case No. 37).
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tional law governing jurisdictional immunities in respect
of ships owned, possessed or employed by States. Yet it
may serve as a strongly persuasive indication of the direction in which the case-law or judicial practice of States has
been developing in the recent past. One outstanding fact is
clearly beyond controversy: that is the marked absence ofa
consistent practice of States in support of immunities in
respect of State-owned or State-operated vessels, regardless of the nature of their service or employment. Whenever a court has exercised or disclaimed jurisdiction in a
given case on the point under examination, it has done so
on grounds which invariably related to the nature of the
service or employment of the ship in question.
179. Owing to the existence of certain technicalities
peculiar to the law and practice of the various legal systems
on the points examined, the survey of reported decisions
does not and cannot lend itself to a general conclusion
applicable to all systems, but it appears to indicate certain
developments favouring a number oflegal propositions. In
the first place, it has helped to delineate or delimit the areas
where the question of State immunities could arise in respect of State-owned or State-operated vessels. Vessels
owned by or in the possession of States are generally
immune if employed in the governmental or public service
of the State, whereas privately owned vessels chartered,
hired or requisitioned by a foreign Government, as long as
they continue to be possessed and operated by it, are to
some extent immune from measures of arrest, seizure,
detention, attachment and execution, but not necessarily
from actions in rem not followed by arrest or attachment.
Nor subsequently could a maritime lien attach to such
ships by reason of collision caused during operation or
possession by the foreign Government. In other words,
actions against vessels owned, possessed or operated by
States may be allowed to proceed if they in fact do not
implead the foreign Governments, whether the actions are
in rem against the vessels, or in personam against their
private owners or private operators. There is no State
immunity because the question simply does not arise. In
The "Visurgis"; the "Siena", decided in Germany in 1938
(see paragraph 169 above), the court declared:
Allowing for minor differences of view in the matter of the definition of
State ships and of the extent of the immunities accorded to them, it is
possible to summarize Continental, British and American practice as follows: "A vessel chartered by a State but not commanded by a captain in the
service the State does not enjoy immunity if proceedings in rem are
brought against it; still less can the owner of the vessel claim such immunity in an action for damages."26'

180. The second proposition rests on the unmistakable
and cogent evidence indicating almost conclusively that
the practice of States has undergone some changes since the
First World War. Shipping came under direct State control
and indeed the control of a group of States. 266 An English
judge once described this state of affairs: "In 1917-18 any
shipowner who had a tanker free from government control
could have become rich beyond the dreams ofavarice."267
'" English translation in Annual Digest . ... 1938-1940 (op. cit.), p. 287,
case No. 94.
1.. See J. A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control. An Experiment in Internalional Administration (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921).
261 Opinion of Judge Hill in The "Sylvan Arrow" (1923) (The Law
Reports. Probate Division. 1923. p.230).
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This rather sudden change of circumstances was vividly
pictured by G. van Slooten as follows:
Before the war, there had been very few opportunities for States which
owned vessels other than those used for national defence or public service
to invoke jurisdictional immunity for themselves or immunity from
seizure for their vessels. Once the war was over and peace treaties entered
into force, the situation changed abruptly. Several States were in possession of sizeable merchant fleets; ... [they] became shipowners in earnest,
engaged in the carriage of passengers and cargo .... 268

181. If, in some jurisdictions, there were decisions during
the last century and even in the mid-1920s upholding the
immunities of privately owned but State-operated vessels
from arrest and attachment and the immunities of Stateowned or State-possessed 269 vessels from all judicial proceedings irrespective of the trading or commercial nature
of their service or employment, such decisions have now
been overruled or reversed, ifnot rejected or disavowed, by
the courts themselves, or with the assistance of the legislature, or upon application of the relevant provisions of an
international convention. There is today no outstanding
judicial decision which has not been overruled or which
has been reconfirmed as still valid that upholds an absolute
rule of immunity for vessels owned or operated by States
regardless of the nature of their service or employment. It
follows accordingly that, whatever may have been the
belief in the nineteenth century which may have lingered
into the first quarter of the present century, contemporary
State practice does not require States to grant jurisdictional
immunities in respect of public vessels employed by other
States exclusively on commercial and non-governmental
service. This does not mean that States are in any way
prevented by law from displaying courtesy or forbidden by
custom to extend especially courteous treatment to trading
vessels of friendly neighbours or allies, should States so
wish or should their courts feel so inclined. Such in any
truly reflects the essentially flexible nature of the rule of
international law regarding State immunity.
182. A third proposition appears to emerge as a necessary
consequence, namely that the practice of States as examined in the brief general survey of judicial developments is
indicative of a clear and irreversible trend in favour of
non-recognition of jurisdictional immunities in respect of
a category of public vessels, or vessels requisitioned, employed or operated by States, based on the criterion of their
exclusive commercial use or service and absence of connection with any governmental service. Immunity need
not be accorded to ships employed by States exclusively on
commercial and non-governmental service, while such
public ships employed on governmental and non-commercial service continue to enjoy the privilege or protection of
268 G. van Slooten, "La Convention de Bruxelles sur Ie statutjuridique
des navires d'Etat", Rente de droit international et de legislation comparee
(Brussels), 3rd series, vol. VII (1926), p. 457. Cf. L. van Praag, "La question
de I'immunite dejuridiction des Etats etrangers et celie de la possibilitc de
I'execution desjugements qui les condamnent", ibid.. 3rd series, vol. XVI
(1935), pp. 116 et seq.
269 Possession of a ship by a State is generally considered to be sufficient
evidence of its State ownership; cf. R. E. Megarry in The Law Quarterly
Review (London), vol. 71 (1955), p. I. See also The "Manuel Arnus"(I944)
(Federal Reporter. 2d Series. vol. 141 (1944), p. 585), in which the United
States Supreme Court disclaimed jurisdiction over a vessel in the possession of the United States under a claim of ownership (United States
Reports. vol. 323 (1945), p. 728).
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State immunities from measures of attachment, seizure,
detention and execution to the extent indicated in the first
proposition, depending on the type of proceedings or
causes of actions brought, on whether the vessel in question is privately owned, State-owned, requisitioned, chartered or government-operated, and on the fact of actual
possession by the foreign Government claiming its immunity.
183. The rules of State immunity as applied to vessels
owned or operated by States were restated with accuracy by
Lord Wilberforce in The "I Congreso del Partido" (1981),
as follows:

etition of an earlier observation made by the same Chief
Justice in The Schooner "Exchange" v. McFaddon and
others (1812), where he said:

... I would unhesitantly affirm as part of English law the advance made
by The "Philippine Admiral" with the reservation that the decision was
perhaps unnecessarily restrictive ,n, apparently, confining the departure
made to actions in rem. In truth an action in rem as regards a ship, if it
proceeds beyond the initial stages, is itself in addition an action in personam. viz. the owner of the ship (see The "Cristina". .. ), the description in
rem denoting the procedural advantages available as regards service, arrest
and enforcement. It should be borne in mind that no distinction between
actions in rem and actions in personam is generally recognized elsewhere
so that it would in any event be desirable to liberate English law from an
anomaly if that existed. In fact there is no anomaly and no distinction. The
effect of The "Philippine Admiral"ifaccepted, as I would accept it, is that,
as regards State-owned trading vessels, actions, whether commenced in
rem or not, are to be decided according to the "restrictive" theory.270

(a) Relative relevance oj views and attitudes

184. As shown in the above examination of legal developments, it has taken the House of Lords more than a
century and a half to rejoin the starting-point made by
Lord Stowell in The "Swift" (1813), where he said:
The utmost that I can venture to admit is that, if the King traded, as
some sovereigns do, he might fall within the operation of these statutes
(Navigation Acts). Some sovereigns have a monopoly of certain commodities, in which they traffick on the common principles that other traders
traffick; and, if the King of England so possessed and so exercised any
monopoly, I am not prepared to say that he must not conform his traffick
to the general rules by which all trade is regulated. 271

185. As also examined earlier, judicial pronouncements
by United States judges have been more consistent, with
the exception of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Berizzi Brothers Co. v. SS "Pesaro" (1926).272 Thus, in
Ohio v. He/vering (1934),273 the court said: "When a State
enters the market-place seeking customers, it divests itself
ofits quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader." This dictum merely reaffirmed the view
expressed a century earlier by Chief Justice Marshall in
Bank oj the United States v. Planters' Bank oj Georgia
(1824),274 where he observed: "It is, we think, a sound
principle that, when a Government becomes a partner in
any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character,
and takes that of a private citizen." That was but a repThe All England Law Reports, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1070.
Dodson, op. cit., vol. I (1815), p. 339; see also the opinion of Sir
Robert Phillimore in The "Charkieh" (I 873)(see paragraph 147 and footnote \34 above) and The "Parlement beige" (1879) (see footnote 137
above), a judgment overruled by the Court of Appeal (1880) (see footnote
138 above).
272 See footnote 179 above.
273 United States Reports, vol. 292 (1934), p. 360, at p. 369.
274 Wheaton. op. cit., vol. IX (4th ed.) (1911), p. 907.
270

27\

... there is a manifest distinction between the private property of the
person who happens to be a prince, and that military force which supports
the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and the independence of a
nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may
possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; ... 275

3.

GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE

oj Governments

186. It is dIfficult to assess the relevance of views and
attitudes of Governments expressed or reflected in certain
actions or statements as evidence or indications of governmental practice on questions relating to the immunities to
be accorded to vessels owned or operated by Governments. The first practical problem is one of determining to
whom to attribute a particular view expressed by a certain
official of a State organ, or an attitude adopted or reflected
in a statement or declaration by a representative of a
Government. Views or considered opinions given by legal
advisers to a Government on matters of general concern or
on a particular issue may be regarded as views of that
Government at a particular time. To what extent the
expression of such views in an official capacity by an
authority of the State could constitute evidence of State
practice is another matter, for practice refers to concrete
acts performed by the State rather than mere expression of
considered reflections. Statements or declarations made by
representatives of a Government before the judicial
authorities of other States as regards the status of certain
government agencies, government ownership of State
property and claims of jurisdictional immunities for such
agencies or property may afford evidence of the positions
taken by Governments, which, if sufficiently clear or consistently maintained, could furnish proof of usage or practice of a State on a particular question.
187. Another difficulty relates, therefore, to the ascertainment of views or attitudes of Governments on a particular issue at the material time, for Governments change
as often as do their views and attitudes on a particular
question. It is not surprising, therefore, that the views
expressed officially by internationally recognized experts
who may also hold positions or bear certain responsibility
within a Government do not necessarily reflect the views
or attitude of that Government; and even when they do
formally represent the views of the Government, such
views are subject to changes and modifications without
notice. Such is the prerogative of the sovereign authority
with which the State, like its executive branch, is vested. If
the views and attitude attributable to one Government or
to one State may change at will, as they are susceptible to
sudden alteration, modification, clarification or indeed
reversal without prior notice, the views of various
m Cranch, op. cit. (footnote 114 above), p. 145; cf. J. G. Hervey, "The
immunity of foreign States when engaged in commercial enterprises: a
proposed solution", Michigan Law Rel'iew (Ann Arbor, Mich.),
vol. XXVII (1929), p. 751.
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Governments on the same questions can and do vary
according to their vital interests, political ideologies, economic theories and social backgrounds.
188. This is on the assumption that thc views sought
relatc to the same aspect of the issue. In reality, however,
there are often several questions involved in a particular
situation and even one and the same issue may have more
than one aspect. There is always the other side of the coin,
as demonstrated by the views and attitudes of Governments regarding State immunity, which may vary with the
side of the coin, whether it is heads when it is the duty of the
Government to recognize and accord State immunity to
another Government, or tails when the Government expects to be the recipient or beneficiary of State immunity to
be recognized and accorded by the courts of another State.
Thus it is not surprising that Governments which are
obliged to submit their publicly owned or State-operated
vessels to their own national or territorial jurisdiction
would think twice before agreeing to submit such vessels
employed exclusively on commercial service to the jurisdiction of the courts of another State. Examples in the
judicial practice examined earlier amply demonstrate this
phenomenon.276 As also frequently occurs, a Government
is likely to support its own claim of State immunity from
the jurisdiction of the courts of another State in respect of
the vessels owned or operated by one of its agencies, without necessarily raising a similar objection when actions are
brought against the vessel before one ofits own courts, and
regardless of whether its own courts adhere to a restrictive
or unqualified view of State immunity in regard to foreign
vessels or vessels owned or employed by a foreign
Government. A Government can maintain a consistent
attitude and adhere strictly to the view that its own public
vessels should be accorded absolute immunity by the
courts of other States, subject always to the important
reservation of reciprocity. When it comes to the granting of
like immunity to the vessels of other States, reciprocity
may in fact operate to prevent such recognition, either
because of the restrictive practice prevailing in the State
requesting immunity, or on the ground oflack of positive
evidence that the same extent of jurisdictional immunity
would, by law and practice, be assured, if not guaranteed,
for the benefit of the vessels owned or operated by the State
before whose courts immunity is being sought. 277 It is not
difficult, as in reality often happens, for one State to advocate the theory or principle of absolute immunity for foreign public vessels, regardless of the nature of their employment or service, while in actual performance there
is no concrete evidence to substantiate the adoption of
the practice of such an unqualified principle, which in
any event is invariably qualified by the principle of reciprocity.278
27. See, for example, Campania Mercantil Argentina v. United States
Shipping Board (1924) (see footnote 162 above); the United States Shipping Act, 1916 and Suits in Admiralty Act, 1920 (seefootnote 191 above);
and The "Cathelamet" (I 926) (see footnote 252 above).
277 See, for example, The "Jupiter" No. I (1924) (The Law Reports,
Probate Division, 1924, p. 236), and compare with The "Jupiter" No.2
(I 925)(ibid., 1925, p. 69); but in the latter case the Soviet Government was
no longer in possession of the Jupiter and claimed no interest in her. The

Italian Government's requirement of reciprocity is more exacting in practice than it might be in the case ofa possible claim of immunity before a
Soviet court.
278 See article 61 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the USSR
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189. It is subject to these cautions and bearing in mind
the relative relevance of views and attitudes of Governments that governmental practice wilI be examined in thc
light of national legislation and international agreements
or conventions bearing on the questions under review.
(b) Nationallegis/ation

190. There appears to be a growing volume of national
legislation dealing directly with, or closely relating to, the
point at issue. In an effort to examine relevant provisions
of national legislation, regard should be had to the commentaries or views expressed in the replies to question 12
of the questionnaire addressed to the Governments of
Member States in 1979. 279 National legislation directly in
point includes laws regulating the extent of immunities
accorded to vessels owned or operated by foreign States,
which invariably depends on the governmental and noncommercial nature of their service or the public, as
opposed to private or commercial, purposes of their employment.
191. In this particular connection, it will be noted in
relation to States which have ratified the 1926 Brussels
Convention and its 1934 Protocol that legislative enactments have invariably been adopted giving effect to their
ratification of the international agreement. Thus Norway's
national legislation of 17 March 1939 280 may be cited as a
typical example. The relevant sections provide:
§ I. The fact that a vessel is owned or used by a foreign government, or
that a vessel's cargo belongs to a foreign government, shall not-with the
exemption of the cases mentioned in §§ 2 and 3-prevent proceedings
being taken in this realm for claims arising out of the use of the vessel or the
transport of the cargo-or the enforcement of such a claim in this realm or
interim orders against the vessel or the cargo.
§ 2. Proceedings to collect claims as mentioned in § I may not be
instituted in this realm when they relate to:
(I) Men of war and other vessels which a foreign government owns or
uses when at the time the claim arose they were used exclusively for
government purposes of a public nature.

(2) Cargo which belongs to a foreign government and is carried by a
vessel as mentioned under I.
(3) Cargo which belongs to a foreign government, and is carried in a
merchantman for government purposes ofa public nature, unless the claim
relates to salvage general average or agreements regarding the cargo.

§ 3. Enforcements and interim orders relating to claims as mentioned
in § I may not be executed within this realm when relating to:
(I) Men of war and other vessels which are owned by or used by a
foreign government or chartered by them exclusively on time or for a
voyage, when the vessel is used exclusively for government purposes ofa
public nature.

(2) Cargo which belongs to a foreign government and is carried in
vessels as mentioned under I or by merchantmen for government purposes
of a public nature.

and the Union Republics of 1961 (United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . . " p. 40).
279 The replies to the questionnaire are published in United Nations,
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp. 555 et seq.
280 Norges Lover, 1682-1961 (Oslo, Grondahl & Sons, 1962); English
translation in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . . "
pp. 19-20.
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§ 4. By agreement with a foreign government it may be decided that a
certificate from the diplomatic representative of the foreign government
shan be considered proof for treating vessels and cargo under the stipulations of § 3, I st paragraph, I and 2, when a requisition is made for the
annulment of enforcements or interim orders.
§ 5. This law win come into force on the day determined by the
King.

By 1980, some 20 countries, which included a wide
variety of States, maritime as well as land-locked, European, Latin-American, African and socialist countries, had
ratified the 1926 Brussels Convention and its 1934 Protocol and seven others had acceded to the Convention. Furthermore, it is not insignificant to note that Estonia and
Hungary also ratified the Convention in 1937. Although
Poland and Romania subsequently denounced it in 1952
and 1959, respectively, Poland reratified the Convention
once again in 1976, effective 16 January 1977. Zaire,
Greece, Turkey, Syria and Egypt were also bound by the
Convention. There are therefore various legislative enactments giving effect to the rules contained in the Convention.
193. Among countries which have not ratified the Convention, the United States of America stands out among
the States which have adopted national legislation along
the same lines. The United States explained its absence
from the Brussels Conference in 1926 by stating that it had
already given, effect to the wish for uniformity in the law
relating to State-owned ships by adopting the Public Vessels Act on 3 March 1925. 281 But a more specific provision
is to be found in a more recent act, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976,282 of which the relevant section
reads:
192.

Section 1605. General exceptions 10 the jurisdictional
immunity of a foreign State
(b) A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the

courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is
brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign
State, which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activity of the
foreign State: Provided, That:
(1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy of the summons and
of the complaint to the person, or his agent, having possession of the vessel
or cargo against which the maritime lien is asserted; but such notice shall
not be deemed to have been delivered, nor may it thereafter be delivered, if
the vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to process obtained on behalf of the
party bringing the suit-unless the party was unaware that the vessel or
cargo ofa foreign State was involved, in which event the service of process
of arrest shall be deemed to constitute valid delivery of such notice;
and

(2) notice to the foreign State of the commencement of suit as provided
in section 1608 of this title is initiated within ten days either of the delivery
of notice as provided in subsection (b) (I) of this section or, in the case ofa
party who was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign State was
involved, of the date such party determined the existence of the foreign
State's interest.

The Statutes at Large ofthe United States ofAmericafrom December
1923 to March 1925, vol. XLIII, part 1, chap. 428,pp. 1112-1113, sects. 1,3
and 5 (reciprocity); United States Code Annotated, Title 46, Shipping,
Sections 721 to lIDO, sects. 781-799.
282 United States Code, 1976 Edition, vol. 8, title 28, chap. 97; reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp.
55 et seq.
28\

Whenever notice is delivered under subsection (b) (I) of this section, the
maritime lien shaH thereafter be deemed to be an in personam claim
against the foreign State which at that time owns the vessel or cargo
involved: Prol'ided, That a court may not award judgment against the
foreign State in an amount greater than the value of the vessel or cargo
upon which the maritime lien arose, such value to be determined as of the
time notice is served under subsection (b) (1) of this section.

194, Section 10 of the United Kingdom State Immunity
Act 1978 283 deals rather exhaustively with the question of
absence or non-recognition of State immunity in respect of
ships used for commercial purposes. It provides :284
Exceptions from immunity
10. (\) This section applies to:
(a) Admiralty proceedings; and
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the subject of
Admiralty proceedings.

(2) A State is not immune as respects:

(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to that State; or
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such
a ship,
if, at the time when the cause of action arose, the ship was in use or
intended for use for commercial purposes,
(3) Where an action in rem is brought against a ship belonging to a State
for enforcing a claim in connection with another ship belonging to that
State, subsection (2) (a) above does not apply as respects the first-mentioned ship unless, at the time when the cause of action relating to the other
ship arose, both ships were in use or intended for use for commercial
purposes.
(4) A State is not immune as respects:

(a) an action in rem against a cargo belonging to that State if both the
cargo and the ship carrying it were, at the time when the cause of action
arose, in use or intended for use for commercial purposes; or

(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such
a cargo if the ship carrying it was then in use or intended for use as
aforesaid.
(5) In the foregoing provisions references to a ship or cargo belonging to
a State include references to a ship or cargo in its possession or control or in
which it claims an interest; and, subject to subsection (4) above, subsection
(2) above applies to property other than a ship as it applies to a ship.
(6) Sections 3 to 5 above do not apply to proceedings of the kind
described in subsection (1) above if the State in question is a party to the
Brussels Convention and the claim relates to the operation of a ship owned
or operated by that State, the carriage of cargo or passengers on any such
ship or the carriage of cargo owned by that State on any other ship.

195. The United Kingdom State Immunity Act, which
was adopted on 20 July 1978, was procedurally and substantively qualified by the State Immunity (Merchant
Shipping) (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) Order
1978,285 which came into operation on 22 November 1978,
the same date as the Act itself. The Order provides:

3. Notwithstanding section 13 (4) of the State Immunity Act 1978, no
application shall be made for the issue ofa warrant of arrest in an action in
'83 United Kingdom, The Public General Acts, 1978. part I, chap. 33,
p, 715; reproduced in United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 41 et seq.
284 See also the United Kingdom's reply to question 12 of the questionnaire (United Nations, Materials . .. , p. 627).
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rem against a ship owned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or
cargo aboard it until notice has been served on a consular officer of that
State in London or in the port at which it is intended to cause the ship to be
arrested.
4. Notwithstanding section 13 (4) of the State Immunity Act 1978, no
ship or cargo owned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be
subject to any process for the enforcement of a judgment or for the
enforcement of terms of settlement filed with and taking effect as a court
order.

196. This Order has the effect of preserving the immunity
from execution of ships and cargoes of the Soviet Union
which would otherwise have been lost by virtue of section
13 (4) of the State Immunity Act 1978, and requires notice
to be given to a Soviet Consul before a warrant of arrest is
issued in an action in rem against a ship of that State or a
cargo on it. It gives effect to articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol
to the Treaty on Merchant Navigation of 3 April 1968
between the two countries. 286 The special treatment accorded to ships and cargoes belonging to the Soviet Union
therefore constitutes an important exception to the general
rule adopted by the United Kingdom in this connection.
197. Section 10 of the United Kingdom State Immunity
Act 1978 has served as a model for several other acts
adopted by other countries, mostly within or related to the
British Commonwealth. Thus section 11 (Ships used for
commercial purposes) of Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 287 literally reproduces the British provision, as
do section 12 of Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979 288
and section 7 of Canada's 1982 "Act to provide for State
immunity in Canadian courts".289 Section 18 of the draft
Australian legislation of 1984 on the immunities of foreign
States, Foreign States Immunities Bill 1984, contains essentially the same provision. 290
(c) International or regional conventions

198. On the point under examination, several conventions have been concluded having a more or less direct
bearing on State practice, and having special relevance or a
more general application; some have been ratified and
come into operation, while others are yet to be processed
and finalized for signature and ratification. It is useful to
highlight the main features of some of the conventions,
international or regional, which have a close relevance to
the issue under consideration.
(i) The Brussels Convention of 10 April 1926 and its

Additional Protocol of 24 May 1934
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199. Pre-1926 efforts by jurists to assimilate the position
of public trading vessels to that of private merchantmen
285 United Kingdom, Statutory Instruments, 1978, Part III, Section I,
p. 4553; reproduced in United Nations, Materials ... , pp. 51·52.
286 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 857, p. 217.
281 The Gazette ofPakistan (Islamabad), II March 1981 ; reproduced in
United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 20 et seq.
288 Reproduced in United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 28 et seq.
28. The Canada Gazette, Part III (Ottawa), vol. 6, No. 15{22June 1982).
Cf. also section II of South Africa's Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981
(reproduced in United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 34 et seq.).
290 See International Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.), vol. XXIII,
No.6 (November 1984), pp. 1398 et seq.
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were reflected in a number of draft conventions;291 but it
was not until 1926 that the first international convention
was adopted dealing directly with the question of the
immunities of public ships engaged in trade.
200. In 1922, Sir Maurice Hill, the celebrated English
admiralty judge, proposed the abolition of jurisdictional
immunities of public vessels, in particular regarding their
commercial activities. That proposal was adopted in the
resolutions ofthe International Maritime Committee at its
1922 London Conference. 292 The draft treaty prepared at
Gothenburg in 1923 and slightly modified at Genoa in
1925 293 was finally submitted to the Conference diplomatique de droit maritime at Brussels. On 10 April 1926, the
Conference adopted the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of
State-owned Vessels, commonly referred to as the Brussels
Convention. 294 That Convention, as Gilbert Gidel, the
Rapporteur, put it, "avait pour raison d'etre essentielle les
navires publics engages dans des operations commerciales".295
201. The main object of the Convention was to assimilate the position of State-exploited merchara ships to that
of private vessels of commerce in regard to the question of
immunities. Article 1 provides: 296
Article 1
Seagoing vessels owned or operated by States, cargoes owned by them,
and cargoes and passengers carried on government vessels, and the States
owning or operating such vessels, or owning such cargoes, are subject in
respect of claims relating to the operation of such vessels or the carriage of
such cargoes, to the same rules of liability and to the same obligations as
those applicable to private vessels, cargoes and equipments.

202. Article 1 merely reaffirms the rule that public
vessels and cargoes carried on State ships are subject to
local laws with respect to their substantive liabilities. Article 2 contains provisions relating more specifically to jurisdiction, as follows:
2.1 The forerunners of the Brussels Convention include article 4, paragraph 3, of the "Draft international regulations on the competence of
courts in proceedings against foreign States, sovereigns or heads of State",
adopted by the Institute ofinternational Law on II September 1891 and
revised in September 1892 (Institute ofinternational Law, Tableaugeneral
des resolutions (1873-1956) (Basel, 1957), pp. 14-15}; article 11 of the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with
respect to Collisions between Vessels (Brussels, 23 September 1910), and
article 14 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea (Brussels, 23 September 191 O) (cf.
G. Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer (Paris, Sirey, 1932), vol. I,
p. 99}; article XVII of the "Barcelona Statute" of 1921 (ibid.); article XIII,
paragraph I, of the "Geneva Statute" of 1923 (ibid.). See also N. Matsunami, The Publication of "Immunity of State Ships" and its Sequences
(Japanese edition, 1925), pp. 110 et seq.
2.2 International Maritime Committee, Bulletin No. 57. London Conference (October 1922) (Antwerp, 1923), p. V.
2'3 International Maritime Committee, Bulletin No. 65. Gothenburg
Conference (August 1923) (Antwerp, I 924), p. vi; and International Maritime Committee, Bulletin No. 74. Genoa Conference (September 1925)
(Antwerp, 1926), p. V.
2'4 League of Nations, Treaty Series. vol. CLXXVI, p. 199.
295 Gidel, op. cit., vol. II, p. 362.
2'6 In interpreting article I of the Convention, municipal courts have
preferred the official English version. Thus the term exploites, which can
mean "used" or "operated", has been interpreted according to the term
"operated" which appears in the English text {see The "Visurgis"; the
"Siena" (1938), footnote 232 above}.
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Article 2
For the enforcement of such liabilities and obligations there shall be the
same rules concerning the jurisdiction of tribunals, the same legal actions,
and the same procedure as in the case of privately owned merchant vessels
and cargoes and of their owners.

Article 2 thus assimilates the position of State-owned and
State-operated ships engaged in trade and their cargoes to
that of ordinary private commercial vessels and cargoes by
subjecting the former to the jurisdiction of local courts. In
addition, it also assimilates the position of States as
shipowners and shippers to that of private persons engaged
in the shipping business by making States accountable
before the local courts in respect of maritime commerce.
203. For the purposes of jurisdictional immunities, article 3 draws a distinction between the exploitation of vessels
by States and other governmental maritime activities.
Paragraph I of article 3 is thus worded:
Article 3
§ I. The provisions of the two preceding articles shall not be applicable
to ships of war, government yachts, patrol vessels, hospital ships, auxiliary
vessels, supply ships, and other craft owned or operated by a State, and
used at the time a cause of action arises exclusively on governmental and
non-commercial service, and such vessels shall not be subject to seizure,
attachment or detention by any legal process, nor to judicial proceedings in

rem. 297

204. Even for public vessels for which immunities from
local jurisdictions are provided, article 3 further authorizes, in paragraph I, certain remedies before the courts of
the countries that own or operate the vessels in question,
recognizing the right of claimants to take
. .. proceedings in the competent tribunals of the State owning or
operating the vessel, without that State being permitted to avail itselfofits
immunity:
(I) In case of actions in respect of collision or other accidents of
navigation;
(2) In case of actions in respect of assistance, salvage and general

average;
(3) In case of actions in respect of repairs, supplies, or other contracts
relating to the vessel.

205. Article 3 includes similar provisions in paragraphs 2
and 3 concerning State-owned cargoes carried on board
public vessels of a governmental and non-commercial
nature and State-owned cargoes carried on board merchant
vessels for governmental and non-commercial purposes.
206. By 1931, none of the signatories of the Brussels
Convention had deposited its ratification at Brussels.298
Meanwhile, doubts arose as to the correct interpretation of
the phrase "operated by a State" in article 3. The United
Kingdom objected to the extension of exemption from

actions in rem to private vessels employed or operated, but
not owned, by a State, which in English case-law was not
entitled to immunity. That objection was sustained and the
Brussels Convention was accordingly modified by the
Additional Protocol signed at Brussels on 24 May 1934. 299
Article 1300 reads, in part, as follows:
Vessels chartered by States either for a given time or by the voyage,
provided they are exclusively used on governmental and non-commercial
service, and the cargoes carried by such vessels, shall not be subject to
seizure, attachment or detention of any kind, but this immunity shall not

prejudicially affect any other rights or remedies open to the parties concerned.·...

207. It is true that the Brussels Convention and its Additional Protocol cannot claim to have had universal application. It is also true that the Convention has left out many
important matters. Nevertheless, the Convention has provided most encouraging guidance for municipal courts to
assume jurisdiction against foreign States in this particular
connection of maritime transport or the carrying trade.
The list of ratifications and accessions to the Convention
and Protocol is not meagre, with 20 or so States ratifying
and seven acceding to the Convention. The application is
not confined to one region, nor to Europe alone, although it
includes important European maritime nations such as
Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Switzerland and
some Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia have also adopted the Convention. Adherents from other continents include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Mexico, Turkey, Uruguay and
Zaire. Its coverage is sufficiently scattered and fairly distributed. Its significance cannot be underestimated, especially in view of its ratification by the United Kingdom on
3 January 1980 after more than half a century of silence
since it signed the Convention.
(ii) Codification conventions prepared by the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva,
1958

208. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, held at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958,
prepared and opened for signature four conventions, two
of which have some bearing on the immunities of public
ships. The first is the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, done on 29 April 1958,301 part I,
section III, of which deals, inter alia, with the position of
ships exercising the right of innocent passage through
foreign territorial waters. This section is divided into four
subsections: A. Rules applicable to all ships; B. Rules
applicable to merchant ships; C. Rules applicable to
government ships other than warships; D. Rule applicable
to warships. The distinction between merchant ships and
warships has its counterpart in the subdivision of government ships other than warships into (a) government ships

297 This provision operates to extend immunity from proceedings in
rem to privately owned ships chartered or requisitioned by a foreign State

and operated by it in governmental service.
291 See J. W. Gamer, "Legal status of government ships employed in
commerce", The American Journal of International Law (Washington,
D.C.), vol. 20 (1926), p. 7S9.
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League of Nations, Treaty Series. vol. CLXXVI, p. 21S.
See also article II of the Additional Protocol.
United Nations, Treaty Series. vol. S16, p. 20S.
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operated for commercial purposes, and (b) government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A number of
interesting points may be noted in connection with this
classification of ships:
(a) For the purposes of the Convention, ships are
classified according to the nature of their service or activities. The old distinction between public and private ships
based exclusively on ownership appears to have been
abandoned.
(b) Government ships other than warships are further
subdivided according to the nature of their operation.
Government ships operated for commercial purposes are
treated in the same manner as merchant vessels, while
those operated for non-commercial purposes may be compared with warships. In terms almost identical with the
provisions of the 1926 Brussels Convention, upholding the
immunities of vessels employed exclusively on governmental and non-commercial service,302 article 22 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone reserves the immunities of government ships operated for non-commercial purposes; paragraph 2 provide'
that "nothing in these articles affects the immunities which
such ships enjoy under these articles or other rules of
international law".
(c) No reference is made in article 21 of the latter Convention to the immunities of government ships operated
for commercial purposes, either under these articles or
other rules of international law. Indeed, paragraphs 2 and 3
of article 20 give the coastal State jurisdiction to levy execution against or arrest foreign ships (including government ships operated for commercial purposes by application of article 21 p03 in certain cases in respect of ships
exercising the right of innocent passage,304 and in all cases
in respect of foreign ships lying in its territorial
waters. 30S
209. The other convention is the Convention of the High
Seas, done on 29 April 1958,306 which contains provisions
concerning the status of ships on the high seas. Paragraph 1
of article 8 provides: "Warships on the high seas have
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State
other than the flag State." Article 9 assimilates the position
of "ships owned or operated by a State and used only on
government non-commercial service" to that of warships
inasmuch as these ships, like warships, "shall, on the high
302 See article 3, paragraph 2, of the 1926 Brussels Convention (paragraphs 203-204 above),
303
''Article 21

"The rules contained in sub-sections A and B shall also apply to
government ships operated for commercial purposes."
30' Paragraph 2 of article 20 provides:
"2. The coastal State may not levy execution against or arrest the ship
for the purpose of any civil proceedings, save only in respect of obligations
or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the
purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal State."
JuS Paragraph 2 of article 20 provides:
"3. The provisions of the previous paragraph are without prejudice to
the right of the coastal State, in accordance with its laws, to levy execution
against or to arrest, for the purpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign ship
lying in the territorial sea, or passing through the territorial sea after
leaving internal waters."
JUn United Nations, Treaty Series. vol. 450, p. 11.
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seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any
State other than the flag State". While this Convention
expressly reaffirms State immunities as applied to ships, it
limits the application of immunities to certain classes of
public vessels only, viz. (a) warships, and (b) ships owned
or operated by a State and used exclusively on governmental and non-commercial service, thus precluding from
participation in the enjoyment of State immunities ships
owned or operated by a Government on commercial and
non-governmental service and ships not exclusively employed for government and non-commercial service.
210. In effect, these two codification conventions serve
to reconfirm the principles of the 1926 Brussels Convention. In a sense, these provisions may be said to consolidate
the existing rules of customary international law. While the
absolute immunity of warships and government vessels
operated for non-commercial purposes is kept intact, the
position of government vessels operated for commercial
purposes is assimilated as far as possible to that of private
merchant vessels. Apart from reaffirming governmental
policies regarding non-recognition of immunity of public
vessels employed in commerce, the 1958 Geneva Convention may be said to be declaratory of the existing practice of
States in this particular connection.
(iii) The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe

Sea
211. This continuing trend seems to have been given
added vigour by the incorporation of section 10, entitled
"Sovereign immunity", into part XII, entitled "Protection
and preservation of the marine environment", of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 307
Artic.le 236, with the same strange title as the section,
provIdes:
Article 236. Sovereign immunity

The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval
auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State used, for
the time being, only on government non-commercial service. However,
each State shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not
impairing operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft
owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner
consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Convention.

212. The scope of this Convention is intended to be universal. The provisions of this article are not without significance in confirming again the distinction between ships
operated by a State exclusively on governmental noncommercial service and those operated on commercial
non-governmental service. The criterion of the nature of
the service or operation of the ship appears to be decisive in
determining its status and the extent of State immunities to
be accorded.
(iv) Other miscellaneous conventions
213. In addition to the three main conventions examined, thue are other miscellaneous conventions relating to
307
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navigation at sea which tend to distinguish between the
position of vessels on the criterion of the nature of their
service or operation, rather than on that of public ownership or possession or control by the State. By way of example, the Treaty on International Commercial Navigation
Law, signed at Montevideo on 19 March 1940,308 contains
the following interesting provisions:
Art. 34. Vessels which are the property of the contracting States or
operated by them, the freight and passengers carried by such vessels, and
the cargoes which belong to the States, in so far as concerns claims relative
to the operation of the vessels or the transport of passengers and freight, are
subject to the laws and rules of responsibility and competency applicable to
private vessels, cargo and equipment.
Art. 35. The rule laid down in the preceding article does not apply to
men-of-war, yachts, airplanes, or hospital-, coast guard-, police-, sanitation-, supply-, and public-works vessels; nor to other vessels which are
the property of the State, or operated by it, and which are employed, at the
time when the claim arises, in some public service outside the field of
commerce.

214. A further example of an international convention
confirming this line of distinction is provided by the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, signed at Brussels on 29 November 1969,309 of
which article XI provides:
Article XI
I. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to warships or
other ships owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only
on government non-commercial service.

2. With respect to ships owned by a Contracting State and used for
commercial purposes, each State shall be subject to suit in the jurisdictions
set forth in Article IX and shall waive all defences based on its status as a
sovereign State.

(d) Treaty practice

215. A similar "waiver clause" is to be found in a growing
number of bilateral treaties, reaffirming a clear trend in the
treaty practice of States supporting the exercise ofjurisdiction by competent courts in admiralty proceedings in rem
or in personam against vessels, cargoes and owners, regardless of the status of the sovereign States, provided the cause
of action arose out of commercial shipping forming part of
the business activities of the State, whether or not conducted by a national enterprise, agency or instrumentality
of government. A typical example of this trend in treaty
practice is provided by article XVIII of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States of America and the Federal Republic ofGermany, signed at Washington on 29 October 1954: 310
(Foo/not£' ]{)7 ('()WIIII/cd)

of the Sea, vol. XVII (United Nations publication. Sale No. E.S4.V.3), p.
151, document NCONF.62/122.
3n'See Supplement to The American Jourl/ol of International Law
(Washington, D.C.), vol. 37 (1943), p. 109; United Nations, Materials on
Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp. 177-17S. See also articles 36 to 42 of the
Convention.
309 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 973, p. 3.
lIn Ibid., vol. 273, p. 3; see also the relevant provisions of other bilateral
treaties cited in United Nations, Materials 011 Jurisdictional Immunities ... , pp. 131-150.

Article XVllI

2. No enterprise of either Party, including corporations, associations,
and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned
or controlled shall, ifit engages in commercial, industrial. shipping or other
business actil'ities* within the territories of the other Party, claim or enjoy,
either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit,
execution of judgment or other liability to which privately owned and
controlled enterprises are subject therein.

4. INTERNATIONAL OPINION
216. In contrast to the three preceding draft articles,
international opinion on the question at issue in draft article 19 is prolific. Views and attitudes of Governments,
apart from being far from uniform, are also changing,311
and they do have a bearing and a certain influence on the
development of international opinion. Just as there are two
mainstreams of theories and views regarding the immunities of States in general, including those of sovereigns and
ambassadors, the opinions of writers and publicists arc
divided in regard to the immunities of public vessels employed exclusively for trade into two groups: (a) those,
favouring unqualified or more absolute immunity;
(b) those supporting one or more criteria for restricting
immunity.
(a) Absolute immunity

217. Writers who hold an absolute view of immunity
generally think that State vessels are exempt from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts regardless of the nature of
their service or employment, even if they are in fact operated solely for commercial purposes. Among these must be
mentioned Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,312 Hackworth,313
Hall,314 van Praag,315 Lawrence,316 Ross,317 Ushakov,318
Wheaton 319 and Westlake. 320
311 See especially the replies of Governments to question 12 of the
questionnaire, in United Nations, Materials . . " pp. 557-644.
312 G. Fitzmaurice, "State immunity from proceedings in foreign
courts", The British Year Book of International Law, 1933 (London),
vol. 14, p. lOl.
1Il G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington (D.C.),
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 423 et seq.
314 W. E. Hall, Treaties on International Law (Sth ed.,) (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 307 et seq.
315 L. van Praag, "La question de l'immunite de juridiction des Etats
etrangers et celie de la possibilite de I'execution des jugements qui les
condamnent", Revue de droit international et de !egis/ation comparee
(Brussels), vol. XV (1934), p. 652; and ibid., vol. XVI (1935), p. 100.
316 T. 1. Lawrence, The Principles ofInternational Law(7th ed., rcvised
by P. H. Winfield) (London, Macmillan, 1923), p. 225, sect. 107.
317 A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law (London, Longmans,
1947), pp.144-145, 179 and IS9.
31B Memorandum presented by N. A. Ushakov to the thirty-fifth scssion
of the Commission, see Yearbook ... 1983, vol. II (Part One), p. 53,
document NCN.4/371.
319 H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Philadelphia (Pa.),
IS36); 6th ed., revised by A. B. Keith (London, Stevens, 1929), vol. I,
pp.241-242.
320 J. Westlake, International Law (2nd ed.) (Cambridge, The University Press, 1910), part I, p. 265.
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218. The main argument in support of immunity of State
trading vessels has been that the mere fact that government
vessels are engaged in trading should not take away the
immunities enjoyed by public vessels. 321 This argument
presupposes the existence of a rule that immunity is
accorded to all classes of State vessels, which is simply
untrue historically. It should be noted, however, that in
some jurisdictions in which immunities have been recognized even for State ships employed in trade, two theories
have been advanced in explanation of such practice. First,
the position of ships is determined by that of their owners.
The criterion of State ownership is determinative of immunity. Public merchant ships are also included in the
category of "public property" (res publica, publicis usibus
destinata). This theory of "public property" had received
judicial countenance in the practice of British courts,
which have now denounced it. 322 According to this theory,
since States were exempt from foreign jurisdiction, their
public property was also immune, for a judicial process
against such property would directly implead the State
owning it. 323 The logic of that proposition reflected the
peculip"ity of the rules of British admiralty courts. It had
been held that, if the owner ofa ship could not be sued, the
ship could not be attached or arrested or proceeded against
in rem, nor could a maritime lien exist or come into being
during the continuing dominium or operation of that ship
by the foreign Government. This theory was first propounded by the Crown Advocate in The "Prins Frederik"
(1820). 324 It went back to the Roman law division of things.
Res publicae are things which lie outside commerce, extra
commercium quorum non est commercium, extra patrimonia. The advocates of this theory appear to have borrowed the Roman term without fully appreciating that
"public property" in the Roman sense means things which
are publicly owned. Moreover, they cannot be the subjects
of private rights and their use is open to the public at large.
It would also seem odd to regard ships actively engaged in
commerce as res extra commercium. The phrase publicis
usibus destinata (destined for public use) means in Roman
law that the property can be used by any member of the
public, and that no one can prevent another from using it.
A public merchant ship could not be open to the public like
ager publicus, highways or sea-shores. 325 In English law, the
term "public property" merely means that a State has an
interest in the property concerned, and the phrase publicis
usibus destinata means "employed by a State for public
purposes", or "in the public service of a State".326
321 See, for example, the opinion of Lord Justice Brett in The "Parlement beige" (1880) (see paragraph 149 above); W. Friedmann, "The
growth of State control over the individual and its effects upon the rules of
international State responsibility", The British Year Book ofInternational
Law (London), vol. 19 (1938), p. 118.
m See, for example, The "I Congreso del Partido" (1981) (see paragraphs 155-156 above).
323 See, for example, the opinion of Lord Atkin in The "Cristina "(1938)
(see paragaph 123, in fine, and paragraph 153 above).
32. See footnote 118 above.
m See, for example, the Institllles of Justinian, book 11.1: De rerum
divisione; book 11.4: De usu fructu; book 1ll.19: De inutilibus stipulationibus; and the Digest. book XLIIl.87: Ne quid in loco publico vel
itinere fiat.
326 See, for example, Juan Ysmae! & Co. Inc. v. Government of the
Republic ofIndonesia (1954) (see footnote 145 above), and the Hong Kong
Am'raji case (1953) (ibid.).
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219. The second theory is that of "State possession",
which found early acceptance in the courts of the United
States of America. Under this theory, the public property
of a State was exempt from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts provided that, and so long as, it was in the actual
possession of the foreign Government,327 regardless of the
fact that a ship had been employed in ordinary trading
voyages. Actual possession was believed to constitute sufficient evidence of public use or government service. This
theory is no longer followed in view of recent developments in the policy of the United States Government as
confirmed by legislation.
220. Both theories appear to have based immunity on the
public character of the functions, employment, service,
operation or purposes of ships. In England, for a long time,
the test of that "public character" had been that of the
foreign State and not of English judges. The varying nature
of the English tvst had led to the granting of immunity in a
number of commercial shipping cases. In the United
States, the test ~of "governmental function" had been the
"actual possession" of the property in question by a foreign
Government. 328
221. A third theory is the one recently propounded by
Mr. U shakov ;329 although without the support of concrete
evidence ofjudicial practice, it could be regarded as similar
to views held by certain Governments. This theory of
complete immunity is based on the principle of complete
sovereignty and equally of States and on the fact that the
origin of State immunity is also based initially on waiver of
jurisdiction, express or implied, or on the consent of the
State having territorial jurisdiction. It is conditional also
on the principle of reciprocity, and immunity itself, like
jurisdiction of a sovereign State, being an attribute of
sovereignty, can in the same manner be waived by an expression or implication of consent, or communication of
consent, express or implied. It will be seen how the various
theories, including this one, could be reconciled in a meaningful and objective approach to this difficult and delicate
question.
(b) Restricted immunity

222. It is generally agreed among writers holding a restrictive view of State immunity that State-owned and
State-operated ships are not entitled to jurisdictional immunities if employed by the State in commercial ventures.
Recently, publicists have increasingly adopted such a view.
Prominent among proponents of this thesis may be mentioned Bisschop,330 McNair,33I Sir Robert Phillimore,332
J27 See, for example, Berizzi Brothers Co. v. SS "Pesaro" (1926) (sec
paragraphs 157-158 above).
l28 See, for example, the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Republic of
Mexico et al. v. Hoffman (1945) (United States Reports. vol. 324 (1946),
pp.39-40).
l29 See footnote 318 above.
llO W. R. Bisschop, "Immunity of States in maritime law", The British
Year Book of International Law. 1922-23 (London), vol. 3, pp. 159 et
seq.
l31 A. D. McNair, "Judicial recognition of States and Governments and
the immunity of public ships", ibid.. 1921-22. vol. 2, pp. 67-74.
132 R. Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (3rd cd.)
(London, Butterworths, 1882), vol. II, pp. 140-141.
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G. G. Phillimore,333 Allen,334 Haycs,33S Hervey,m
Borchard,m Garner,338 Gidel,339 Bonfils and Fauchille,340
Ripert,34\ Fox,342 Nielsen, 343 Matsunami 344 and Watkins. 345
223. No fewer than six arguments have been put forward
in support of the proposition that State merchant vessels
should be subject to the jurisdiction of competent foreign
courts. It has been argued, in the first place, that even
assuming that a rule of customary international law existed
in the nineteenth century in favour of immunity for all
types of State ships, it is now no longer tenable that such a
rule could still have a general application. When the immunities of State ships became crystalized, it could not be
predicted that coastal States would soon become engaged
in maritime trade and employ their newly acquired merchant fleets side by side with private shipowners in commercial ventures. 346 There would appear to be a fallacy in
the assumption that a rule of law concocted to suit the
economic and social conditions of the nineteenth century
should still apply today, when not only circumstances, but
also theories and ideas are fundamentally different.
224. Secondly, a closer inspection of government merchant ships discloses some cardinal resemblances between
this class of public vessels and ordinary trading vessels.
Public merchantmen, in spite of State ownership and State
operation, possess the same intrinsic characteristics as private traders and are employed for the same commercial
purposes. The reasons for assimilating their legal position
to that of private ships of commerce seem stronger than the
lJ3 G. G. Phillimore, "Immunite des Etats au point de vue de la juridiction ou de l'execution forcee", Recueil des cours ... , 1925-lll (Paris,
Hachette), vol. 8 (1926), p. 461.
334 E. W. Allen, The Position of Foreign States before National Courts
(New York, Macmillan, 1933).
335 A. Hayes, "Private claims against foreign sovereigns", Harvard Law
Review (Cambridge, Mass.), vol. 38 (1924-1925), p. 599.
336 J. G. Hervey, "The immunity of foreign States when engaged in
commercial enterprises: a proposed solution", Michigan Law Review
(Ann Arbor, Mich.), vol. 27 (1927), p. 751.
331 E. M. Borchard, in a series of articles referred to by G. G. Phillimore,
lac. cit. (footnote 333 above), pp. 469-471.
338 J. W. Gamer, "Immunities of State-owned ships employed in
commerce", The British Year Book of International Law, 1925 (London),
vol. 6, p. 128.
m G. Gidel, Le droit international de la mer (Paris, Sirey), vol. II (1932),
pp. 337 et seq.
340 P. Fauchille, Traite de droit international public, 8th ed. (revised) of
Manuel de droit international public by H. Bonfils (Paris, Rousseau, 1925),
vol. I, 2nd part, p. 1116, para. 625 (Navires marchands d'Etat).
341 G. Ripert, in Revue internationale du droit maritime (Paris),
vol. XXXIV (1922), p. I; cf. G. G. Phillimore, lac. cit. (footnote 333
above), pp. 468-469.
342 W. T. R. Fox, "Competence of courts in regard to 'non sovereign'
acts of foreign States", The American Journal of International Law
(Washington, D.C.), vol. 35 (1941), pp. 632-636 and 640.
343 F. K. Nielsen, "The lack of uniformity in the law and practice of
States with regard to merchant vessels", ibid.. vol. 13 (1919), pp. 12-21.
344 N. Matsunami, Immunity of State Ships (London, Richard Flint,
1924); cf. The British Year Book of International Law. 1925 (London).
vol. 6, p. 239.
345 R. D. Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant (Baltimore (Md.), The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), pp. 189-191. See also S. A. Riesenfeld, "Sovereign immunity for foreign vessels in Anglo-American law", Minnesota
Law Review (Minneapolis, Minn.), vol. 25 (1940), pp. 7 et seq.
346 See, for example, van Praag, lac. cit .. 1935 (footnote 315 above, in
fine), p. 116.

argument that they should benefit from the immunities of
States originally accorded to men-of-war. There appears to
be no cogent reason for an ordinary vessel of commerce to
be accorded immunity by the mere circumstance that it is
owned or operated by a State. As Sibert suggested, public
vessels should be further subdivided, for the purposes of
immunity, into trading and non-trading vessels, public
trading vessels being subject to the local jurisdiction like
private ships.347
225. Thirdly, it seems harsh and inequitable to draw a
line of distinction, for the purposes of immunity, between
public and private merchant vessels, while States are in fact
competing with private shippers and shipowners. If it is
open to States to enter the market of maritime trade, they
should be placed on the same footing as other traders. The
mere fact of ownership or operation by a State should
provide no ground for distinguishing such public vessels
from trading ships. The trading character or the commercial nature of the operation of the vessels should be
sufficient to assimilate their position to that of private
merchan t vessels. 348
226. Fourthly, to allow proceedings in rein against
government ships employed in commerce is in no way inconsistent with the dignity, equality, sovereignty and independence of the States owning or operating the vessels,349
nor does it appear that permitting such proceedings will
interfere with the political arms of the Government in the
conduct of foreign relations. 35o
227. Fifthly, the ever-growing number of ships employed
by States in ordinary trading voyages is all the more reason
for restricting their exemptions from local jurisdiction. In
the interest of safe navigation, it would seem undesirable to
allow to navigate the seas so many vessels whose owners
are aware that these ships can never be arrested while in the
service of States, however negligently they may have navigated. 351 Furthermore, there is a danger that immunity
may operate to the detriment of States owning or operating
such merchantmen, for shippers will hesitate to trade with
them, and salvors will run few risks to save the property of
States, if these ships are to be exempt from the jurisdiction
of coastal States. 352
347 M. Sibert, "Les voies de communication en droit international publie", COllrs de droit. Paris (1953-1954) (mimeographed), pp. 181-185 and
203-204. According to Gidel, op. cit.. vol. I, pp. 98-99:

"Le critere essen tiel dont on s'inspire it I'heure actuelle pour c1asser
les navires et determiner leur statut juridique au point de vue du droit
international public est Ie genre de nal'igation" effectue par ces navires.
Ce qui importe. c'est leur affectation atelle ou telle activite et non pas la
qualite de leurs proprietaires, particuliers ou personnes pUbliques.
"
3" See. for example, E. D. Dickinson, "The immunity of public ships
employed in trade", The American JOllrnal of International Law
(Washington, D.C.), vol. 21 (1927), p. 108. See also The "Allualita "( 1916)
(footnote 181 above).
3'. In The "Cristina "(1938) (/oc. cit. (footnote 164 above), p. 521), Lord
Maugham posed the question: "Is it consistent with sovereign dignity to
acquire a tramp steamer and to compete with ordinary shippers and
shipowners in the markets of the world T'
350 According to Judge Mack, in The "Pesaro" (1921) (/oc. cit. (footnote
183 above). p. 485), "it seems improbable that in these days the judicial
seizure of a publicly owned merchantman like the Pesaro would affect our
foreign relations in any greater degree than the judicial seizure of a great
privately owned merchantman like the Aqllitania. "
);1 See the opinion of Judge Hill in The "Espozendc" (1918) (footnote
146 above) and in The "Crillldon" (1918) (ibid.).
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LaSt. but not least, there is the argument that world
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trJ f~~\\\hippers will ship their goods on public merchantWf for fear of accidents at sea and resulting loss of mermen disc with relatively little hope of salvage and without
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5.

AN UNDEVIATING TREND

"9 While there is no general agreement either in the
~~~l1ce of States or in international opinion as to the basis

(or n:ssels operated by States for commercial non-governnll'ntal purposes, there appears to have emerged a clear and
unmistakable trend in support of the absence of immunity
f,;r vessels employed by States exclusively on commercial
non-govcrnmental se~vice ..This t,rend ap.pears!o be ~n~e
\l3ting and reasserts Itself m all Its manIfestatIOns: m JUdICIal practice, in the traditionally "absolute immunity"
Jurisdictions, in legislation even in countries where the
most unqualified theory of immunity had prevailed, such
3\ the United Kingdom and the United States of America,
an the adoption of international conventions, such as the
1926 13russels Convention, and in other more general con\l'ntlons, such as the law of the sea conventions of 1958
and 1982. There seems to be emerging an inevitable trend
an national legislation recognizing the possibility of assimIlating the position of State-operated merchant vessels to
that of private merchantmen. Romania's decree-law No.
44J. of 20 November 1972,354 concerning civil navigation,
may also be cited as re-enforcing this undeviating trend. It
prll\'ides:
In

AnKle 103. The provisions of art ides 97, 100 and 101 do not apply
mtlltary vessels or to vessels in government service flying a foreign

I1J~

230. Writers whose opinions differed widely in the past
appear to have narrowed their differences. Contemporary
writers are more inclined to favour less unqualified immunity and sympathizers of the more absolute view of
immunity have begun to recognize important qualifications and limitations, such as the principle of reciprocity and the theory of implied consent or presumption
of wai ver by conduct, in addition to the significant restriction of express consent or explicit agreement. 355 A compromise solution could be found along these lines which,
while not completely satisfactory for all, might produce
(:l'nerally tolerable results.
.,' Sre Ihe opinion ofJudge Mack in The "Pesaro"(l 92 I)(footnote 183
Ihme).

'" ", , , no one can shut his eyes, now that the fashion ofnationalization
1\ III the air, to the fact that many States are trading ... with ships ... ; and if
:hc\c national ships wander about without liabilities, many trading affairs
",II hecome difficult; ... " (The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920,

1'" JS·39),

'" See United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities. , .,

P ~7,

." See, for example, Ushakov (footnote 318 above).
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C. Formulation of draft article 19
231. It is against this background of an undeviating trend
in favour of restricting State immunity with regard to
trading vessels operated by States on commercial nongovernmental service that draft article 19 should be formulated. Several elements of fundamental importance
should be noted and be taken carefully into consideration:
(a) The question of State immunity in respect of attachment and execution of its property as such is outside the
scope of article 19, for it belongs properly to part IV of the
draft articles- Immunities of State property from attachment and execution. Thus ships owned or operated by
States for commercial purposes, which form the subjectmatter of draft article 19, are not considered as public
property or property of the State for the purpose of execution of judgment against the State or attachment of
State property in a proceeding against the State.
(b) The question at issue concerns primarily the immunities of States from admiralty proceedings for public
vessels employed by them exclusively on non-governmental and commercial service.
(c) Such public vessels should not be accorded immunities from jurisdiction in proceedings in rem against the
vessels of their owners, the foreign States.
(d) Privately owned vessels operated by a State for commercial non-governmental purposes should not be accorded any immunity, although while under requisition or
charter to a foreign Government, they may be entitled to
some special treatment in respect of suspension of
measures such as seizure, arrest, detention or attachment
while in the public or governmental and non-commercial
service ofa foreign State. Proceedings in rem may certainly
be permitted against privately owned ships at all times,
although actual arrest, seizure, detention or attachment
would have to be suspended pending operation or employment by the State on governmental non-commercial service.

(e) A fortiori, proceedings in rem followed by arrest,
seizure, detention or attachment of privately owned vessels are generally permissible while they are in the service
ofa State, provided the nature of the service is exclusively
commercial and non-governmental.
(f) What has been said of vessels is also applicable to
cargo belonging to the State.

I.

ALTERNATIVE

A

232. Accordingly, draft article 19 might be couched in the
following terms:

Article 19. Ships employed in commercial service
1. This article applies to:
(a) admiralty proceedings; and
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the
subject of admiralty proceedings.
2. Unless otherwise agreed, a State cannot invoke
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immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another State
in:
(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to that
State; or
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such a ship if, at the time when the cause of
action arose, the ship was in use or intended for use for
commercial purposes.
3. When an action in rem is brought against a ship
belonging to a State for enforcing a claim in connection with
another ship belonging to that State, paragraph 2 (a) above
does not apply in regard to the first-mentioned ship unless,
at the time when the cause of action arose, both ships were
in use for commercial purposes.
4. Unless otherwise agreed, a State cannot invoke immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another State
in:
(a) an action in rem against a cargo belonging to that
State if both the cargo and the ship carrying it were, at the
time when the cause of action arose, in use or intended for
use for commercial purposes; or
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such a cargo if the ship carrying it was then in
use or intended for use as aforesaid.
5. In the foregoing provisions, references to a ship or
cargo belonging to a State include a ship or cargo in its
possession or control or in which it claims an interest; and,
subject to paragraph 4 above, paragraph 2 above applies to
property other than a ship as it applies to a ship.

2.

ALTERNATIVE

B

233. Draft article 19 could take a more simplified form,
on the model of article 12, and might read as follows:
Article 19. Ships employed in commercial service

1. If a State owns, possesses or otherwise employs or
operates a vessel in commercial service and differences
arising out of the commercial operations of the ship fall
within the jurisdiction of a court of another State, the State
is considered to have consented to the exercise ofthatjurisdiction in admiralty proceedings in rem or in personam
against that ship, cargo and owner or operator if, at the time
when the cause of action arose, the ship and/or another ship
and cargo belonging to that State were in use or intended for
use for commercial purposes, and accordingly, unless otherwise agreed, it cannot imoke immunity from jurisdiction in
those proceedings.
2.

Paragraph 1 applies only to:

(a) admiralty proceedings; and
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the
subject of admiralty proceedings.

ARTICLE 20 (Arbitration)

A. General considerations
1. SCOPE OF ARBITRATION

234. When a State agrees to submit a dispute or difference to arbitration, either in advance in a written agreement or on an ad hoc basis, it is interesting to examine the
extent to which that consent or agreement to submit to
arbitration may constitute an exception to the application
of State immunity. Clearly, arbitration is a well-known
method of pacific settlement onegal disputes. As such, it is
distinguishable from judicial settlement as a separate and
different method of dispute settlement. However, a closer
examination of procedures available in internal laws will
reveal the closest connection between arbitration and judicial settlement, even to the extent that there are areas
where the two methods of dispute settlement may and, in
fact, do overlap, ifnot completely coincide with each other.
In certain areas, the operation of one is inextricably linked
to the other. Arbitration may exist as a legal process in
court or out of court. As an out-of-court settlement, an
arbitral proceeding is still not entirely free from judicial
control, by way of judicial review, appeal or enforcement
order. Thus it could be misleading to suppose that arbitration is always to be viewed in contradistinction to judicial
settlement, or that the judiciary applies rules of law while
arbitration applies equitable rules. In reality, apart from
historical developments in English courts, law and equity
are applicable alike by the courts just as much as they are
by arbitral tribunals or by arbitration.
235. In view of the twilight zone which blurs the distinction between arbitration and judicial settlement, it is difficult to state precisely in what manner an agreement to
submit to arbitration constitutes submission to jurisdiction or an inevitable eventual waiver of immunity from
that jurisdiction. This, in turn, would appear to depend on
the link between the arbitration to which a State has agreed
to submit the dispute in question and the disposition of the
court to exercise its otherwise competent and available
jurisdiction. There are many types of arbitration, some of
which may be to a greater or lesser degree subject to the
control or under the jurisdiction of a court, or under judicial supervision, others being essentially part and parcel
of the judicial process of adjudication.
236. Having thus clarified the conceptual ambiguity inherent in this connection, it is still not easy to envisage the
interplay of the two analogous concepts. Just as a court of
law may appoint a commission of inquiry, ajury, or a panel
of experts or assessors, a panel of arbitrators could be so
appointed to consider certain questions assigned to it by
the court. The court might also be called upon to approve,
revise or enforce an arbitral award or judgment, as ifarbitration merely formed part of the pre-trial phase of a judicial process. It is perhaps because of their closeness that
the two notions cannot be sharply focused upon as distinct,
but rather as overlapping concepts, the court rising above
arbitration, which is inevitably eclipsed by the finality of
judicial prerogative. This overlapping of concepts, resulting in a certain confusion, gives rise to a tendency to equate
an agreement to submit to arbitration with consent to submit to jurisdiction. Arbitration could be viewed, at first
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sight, as an exception to the exercise of jurisdiction, almost
tantamount to exemption or immunity from the jurisdiction ofa competent court; but on reflection it could at best
operate only to postpone or temporarily suspend the exercise of jurisdiction and only eventually to confirm the ultimate submission to the jurisdiction or the expression of
choice of jurisdiction. In the final analysis, therefore, arbitration is more like an exception to jurisdictional immunity than a substitute for jurisdiction or an alternative
method of dispute settlement, as it may well be in the
regulation of differences between States or settlement of
disputes between Governments. Thus arbitration as a
notion has more than one meaning, depending on the type
of dispute and the status of the parties thereto. Arbitration
between States or Governments as a method of dispute
settlement is subject to public international law, while
international arbitration in which parties are of different
nationalities or in which there is a foreign element involved, whether or not one of the parties is a State, belongs
to the realm of internal law or private international law.
2.

TYPES OF ARBITRA nON

237. It is therefore not irrelevant to mention the different
types of arbitration in order to illustrate conceptual difficulties in an initial approach to the question of "arbitration" in relation to jurisdictional immunities of
States.
(a) Arbitration under internal law

238. The most common of all types of arbitration, having
the greatest relevance to the present study, is arbitration
under internal, domestic or municipal law, or indeed
national law, as opposed to public international law. In this
sense, the expressions "internal law" or "internal legal system" necessarily include the notions of private international law or of conflict oflaws. Arbitration under internallaw may take many forms. To take a simple example,
section 210 of Thailand's Code of Civil Procedure (B.E.
2477)356 provides:
In any case pending before a court offirst instance, the parties may agree
to submit the dispute, in reference to all or any of the issues, to one or more
arbitrators for settlement, by filing with the court ajoint application stating
the terms of such agreement.
If the court is of the opinion that the agreement is not contrary to law, it
shall grant the application.

239.

Under the Thai internal legal system, there are two
types of arbitration, viz. arbitration appointed by the cou~t
or within the court, and arbitration out of court. For arbItration in the court under section 210 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, section 218 requires the arbitrators "to file their
award with the court" and provides that the court "shall
give judgment in accordance therewith". However, if t~e
court is of the opinion that the award is contrary to law III
any respect, it shall have the power to issue an order refusing to confirm the award, or it may amend the award
Jl6 The 1934 Code was enacted on 15 June 1935; unofficial translation,
edited by Mr. Suchart Chivachart.
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within a reasonable time so as to confirm it by a judgment.

240. Section 221 provides that "where a dispute is submitted to arbitration out of court, if any party refuses to
abide by the award, such award may not be enforced unless
the court of territorial competence upon the request of the
opposing party gives judgment in accordance with the
award". It is further provided that "in such case, the court
of territorial competence shall be the court designated by
the parties in the agreement or, in the absence of such
designation, the court which would have territorial jurisdiction and competence to try and adjudge the dispute".

241. Thus both types of arbitration under the prevailing
legal system of Thailand, arbitration in court and arbitration out of court, are intimately linked to the existing
machinery of justice, the administration of which is in the
hands of the court in the name of the King under the
country's Constitution. The closeness of the linkage or
association with the court renders an agreement to arbitration equivalent to consent to the exercise ofjurisdiction by
the competent court.
242. In other internal systems, it is also conceivable that
there could be other types ohrbitration more or less connected with the framework of the judiciary or the system of
administration of justice, depending for implementation
and enforcement upon the existing machinery of justice.
Even in the most independent type of arbitration, whether
under internal law or in transboundary arbitration or international arbitration, the ultimate resort for enforcement is
open to the judiciary for satisfaction or implementation of
the award.
(b) International commercial arbitration

243. International commercial arbitration is but another
type of arbitration under national law or an internal legal
system, but in which the dispute involves a foreign element
or two parties of different nationalities. In the field of
commerce and trade, attempts have been made to provide
for uniform rules or procedures for the settlement of differences or disputes by commercial arbitration. 357 Thus
the International Chamber of Commerce 358 and the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)359 have also prepared model rules to be
adopted by parties seeking to settle their differences by
arbitration, generally covering, but not necessarily confined to, commercial activities.
(c) Arbitration for investment disputes

244. Another specific area in which international arbitration between private enterprises and government agen117 See P. 1. Benjamin, "The European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration", The British Yl'ar Book of Intemationa! Law,
1961 (London), vol. 37, pp. 478-487; International Union of Lawyers,
Inremationa! Commercia! Arbitration, rapporteur general P. Sanders,
vol. I (Paris, Dalloz et Sirey, 1956), vol. II (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,
1960), vol. III (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).
ll8 P. Sanders, "ECAFE rules for international commercial arbitration", II/temationa! Arbitration: Liber Amicorum filr Martill Domke, P.
Sanders, ed. (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 252.
119 See the report of UNCITRAL on the work of its twelfth session
(C"OI//lIlIwt/OJllInf Ilagf'.)

Documents of the thirty-sixth session

56

cies has grown in practice is the settlement of investment
disputes. 30o The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States. opened for signature at Washington on 18 March
1965,301 may be cited as an example of efforts to resolve
investment disputes between States and foreign nationals
by arbitration, which may be said to assume an international character, and whose award may depend for
judicial enforcement upon several jurisdictions, where
assets happen to be located or where enforcement
measures are available.
(d) International arbitration

245. International arbitration in the sense of inter-State
or intergovernmental arbitratiolJ is a method of pacific
settlement of disputes between nations or States under the
Charter of the United Nations. It can take many different
forms, with one or more arbitrators applying various rules
and different procedures. The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague is a striking example of an arbitral
institution with a permanent panel of arbitrators, from
which parties could propose or select international arbitrators. While international arbitration, being as such a
means of pacific settlement of disputes between States,
appears to lie outside the scope of the present study,362 an
award of such international arbitration may well derive its
force from municipal judicial authority for an eventual
enforcement measure, which incidentally forms the subject of the next part of the study and need not be further
discussed in relation to the present draft article.

3.

ARBITRATION CLAUSE

246. An arbitration clause or compromis is a clause in a
contract-in the present context a State contract, which
could be a contract of loan,363 a commercial contract, or
another type of transaction - whereby the parties, including the State or government agency, agree to submit a
dispute which has arisen or which may arise to arbitration
of one type or another, with or without an effective means
of enforcing the award. An arbitration clause depends on
the volition of the parties at the outset, but may become
obligatory or compulsory once the clause is adopted or
incorporated in a contract or loan or other commercial
transaction.

which tends to becloud the issue. A State agreeing to submit to arbitration is entitled to insist on settlement by or
through arbitration before judicial settlement. Should the
case be brought before a court, it is not always clear
whether the State could or should claim immunity from
the jurisdiction of the court. The answer to this question is
likely to depend on the stage of the proceedings, judicial or
arbitral, since in more ways than one an arbitral award is
essentially linked, in its initiation or enforcement, to judicial process. Of course, an agreement to submit to arbitration may operate to suspend or postpone the initial
exercise of jurisdiction by the court pending the appointment, examination and award of the arbitrators, especially
if the court in question is that of a State which recognizes
the type of arbitration to which parties have agreed to
submit their difference or dispute.
Thus, in 1982, in the arbitration case Maritime
International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of
Guinea (the latter being the appellant, and the United

248.

States of America the intervenor),364 the United States
Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant was immune
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of1976 365 and
that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm
the award, as the suits were between foreign plaintiffs and
foreign States. Had the court found itself with sufficient
original jurisdiction without conferment by the arbitration
clause in the contract, the question of immunity might
have been only temporarily postponed and the award judicially confirmed. The type of arbitration selected by the
parties was in conformity with the 1965 Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States. Such an agreement was not
considered as a valid waiver of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The connection between
the enforcement or confirmation of the arbitral award and
the agreement by Guinea to submit to arbitration was
severed by non-immunity as a condition to subject-matter
jurisdiction. To look at the decision in a different legal
context, the agreement to submit to arbitration did not
create new jurisdiction where none existed. If the decision
appears to complicate still further the confusion between
consent to arbitration and consent to the exercise of jurisdiction, it does clarify the distinction between agreement to
submit to arbitration and absence of judicial jurisdiction.

B. The practice of States
JUDICIAL PRACTICE

247. Judicial practice on the point under examination is
bound to be scanty, owing to the conceptual difficulty
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GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE

2.
State

(a) Nationallegis/ation

249. National legislation in the field of jurisdictional
immunities contains some reference to arbitration as an
exception to State immunity from the existing jurisdiction
of an otherwise competent court. An interesting provision

36,
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(1979), Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session,
Supplement No. 17 (Al34/17), paras. 57-70.
360 See, for example, American Society ofInternational Law, Proceed·
ings of the International Investment Law Conference (Washington (D.C.),
1956), part I, pp. 22-32; revised in The Business Lawyer (Chicago, Ill.),
vol. 12 (1957), pp. 264-271.
361 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 575, p. 159.
362 See, for example, Societe commerciale de Belgique. judgment of

37(

thq
15 June 1939, P. C.U., Series AlB, No. 78, p. 160; and the Socobelge case
(see footnote 242 above).
363 See, for example, M. Domke, "Arbitration clauses and international
loans", The Arbitration Journal (New York), vol. 3 (1939), p. 161.
See footnote 38 above.
365 See footnote 282 above.
364

371
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is to be found in section 9 of the United Kingdom State
Immunity Act 1978,366 which reads:
Exceptions from immunit),

9. (I) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which
has arisen, or may arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects
proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom which relate to the
arbitration.
(2) This section has effect subject to any contrary provision in the
arbitration agreement and does not apply to any arbitration agreement
between States.

250. Similar prOVlSlOns are found in section 10 of
Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance, 1981,367 section 11
of Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979 368 and section 10
of South Africa's Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981,369
and in the draft Australian legislation, Foreign States
Immunities Bill 1984. 370 Since consent of the State is all
that matters with regard to arbitral competence and may
imply, in some measure, submission to the jurisdiction
of a court, neither the United States of America nor
Canada has considered it necessary to include such a
provision in its legislation.
(b) International or regional conventions

(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity

(ii) 1923 Protocol on Arbitration Clauses

252. The Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, signed at
Geneva on 24 September 1923,373 provides, in article I, for
recognition of:
... the validity of an agreement whether relating to existing or future
differences between parties subject respectively to the jurisdiction of different Contracting States by which the parties to a contract agree to submit
to arbitration all or any differences that may arise in connection with such
contract relating to commercial matters or to any other matter capable of
settlement by arbitration, whether or not the arbitration is to take place in a
country to whose jurisdiction none of the parties is subject.

(iii) 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards

253. In a different context, but not entirely irrelevant to
the relationship between consent to submit to arbitration
and waiver or renunciation of jurisdictional immunity in
regard to judicial proceedings connected with the arbitration, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed at New York on
10 June 1958,374 contains provisions regarding, inter alia,
recognition of an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration (art. II) and recognition of arbitral awards as
binding and enforceable in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the State where the award is relied upon
(art. III).

251. The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 37t contains an interesting article 12,372 which reads as
follows:
Article 12
I. Where a Contracting State has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration a dispute which has arisen or may arise out ofa civil or commercial
malter, that State may not claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court
of another Contracting State on the territory or according to the law of
which the arbitration has taken or will take place in respect of any proceedings relating to:
(a) the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement;
(b) the arbitration procedure;
(c) the setting aside of the award,

unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides.

2. Paragraph I shall not apply to an arbitration agreement between
States.

See footnote 283 above.
See footnote 287 above.
]68 See footnote 288 above.
]69 See United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities ... ,
pp.37-38.
]70 See section 17 (footnote 290 above), which resembles more closely
the provisions of the 1972 European Convention.
]71 See Council of Europe, European Convention on State Immunity and
Additional Protocol (1972), European Treaty Series (Strasbourg), No. 74
(1972).
172 See the commentary to article 12, Council of Europe, Explanatory

57

3.

INTERNATIONAL OPINION

254. Leaving aside for the moment the question of
enforcement of arbitral awards or of foreign arbitral
awards by national courts, which will be taken up in part IV
of the draft articles on immunities from attachment and
execution, it is convenient at this juncture to note an
emerging consensus oflegal opinion favouring arbitration
as a means of settling international trade, loan or investment disputes. However, the extent ofconsent to submit to
arbitration, being regarded also as consent to the exercise
ofjurisdiction in appropriate circumstances,.is.a mat~er f~r
States to decide and agree upon. After all, It IS an Imphcation to be drawn from the expression of consent to submit current and future differences and disputes to arbitral
settlement in regard to possible exercise of existing jurisdiction in relation to the arbitration, from the appointment
of arbitrators and interpretation of arbitration clauses to
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 375

]66
]67

Reports on the European Convention on State Immunity and the Additional
Protocol (Strasbourg, 1972), p. 21.

4. AN IRRESISTIBLE IMPLICATION OF CONSENT

255. Once a State agrees in a written instrument to submit to arbitration disputes which have arisen or may arise
League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXVII, p. 157.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 330, p. 38.
37S See, for example, International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for
Martin Domke (op. cit.) (footnote 358 above).
]7]
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between it and other private parties to a transaction, there
is an irresistible implication, if not an almost irrebuttable
presumption, that it has waived its jurisdictional immunity in relation to all pertinent questions arising out of the
arbitral process, from its initiation tojudicial confirmation
and enforcement of the arbitral awards. A crucial point is
the existence of available jurisdiction which is competent
to consider the subject-matter, whether it be the appointme,:t or challenging of arbitrators, arbitral procedures, the
settmg aside or confirmation of an award, or judicial supervision of the arbitral process.

C. Formulation of draft article 20
256. In the light of the foregoing, draft article 20 might be
formulated as follows:

Article 20. Arbitration
1. If a State agrees in writing with a foreign natural or
juridical person to submit to arbitration a dispute which has
arisen, or may arise, out of a civil or commercial matter, that
State is considered to have consented to the exercise of
jurisdiction by a court of another State on the territory or
according to the law of which the arbitration has taken or
will take place, and accordingly it cannot invoke immunity
from jurisdiction in any proceedings before that court in
relation to:
(a) the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement;
(b) the arbitration procedure;
(c) the setting aside of the awards.
2. Paragraph 1 has effect subject to any contrary provision in the arbitration agreement, and shall not apply to
an arbitration agreement between States.

